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Abstract 
Roger W. Atkinson 
Information System's Project Management 
and the Phenomenon of Trust 
The aim of this research was to investigate how the continual low success rate of IS 
projects could be improved through an evaluation of success and failure factors. 
A literature review revealed a comprehensive but uncoordinated history of research 
into the identification of the critical factors. This proved to be inconclusive, but did 
indicate that project management contributed more to the failures than the technology. 
A model for expressing the complexity of IS project environments is proposed to aid 
project teams with their strategy. Also, the criteria for measuring success of both 
project management and IS projects has been extended. 
Although many disciplines had considered trust as a success factor, this was missing 
within the domain of project management. To examine the effect of trust in an IS 
project environment a game termed Project Paradox was designed and run. A lack of 
trust was found to be compounded by conflicting objectives inherent within IS 
projects. 
It is recommended that the issues relating to trust should be considered and managed 
as an integral part of a risk analysis. To enable this to be realised in practice a 
framework for a Trust Audit is proposed. The thesis concludes with a number of 
research initiatives aimed at improving the success rate of IS projects. 
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Chapter 1 
1.0 Introduction 
Accurate and timely information systems (IS) are becoming increasingly critical to the 
efficient and effective operation of public services, private organisations, the Government 
and the subsequent impact upon individuals. Implementing new, or changes to an existing IS 
are often managed using the structure ofprojects; that require a different set of skills and 
knowledge compared with traditional line or functional management. However, a problem 
was identified more than two decades ago by DeMarco (1982) who reported that the 
success rate for IS projects was low. In an attempt to understand this phenomenon, research 
studies have been conducted by for example, Cerullo (1980), Gobeh and Larson (1986), 
Pinto & Slevin (1987), Morris and Hough (1993), Ward (1994), Fortune & Peters (1995), 
Ballentine et. al (1996), Cavell (1998), and Wateridge (1996). The results from these 
researchers and other more recent reports from Cooke-Davies (2002), Pinto (2000), Gray 
(2001) and Yeo (2002) have generated views of what are believed to be the most likely 
success factors, from several diflerent perspectives. Some factors, such as the need for high 
user involvement, clearly defined objectives and senior management support are identified by 
more than one author. Despite the existing knowledge about IS projects, the success rate 
continues to be reported as low. 
1.1 Examples of IS Project Failures 
Public sector IS projects are subject to audit; the results that are published include 
information about these failures. Collins (1994) identified a number of Government IS 
projects that bave failed. Over afive-year period, the total cost of these failed projects was 
quoted at L5,000m. Table 1.1 provides an example of some the costs involved. 
Department costs 
DHSS E2 million 
customs L85 million 
House ofLords LIA million 
MoD L950 million 
Table 1.1 Examples of Government Failed IS/IT Prolects Source: CoUins (1994) 
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Other Government Departments that also reported having failed IS projects were the 
National Audit Office, Police, Inland Revenue, Foreign Office, Department of He" Royal 
Art Collection and Trade and Industry. The broadcast by Collins (1994) included figures 
from the Public Account Conunittee that suggested 8 out of 9 major of the UK 
Government's IS projects were failing. 
Flowers (1996) conducted a study that sought to review failed information technology (IT) 
projects in both the public and private sectors. Some researchers use the term IT when 
describing IS projects that are supported by technology-, often referred to as ISAT projects. 
Sonie ofthose projects studied by Flowers (1996) are listed in Table 1.2 below. 
The Performing Right Society PROMS Cost LI lm JESm wasted 
The California Department of Motor Vehicles L293m project was halted 
Computerised reservation system E142m write off 1993 
London stock exchange TAURUS project cancelled L75m wasted. 
Tablej. 2 ITPr-oiect Faflures Source: Flowers (1996) 
Gallagher (1995) reported exxTIes, of project Mures Mowing a major research study by 
the Standish Group, who investigated the numbers and associated costs of failed IS projects 
in the United States of America (USA). Table 1.3 provides a summary of the Standish Group 
results. 
Only 16 % dprojects started, are successful 
52.7 % of projects are 189% over budget 
Average overrun on time is =% 
3 1% of IS projects are cancelled before oomPlete 
TableM IS Project Faflures in the USA Source: GaUagher(1995) 
Some ofthe fmdings indicated that in 1994 the USA invested more than $250bn each year on 
175,000 projects. From these, $81bn would be lost due to cancelled IS projects and $59bn in 
cost ovenuns. 
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Four years following tile original Standish Group findings, the study was repeated. Scollick 
(1999) reported the analysis of those results taken from the 2,400 projects, focus groups, 
interviews and group sessions from the follow up research. The results indicated that in the 
four years between 1994 and 1998 the number of IS projects which were completed but 
missed an objective such as they were late or over budget had I... remained about the same' 
also that IS projects continued to fail, and that the '... rate of success was not improving'. 
Therefore, despite the research that has been carried out the success rate of IS projects has 
not improved. In the majority of cases the reasons and suggested causes ofthose failed IS 
projects were attributed to some aspect ofproject management, rather than a failure of the 
ISAT used. 
In order to verify the problem of failed projects, for three consecutive years during the early 
stages of this research, examples of reported failed IS project were collected from the 
Computing Journal. Those have been compiled into Tables 1.4,1.5 and 1.6 respectively and 
illustrate how the press frequently keep IS failures in the public eye. There is, therefore, 
evidence that both public and private sectors have examples of failed IS projects. 
One observation to be made from the examples in the Computing Journal is that almost an 
projects publicised have been from the public sector. Why should this be? Is it that public 
sector IS projects are more likely to result in failure thm those in the private sector? 
One answer to these questions could be the openness in which the public sector operates. 
The public sector is required to make available to public scrutiny the results from the auclits 
of their IS projects. The National Audit Office and the Public Accounts Conmittee would 
finther investigate spectacular failures. 
It is also possible to indicate how some government projects are more likely to fail from the 
start. For example, the Government can introduce new legislation that requires an IS to be 
implemented within a fixed date. Given unlimited resources available to such projects it may 
be possible to meet a pre-defined target date. However, in reality those Government projects 
would also have a limited set of resources. Thus, by fixing the time for delivery while having 
limited fimding and staff, the probability of success is naturally reduced. 
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4 Jan National Blood Transfusion System. Hours after letting L5m contract estimate was possibly I 001/o inaccurate 
18 Jan LM RAF Logistics project L400m possible loss am stage 300% over estimate 
I Feb Police Forces V IBM National Automated Fingerprint Identification system (NAFIS) fl. 25m, damages awarded 
8 Feb Performing Rights Society (PROMS) to collect royalties LIK musicians and publishers, L16m damage claim against 
U3Ms for poor preject. management 
28 Mar Barclays Registrars System fl2m to develop failed to achieve standards to connect with CREST 
4 Apr & 22 Aug Magistrates Courts Standard Specification QvIASS) 6yn cost L45m cancelled 
18 Apr NHS Hospital Information System (HISS) Estimate first 3 systems 2 years atUrn actual cost E32m 
25 Apr Project ABC National Australian Bank (NAB) estimate VOin actual f: 200in stopped after I of 4 implemented 
16 May DIEE Teachers Pension Agency Cost U7m supplied by Hoskyns reported to have failed to deliver a workable 
system in a reasonable time project terminatedL 
13 Jun 96 DTI unveils guide to stop procurement disasters 
25 Jun Child Support Agency (CSA) cost f 10in project likely to be sa-apped 
4JuI NHS numbers project Cost ElOrn to create unique number for babies, extra f4m needed to make work, after 6 
month 7,500 duplicate numbers were created, 500 duplicates in I week 
25 JW European Space Agency (ESA) Ariane 5 self destructed after 39 seconds oflaunch, No test ever conducted, no 
single person in charge, project manager error. 
I Aug ICL charged fl. 6m for failed community charge software to St Albans City and District Council 
8Aug96 RAFIIts V00m Logistics Project RAF considers bale-out overincpt'IBM Lits management 
15 Aug 96 Civil servants jeopardise rr projects 
22 Aug 96 Big bang policy blamed for PH pr6ject failures 
19 Sep Driver and VeJiicle Licensing Agency (DVLA) ghosting problem, 6 cars found with same registration number 
26 Sep L8.6 in Police National Computer (Phoenix) contract paid in full before start 3m records to be iriptit at 46,000 per 
day, actual 765.7,000 per day After 300,000 records input project cancelled 
27 Oct DSS Drops E25in Analytical Services Statistical hffirmation Systems (ASSIST) 2yrs into a 10 yr. project 
7 Nov 1996 Hyder writes offL35m spend on IBM Welsh supcr-utility Croeso L100m customer services 
14 Nov 96 IBM trips on rodcy road ofprcject management, f45m Lits. 
28 Nov Law SocietyNational Solicitors data base'scandalous mess' Estimate EMm actual 00m pow project 
management 
12 Doe 1996 Executive in the firing line for over-ambitious Hiss Hospital information systems trial Nottingham trial was a 
complete waste oftime and money- L30m wasted 
Table 1.4 Computing: Montblv Revorting of Fafled Proiects 1996 
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30 Jan DSS warned by Select Caninittee to improve Benefit Fraud detection system before new Government Payment 
Card System costing f1bi%eg. 14% of child benefit claims have no National Insurance Number (NIN) 
20 Feb Inland Revenue could cost twcpayers up to f-6W, 000 afteT sending out up to 20,000 unnecessary demands for 
interest to diosc who had paid by the correct datc. 
6 March Wand Revenue confesses to a system blunder admitting flut it mismanaged the computer generated mailing to 
the first wave of sel Passessing taxpayem 
3 April Government Child Support Agency (CSA) computer system costing L600171 to be saWPed after Government 
admitted the need for a new system. CSA and the contractor EDS blamed the intrWucdon of an early new DSS 
10 April MoD reports that almost f4m ofammunition. may have fallen into the wrong hands after a computerised 
accounting system failed to keep up with operations in Bosnia. 
24 April Police Finger print recognition system. A consortium of37 police fo= won fl. 2m from. IBM UK over failure 
to develop a fingerprint recognition system did attained only 40% accuracy rates compared with the 70*/o target. LK 
longest running rr legal dispute escalated to be worth 03m. 
I May Department for Fýducation and Employment (DEP received an undisclosed settlement from Hoskyns (Cap 
Gemini) afkr the Public Account Cominittee accused them for 'causing assessment delays' in a U7m contz-ad'. 
I May Wlddx=d Beer CAxnpany lost Elm over a fixed price data warehousing project, delayed for 12 months reported 
due to'project was badly specified and badly managed'. 
I NW Privatised Electricity Systems fficed delay, Logica warned Office: ofElectricity Regulation (Offer) delivery date for 
software had slipped. Also Cap Gernini describe deadline to deliver 25m electricity accounts as 'tigit'. A source closely 
connected to utilities deregulation said ' No-am listerring to warnings'. 
26 Jun Price Waterhouse IT Directors Report UK Financial survey overall 250/6 of firms reported a success rate less than 
50010 
24 Jul DoT to cancel 00 m contract after years ofdelay for a project to register planned road works for UK Utilities 
Users tell government they have lost confidence in DIGITAI: s ability to deliver. DIGITAL say they delivered to a 
specification agreed by DoT. 
21 Aug MoD systern hit by 7-year delay. RN Joint Tactical Information Distribution System costing L205m. Reported 
waste of; E2b from armuaI f9b defence budget due to delays caused by bureaucracy. 
25 Sep Ndland Electricity dump an MM billing system which had tak: en 5 years to develop 6 months before the new 
Deregulation of suppliers to start. Cbriti-act termination under way, Mdland Elec. says IBM not to bla= 
16 Oct. Big 4 retail banks say 15 years ofIT investment has failed to raise profitability mid made them more vulnerable in 
the market place. Poor cost benefit analysis blamed as key contributory factor. 
13 Nov. Alarming data loss hits NHS rc=&. One acample describes a hospital IT system backed up cancer research data 
weekly, deleted the original and discovered the bwk up had failedL 
18 Dec Crown Prosecution Services CPS scrap a budgeted t8m court system, whidi had taken 7 yews and: EI 6m 
expenditure to build. 
Table 1.5 Computing: Monthly Reporting of Failed Profects 1"7 
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29 Jan Home Office and nationality Directorate L70m system flices delay. Deal was a Private Fmance 
Initiative PF1 so contractor Siemens will not see benefits until pr6ject is complete and will incur financial penalties in the 
form of lost monthly revenue. Reason for delay, extra time required testing system before real casework could begim 
19 Feb Air traffic control centre Swanwick L35(kn project, 2-year delay caused by a series of software hitches. 
5 Mar Microsoft rejects first project from Bill Gates private investment in Cambridge University. Anti thcft tedmlogy 
decided by Microsoft to be too big brother. System designers were tying to design a *s= that was the exact opposite. 
2 Apr Prime Minister Tony Blair announced costs off400m for Central Government to complete millcrinitan projects. 
This figure is 300% bigger dm before. An estimate suggests final cost could be 30Wo more than the latest L400m. 
2IMay 1000 custorners exposed to p&=tial credit card frauil. Worldwide Computer Auctions web site had direct link to 
company database giving credit card details. 
4 June Report ofthe Crown Prosecution Service CPS abandoned case macking service; system was 3 years late and 100% 
over budget. 
2 July Nat West banks in-house software upgrade prcject to 5000 PCs on 300 servers had a'glitch' resulting in 1,750 
branches fiorn being able to provide information to customers. Software upgrade generated repeated requests for services 
uatil the system overloaded and crashed. 
6 Aug Barclays Bank Gloucester data centre system crashed closing down cash machines after a systems upgrade pioJect 
was hstalled with the o1jectivcs of increase capacity and improved reliability. 
3 Sep. Fox Meyer declared Million bankrupt attempt to claim S500m claim form producers of SAP after mis- 
representation oftheir integrated package software which could only deal with 6 warehouse invoice systems compared 
with stated 23. 
22 Oct project by Microsoft to increase the desk top opei-ating *stems share of internet accused of72 anti-trust cases by 
US Department of Justice am 20 State Attorney Gcrxxals. Case alleges A third party America on Line were approached 
asking 'how much do we need to pay you' with a view of 'screwing-up'Netscape. 
5 Nov MoD project Trawictman a system for the intelligence staffproduced by Dam Sciences loses 04million. Project 
started in '95 was released in'98. Project was late and declared already obsolete. Original specification failed to identify 
links to od= computer based infmr-ation systems. 
17 Dec Assistant Director ofcarnpaign group Taskforce 2000 warris a year before rrifflenniurn IT projects will fail through 
4a sceriario, ofdeath by attrition' the sheer scale of upVadm planned for 1999 will cause a logjam. 
Table 1.6 Computing: Monthiv Revortine of Failed Proiects 1998 
On the other hand, when IS projects fail in the private sector, there is no mechanism or 
incentive in place to automatically record and publish those failures, which in any event 
could prove damaging to investor confidence. Despite this, there have been some reports for 
IS project Mures in the private sector. For example, the TAURUS project that aimed to 
reduce the flow of paper in the transaction of buying and selling shares was documentedL It 
could be argued that the publication of faMures within business would be detrimental to the 
image of the companies and morale of the staff involved, which in turn could reduce share 
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prices. The high incidence ofreported fidled public sector projects, compared with reported 
private sector projects, does not therefore necessarily rellect a corresponding percentage of 
fafled IS projects whhin the two differerA sectors. 
1.2 Comparison of IS Projects with Other Disciplines 
While IS related journals such as Computing report IS project failures, the national press 
publish what could be classed as significant or spectacular failures. These would include such 
as The London Ambulance Service (LAS), or the London Stock Exchange project 
(TAURUS), demonstrating that IS projects are not unique in failure. The national press have 
reported some high proffie projects, other than IS that were said to have failed, Table 1.7 
shows some of the examples. 
TheNewLondon Library reported 10 years late and well over budgeL 
The fht French nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, taldng 14 years to complete at a cost off4bn was too short 
for planes to land by a length of 12 feeL 
Four months afier a il 00m Newbury Bypass road was opened with a new surfim designed to reduce spray 
and vehicle noise, aq)ected to last 10 years, the surface cracked with repairs estimated at millions of 
additional pounds. 
Table 1.7 Examples of Proiect Failurvs None ISAT 
Research by Morris and Hough (1993) reported that as far back as 1975 the US Congress 
General Accounting Office reported that federally fimded projects were 'ovemmning on 
average 75% while the overrun on $I bn was over 140%'. By 1982 those costs had 
increased to an average overrun of 140% and for projects over $Ibn the overrun was 189%. 
Table 1.8 contains a limited number of examples from the Morris and Hough (1993) study 
which indicates that other sectors in addition to IS, were experiencing some difficulty in 
achieving success. 
It can be argued, using the secondary evidence presented above, that projects in general are 
prone to faflure and that IS projects specifically have been identified as having higher than 
average failure rates. Failed Public Sector projects are reported because of the requirement 
of open govenmnient. However, there is no research to suggest that the faflure rate of 
government projects is any different to those in private organisations. 
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Projects studied Numbers Overrun 
World Bank 1,014 30-40% cost 
US nuclear plants 42 190-3,9WO/o cost 
Oil projects 20 10-7800/a cost 
US weapons 22 200-30(r/o cost, 
1 30-50% schedule 
Tablel. 8 Costs of Project Failures None ISAT Source: Morris and Hough (1993) 
While IS project failures are documented, there appears to be no equivalent reporting of 
successful projects. For exarMle, copies of the report concerning the failed London 
Ambulance System are readily available (Wiffiams 1993), while reports concerning project 
successes are mt avaflable. 
A reason whyfidlures are reported but success is ignored could be due to success being the 
expected outcome, while failure is not. It is also easier to identify and fink factors with failure 
9= to identify reasons or causes for success. Some factors may have been undertaken in the 
course of a successful project, but were either unknowingly nugatory or could not be linked 
directly to the success. Simply because a risk analysis was carried out prior to a successful 
project does not provide the evidence that the project would not have been successful had 
the risks not been identified. 
The Standish Group research, for example, identified the chance of success being a factor of 
the average cost ofprojects, with higher cost projects having a lower chance of success. 
Their results are shown in Table 1.9. 
Company Average cost of projects % Success 
Large W22,000 90/0 
Medium $1,331,000 16% 
SmaU $434,000 28% 
Table 1.9 Success bv Development Costs Source: GaUagher (1995) 
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The total financial losses due to a fiffled IS project are however likely to be greater than 
those reported. When failure occurs, limited financial resources are wasted. That waste is 
usually calculated as the actual direct cost expended on the failed project. Other indirect 
costs would also have been incurred due to a failed IS project; for example the opportunity 
costs. Gallagher (1995) further reported from the Standish Group study that the '... costs of 
these failures and overruns is just the tip of the proverbial iceberg' that in total could be 
costing '... trillions of dollars'. These are the wasted finances and resources which have 
been caused as a by-product of failure. 
1.3 Research Objectives 
The wasted opportunities and consequential loss caused by the failure to implement 
successful IS projects are a real concern for all the stakeholders involved and provided the 
rationale for this research. The aimý was to understand how the low success rate of IS 
projects could be improved. Since the factors of project management, rather than the IT, 
, diagher had been identified as the most likely reasons for failure by researchers such as c 
(1995) and Wateridge (1996), the research would focus into this area in more detail. 
Consequently, an extensive literature review was conducted into, project management, 
management and inforrnation systems. An analysis of thosefindings are presented in 
Chapter 2. Following the initial literature review, the first research objective was: 
* To identify factors and criteria in IS project mamgement whick could lead to 
project success. Following the analysis and evaluation of the resultsfrom thefirst 
objective and after afurther literature review, with afocus on trust the second 
research objective was: 
e To understand the likely impact that trust in project teams would have on the 
success of IS projects. This led to the development of a Trust A udit. 
1.4 Research Approach 
The details of the research methods and data populations for this work are presented in 
Chapter 3. However, it was felt important initially to identify the epistemology position of 
this research, by stating which part of reality it was believed the research was addressing. 
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Since the environment from where the data were collected focused on IS projects, it was 
considered reasonable to position this work within the accepted knowledge domain of IS 
research as defined initially by Mumford et al (1985). A more detailed description of the 
ontology (Le. the things) within the IS domain that combine to become the epistemology of 
IS knowledge are discussed in Chapter 3. 
7he sequence of the research is presented in Figure I. I. 
Initial literature search 
1. Identification of rescarch topics 
Thist identified as a possible gap in 
e project management litwdture 
Questionnaire survey directed at Factors of successfifl projects were 
successfiii projects to identify the identifiedL An extended framework of 
factors and criteria involved. Also to criteria to measure IS project success 
obtain initial perceptions and beliefs was developed, 'The Square Route'. 
about trust in project teams. Possible influence oftrust in project 
I teams and vroiect success. 
xnd literature search with a focus Outcome: 
trust taken from other disciplines. Understanding the behaviour of 
velopment ofncw simulation to 'Project Paradox! when the decisions 
t for trust in project teams. Testing ofwhether teams would co-opemte 
new game using *mffietic data. were taken by chance. 
I 
nning Project Paradox with real Outcome: 
A, simulating both co-located and A Trust Audit fi-amework for IS 
tn"Med project teams. Comparing 
Jpr6ects 
is developed and presented. 
se results widi synthetic data and The summary and conclusions ofthe 
nparing the results with the findings from diis research are given 
Tature. with suggestions for these to be 
transfxred into the work place and 
for finther research. 
Figgre 1.1 Structure used for this Research 
1.5 Structure of the Remaining Chapters 
The content of the remaining Chapters is as follows. Chapter 2 presents the analysis and 
discussion of the secondary literature. The topics discussed were IS, managenxmt and 
project management. The analysis and evaluation of IS and project management were not 
trust taken from other disciplines. Understanding the behaviour of 
velopment ofncw simulation to 'Project Paradox! when the decisions 
t for trtist in project teams. Testing ofwhether teams would co-operate 
: new game using *mthetic data. were taken by chance. 
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conducted to a point where the decomposition of each term became so detailed that the 
uniqueness ofthe meaning of IS project management became lost. Included in Chapter 2 are 
two outputs generated from this research. These interim findingloutputs were published in 
Atkinson (1997) and Atkinson (1999). The output from the literature search was used to 
select the domains for the questionnaire. 
Chapter 3 descd)es the research nieffiods used for this study and justification is given for 
their selection. These describe the development ofthe research questionnaire and the 
population within which the survey was conducted. 
Chapter 4 contains the analysis of the responses from the questionnaire survey of stage 1. A 
significant Ending from the questiormaire was centred on the subject of trust. The topic had 
not appeared in the project management literature but had been identified in other 
disciplines. The omission oftrust from the debate in IS project management was considered 
a potential weakness, which provided the focus for stage 2 of this study. 
Chapter 5 contains a review of the literature involving trust from other disciplines, and 
provides a discussion ofthe possible inipact oftrust upon project success. The evaluation of 
the trust literature identified that the t)W of trust involved in project teams was inextricably 
linked with the co-operative and collaborative intentions and behaviour of the team 
members. It was established that testing for such behaviour was possible and lead to the 
design, development and testing ofa project game, called Project Paradox. 
Chapter 6 provides a detailed discussion of bow Project Paradox, the new research 
instrument, was developed. The behaviour of Project Paradox was observed when 
simulations were run using random data as input into various playing sh-ategies. The outputs 
from these were later cornpared with the results obtained when teams took part in Project 
Paradox. 
Cbapter 7 presents the analysis and evaluation of the results obtained from running Project 
Paradox. The ramifications oftrust for the success of IS projects were discussed. 
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In Chapter 8a fi-arnework is presented to indicate how a trust audit could work in practice 
(including the use ofthe business garne Project Paradox). Also discussed is how 
organisations could use the findings from this research to inform company policy directed 
towards increasing the success rate for IS projects through irnproved project management 
practices. 
Chapter 9 provides the summary, evaluation and conclusions of the key findings together 
with reconunendations for further research. 
1.6 Summary 
This Chapter bas discussed the high failure rate of IS projects and identified some of the 
research already undertaken into this problern. Examples, giving the numbers and costs of 
continuing failures indicated the scale of the problczn and provided the rationale for tHs 
research. The aim ofthe research was to investigate how the low success rate of IS projects 
could be improved; this resulted in 2 specific research objectives being stated. Finally a brief 
statement was made regarding the Justification. of the research approach While Figure 1.1 
illustrated the structure used for this research. 
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Chapter 2 
2.0 Literature review 
2.1 Introduction 
To support the two-stage research approach, the literature review is presented in Chapters 
2 and 5. Chapter 2 underpins stage 1, the evaluation of which infornied the design of the 
questionnaire. The literature review for stage 2 led to the design and administration of 
Project Paradox, which is discussed in Chapter 5. 
This literature review for stage I covered three topics: 
information systems, 
management, 
project management. 
This was done in order to scope and focus the remaking sections and indicate whether 
there were any possible gaps in the literature in respect of IS failures. The evaluation of the 
literature did reveal that project management had adopted several general management 
factors. However, the domain oftnist, which was identified in the geneml management 
literature, had not been considered as a possible success factor for project management. 
That was the first itidication that there existed a gap in the project management literature. 
Questions relating to mist were, therefore, included in the questiomaire for stage 1. 
One ahn of the literature search was to investigate the reasons for the low success rate in IS 
projects. The outcome of this research indicated that the failures may not be linifted to the 
previously identified success factors being incorrectly undertaken, but also due to some 
additional factor(s) not yet identified (Atkinson 1997). 
The project management literature search also included a review of how success and failure 
ofIS projects were measured orjudged. This resulted in a further research output, referred 
to as the 'Square Route', (Afldnson 1999) which is discussed in detail in Section 2.10.5. 
The 'Square Route' contained 3 additional sets of criteria against which the success of IS 
projects could be measured, in addition to a limited set of criteria, collectively referred to as 
the Iron Triangle: cost, quaity and time. Data were collected using an open question via 
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the questionnaire during stage I to identify the range of criteria the respondents use to 
measure success in order to map their responses against the criteria set out in the 'Square 
Route'. The following sections provide details ofthe three topics starting with IS. 
2.2 Systems 
Systems play a major part in IS structures. Thftking about systems and how organisation 
structures could be considered as systems was studied by (Beer 1985). That early work 
recommended '... dissolving rather than solving problems' by putting an organisation's 
procedures in cybernetic order. Beer (1985) believed that managing systems was 
complexity that could be measured by a loose portmanteau variable' he termed 
6variety'. 
Beer (1985) saw a relationship between 'management, operators and the environment'. 
That relationship required channels for the flow of infortnation to be in place. Even when 
those information channels were in place, Beer (1985) suggested the axiom that the 
'variety, of the environment would always be greater than the 'operators' that serve it, 
while in turn the operators' will exceed the 'management' which attempt to control or 
regulate them. The relevance for project management is that the profession will always be 
in catch up mode, never in full control- Some mistAes or failures are therefore to be 
expected, with the temporary nature of projects simply making the problem more volatile 
and difficult to achieve success. 
2.2.1 Systems Structures 
Systems within an organisation can be considered as structured, semi-structured or un- 
structured. The movement between these three levels can be considered in systems terms as 
a requirement to be both effective and efficient. In structured systems e. g. early pay-roll or 
stock control, the aim was to become more efficient. Efficiency was achieved by doing 
more with the same resources or doing the same with reduced resources. Early IS project 
strategies did not question whether this was the most effective system (Le. correct). 
The derived information available through the use of feedback loops from structured 
systems was used to aclieve an increase in efficiency. This enabled semi-structured and 
unstructured systems to support 'what-if type questions to be answered, thus helping 
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numagement to make informed decisions where the logic was un-structured. That is to say, 
unlike a structured system where facts and figures are known in advance, un-structured 
systems enable people to use flair and intuition, where fuzzy logic does not allow the 
precision used in deduction from a given set of data or facts. 
The IS projects which project management implement can be involved in one or more of 
the systems levels. The efficiencies achieved from the early structured projects are often 
now being re-considered in terms of helping organisations with increased effectiveness, 
doing the right things with improved decision making. 
Checkbnd (1985) and Wilson (1984) also studied Fystems and introduced the idea of 'hard' 
and soft, systems. Checkland (1985) produced a topology for underst=ding systems and 
LqbeRed thein as: 
Design physical (e. g. boats), 
Design abstract (e. g. mathematical models), 
Natural (e. g. biological systems) and finally 
Human activity (all aspects). 
Cbeckland (1985) suggested the Human activity syVem required a dfferent method of 
analysis and understanding to the other types of system. To help with that process the Soft 
Systems Methodology (SSM) was developedL IS projects include Human activity system 
and the SSM method is used by project, systems and design stafE When studying 
structured systems an analysis method called structured systems analysis and design 
methodology SSADM is used. One methodology for use by project managers is Projects in 
Controlled Environments (PRINCE), now at version 2 (Bentley 1998). 
The systems thý&ing concepts have been developed into a method of understanding failure. 
Fortune and Peters (1995) used the systems thinking ideas when they created a systems 
approach to learning from Ulures, in contrast to other faihire analysis techniques which 
they considered less accurate. For example Fortune and Peters (1995) descnibed the official 
enquiry as a method from which lessons could be learned as '... very thorough but slow, 
cumbersome and expensive' and I... intends to concentrate on individual aspects of failure 
rather than considering it as a whole and investigating inter-relationships. It could, 
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therefore, be reasonable to suggest that IS project management is a combination of design 
physical and human activity systems. The research questionnaire included questions about 
the use of both systems and project management methodologies used in successful projects 
to see ifthere were any indications that they were associated with project success. 
211 Information Systems 
A study by Porter (1985) described how business could be considered to be under attack 
from threats and produced a model called the 5 Force model to represent the idea. The 
forces were: 'New entrants' to the market place, 'Substitute products or services' which 
can replace existing products, 'Suppliers' who can manipulate prices and restrict the supply 
of products, 'Buyers' who can exert pressures through economy of scale purchasing and 
'Rivalry' from similar positioned organisations. The 5 Force model was generic to any 
organisation. Robson (1997) tailored that 5 Force model to IS projects with the intention of 
identifft opportunities where Porter (1985) viewed only threats. 
P. New entrants R Ca" IScreate 
barriers to entry? 
P. Competitive it 
P. Suppliers Background -ff P. Buvers 
S 
C 
R KC I Can IS change 
) 
I; L Can IS help T si" , The basis of R Can IS 
the customer p titloj Com Competition? increase the 
to dominate cost to the buyer 
the supplier? ofswitching 
P. Substitute R Can IS suppliers? 
vroducts generate new 
services products and services 
to reduce exteral 
Substitutions? 
FiL-ure 2.1 Robsons Adaptation of Porters 5 Force Model Source: Robson (1997) 
P= Porters original ideas R= Robson's adaptabon to IS 
Pamns 0 996) classified 6 different tAxs of strategy an organisation could consider and 
how IS projects should be using thern to obtain the possible benefits. These strategies were 
devised to enable the project rnanager to understand how organisations viewed the IS 
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projects to be hTlemented that in turn would indicate the criteria against which the project 
would be judged. Those 6 different strategies are described below in Table 2.1. 
Leading edge. IS are believed to be the driving force for the business placing a high risk on new and 
possibly untested ideas. 
A free rziarket IS are viewed in an organisation. as a profit centre which can withstand external competition, 
possible problem is the exierrial. competition may at some time prove a better business option with resulting 
in the IS dept being outsourced. 
Monopoly. No external competition IS seen as part ofan organisation, possible problem IS dept are single 
source and in a strong position to block new ideas 
Necessmy evil. IS are not considered important to the organisation. Resources and staff development not 
therefore seen as important 
Centrallyplanned IS are included when organisational changes are planned and are seen as an integrative 
part ofthe system, not an unwanted overhead. 
Scarce resource. IS are limited by fimding with" real reason an judged by cost/beriefit criteria. Best 
benefits may not be allowed to surface due limited resources. 
Table2.1 ISStrateldes Source: Parsons (1996) 
The strategy developed for an organisation is one of the driving forces for the selection of 
the type of is project required. Ifat the start of a project the most appropriate strategy is 
not selected, the cbance of a successful project is already reduced. 
It could be argued, that a project manager may be directed to inplement an IS that is not 
the best strategic choice. Such an error at the strategic level could point the project in the 
wrong direction with stakeholders who are not fiiUy committed. A contributory reason for 
some failed projects could be an incorrect strategic decision for the choice of systems and 
infortimfion requirements, and not a fArre of the project management, or the resultant 
system. However, While the implementation of IS should be based upon an appropriate 
strategy, it may be nained by poor project management. On the other hand, a poor strategy 
is very unlikely to be corrected by good project mariagement. 
For exarMle, a stmtcgy xnay indicate savings could be rnade by using an IS which would 
improve the efficiency vAthin an organisation. TypicaRy, removing a number of routine, 
mecbanistic vype work, associated with early pay-roll systems, would fit into this category. 
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Iý on the other band, a strategy indicates those in middle management need support for 
decision making, the IS required would need to be an effective not efficient system. 
The author has demonstrated in Figure 2.2 bow different strategic requirements could be 
mapped onto different types of IS. The three left most triangles were presented in Atkinson 
(1990) as an original diagram. Over the last ten years, new and updated IS types have also 
become available to managers. The two right most triangles of Figure 2.2 provide an 
updated illustration ofhow the types of IS can be mapped with an organisation process to 
provide more efficient or effectiveness. 
Task type The requirement 
Un structured 
Effective 
Semi r, 
nctional structured 
Informati 
stems\ 
E icient ce 
automation 
Operational Data Transaction 
Organisation Data/information Types of 
levels volumes information system 
Figure 2.2 information System Types and AppEcations Source: Adchwn 2000 
The organisafional requirements for different types ofIS will change over time. The task for 
the IS project manager can be seen to be constantly changing, thus reducing the 
opportunity to learn from the mistakes of earlier projects. At the same tine some bespoke 
systems are now being replaced with 'package' Commercial offthe Shelf (COTS) type 
systems. The COTS type system offers a chance to reduce the time to firiplementation. At 
the same the, COTS change the existing problem/solution way of systems development to 
that of a solution/problem approaclL This indicates how a strategy for an organisation's 
systems can be driven by existing COTS; thus, indicating how an IS can Muence an 
organisation's operations in contrast to an IS simply supporting an existing operations. 
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Therefore, the variables that project nimagers are hying to control can be seen to be 
changing over time. From this, parallels can be made between the early axiom of Beer 
(1985) and some of the problems for project management, ie. that the '... environment will 
be greater than the operators tying to serve it, which will be greater than the management 
attempting to control it', some IS project failures could be considered inevitable. 
2.3 Project Management 
Oisen (1971) suggests the term project manageinew came into popularity after 1954 when 
a team was put together to 'manage a crash project for the U. S. Airforce's missile 
program. 7. At the A: merican Project Managemeiit Institute Symposium in 1970, several 
attempts were inade to describe project management and since then other authors have 
offered ideas to define project management. Oisen (1971) views were formed from the 
1950's and may bave been one of the earliest attempts to define project management. 
'Project Management is the application of a collection oftools and techniques (such 
as the CPM and matrix organisation) to direct the use ofdiverse resources toward 
the accomplislunent of a unique, complex, one-time task within time, cost and quality 
constr-aints. Each task requires a particular mix oftheses tools and techniques 
structured to fit the task environment and ffe cycle (from conception to completion) 
of the task'. 
Notice tile success criteria are intrinsical1y linked to the definitior. L Those limited criteria for 
measuring success included in the description used by Oisen (197 1) continue to be used to 
describe project management today. The British Standard for Project Management BS6079 
(1996) defines project management as: 
'... any managcment activity that inftoduces a new objective or causes change and 
has a definite start and finish thm is a project'. This is achieved by '--- the planning, 
mnitoring and control of all aspects of a project and the motivation of all those 
involved in it to achieve the project objectives on time and to the specified cost, 
quality and perfonnance'. 
The UK Association for Project Nlanagen=A (AP" has produced a UK Body of 
Knowledge (BoK) (1995) which also provides a definition for project nmnagmnent as: 
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'The pLmning, organisation, monitoring and control of all aspects of a project and the 
motivation of all involved to achieve the project objectives safely and within agreed 
time, cost and perfonnance criteria. Ibe project nwiager is the single point of 
responsibility for achieving this'. 
'There are many definitions of a project. The simplest form of a project is a discrete 
undertaking with defined objectives often including time, cost and quality 
(performance) goals. All projects evolve through a siný fife-cycle sequence during 
which there should be recognised, start and finish points. In addition the project 
objectives may be defined in a number of ways e. g. financial, social and economic, 
the iniportance being that goals are defined and the project finhe'. 
The UK APM BoK (1995) was divided into 4 mairt categories These are Project 
management, Team, Tasks and General maiiagement. These 4 main categories were further 
subdivided into 40 specific topics requiring a knowledge or ability to carry out tasks. A 
copy of the topics included in the APM BoK (1995) is given in Appendix A. Several 
countries have developed their own BoK for project management, which seems to indicate 
that at least at an international level the factors wlich collectively are project management 
are not consistent. Wirth and Tryloff (1995) compared the contents of 6 project 
management BoK! s from 6 different countries. The analysis identified a range of common 
and unique factors that the project management conununity for each different country. 
Turner (1996) provided a consolidated matri: K that helped to understand and moderate 
different attempts to describe project management. The matriK contained 68 fiwions, 
divided into 10 sections that he considered was '... an initial attempt at scoping an 
international project management BoKý. 
Turner (2000) suggested that atten-4)ts to define project management during the 1990's, 
'... bad proved to be a triumph of : nationalism over globalization', and pointed to the 
Competence Baseline issued by the International Project Management Association as a 
further attempt to agree core elements. A review of the APM BoK undertaken by Morris 
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and Dixon (2000) proposed 17 significant differences to be considered by those charged 
with producing a revised APM BoK (2000), the structure is given in (Appendix B). A 
revised APM BoK (2000) served to demonstrate that the profession of project 
management is evolving to rellect the new challenges and changes faced by the profession. 
A further example that Beer's (1995) axiom continues to apply to project management. 
Other shnilar but different views of project management are offered in the British Standard 
6079 (1996) and the British Computer Society Special Interest Group BCS PROMS-G. 
Lock (1992) suggested project management was '... a specialised branch of management' 
but which requires a I... clear grasp of'proven and long-established principles of 
management and leadership'. Boddy and Buchanan (1992) on the other hand considered 
that project management was primarily to do with change. 
Benjamin and Levinson (1993) suggested that one of the most important factors for a 
project marager is to have '... at several levels of detail the risks mapped out over time 
and a conunon fimne ofreference and vocabulary for discussing and managing change'. 
Burke (1993) focused upon what could be considered traditional views of project 
management, planning and control while Reiss (1995) considered that a project was a 
human activity that achieves a clear objective against a time scale. To achieve this, Wbile 
pointing out that a simple description is not possible, Reiss (1995) suggested that project 
management was a combination ofmanagement and planning and the management of 
change. Lock's (1992) view was that project management had evolved in order to plan, 
co-ordinate and control the complex and diverse activities of modem industrial and 
commercial projects. Burke (1993) considers project management to be a specklised 
management technique, to plan and control projects under a strong single point of 
i responsibility. Meredith and Mantel (1989) and Stuckenbruck (1986) have also attempted 
to define project management, and that process continues. 
Ward (2000) pointed out that 12 leading project managcment textbooks all provided 
different definitions suggesting his preferred, but not own definition was, 'Project 
Managenxnt is the interdisciplinary process of acbieving a satisfhctory end result'. The 
process of attempting to define project management can be seen to have been an on going 
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debate during the second balf of the twentieth century. During the same period three 
criteria for measuring success, mmely cost quak and time have been linked to the 
defbition. Ibis may be a limiting factor if the perception is that project management is 
measured using only those criteria. 
Many different descriptions for project management can be found. Three decades ago 
Oisen (197 1) noted that '... there seemed to be as many different definitions as there were 
people defining the term' and since then many more definition have been suggested. There 
is possibly a paradox in even attempting to define project management. Can a subject, 
which deals with a '... unique, one-off set of complex task' as suggested as early as Oisen 
(197 1) be defined? Project management could be described as an evolving phenomenon. 
While not ambiguous, it remains vague enough to prevent a shoe rigid definition. This 
could be a flexible attribute contributing to its enduring strength. 
However, while several Merent descriptions for project management have been offered in 
the past 30 years, the generic criteria for measuring success, namely cost, qualfty and time 
remain the same. It was for these reasons that questions about how projects are measured 
for success and how project managers would prefer to measure project success were 
included in the questionnaire. 
Having a standard would appear at the outset to be a requirement of project management. 
But the fact that there are several standards referring to the same topic indicates there is not 
'a'standard at all. While the UK APM have their BoK. (2000) for project managers to use 
as a reference document, it is not a definitive EA. In some respects, organisations magnify 
the difficulty as they compete to be seen as the 'standard, standard creator. Meanwhile 
work on an international Body of Knowledge to resolve this problem continues, with 
initiatives such as descnibed earlier by Turner (2000). 
To conclude the section about project nmagement, a definition offered by the author is: 
project management involves the application of knowledge, skills and itituition to deliver an 
acceptable product or change. 
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2A Management 
Drucker (1993) was one of the first writers about nmnagement and continues in his early 
belief that management involved five basic principles. These are presented in Table 2.2. 
setting objectives 
organising, 
motivating and conununicating 
establishing measures ofperformance 
and developing people. 
Table 2.2 Five Basic Principjes of Management Source: Drucker (1993) 
Fayol (I 997a) is credited with identifijing 6 nmnagement activities and 14 principles of 
nmnagement Fayol (I 997b); these are presented in Tables 2.3 and 2.4 respectively. 
Forecasting 
Planning 
Organising 
Commanding 
Co-ordinating 
CaitroUing 
Table 2.3 Favolls Managerial Activities Source: Fayol (I 997a) 
These 6 activities as defiried by Fayol can be seen to be some ofthe core requirements for 
project management APM's BoK (1995). From this it can be seen that the early thoughts 
of what managers did coukl be classified as involving Structure and Organising tasks. 
Included also is the commanding actMty, as identified by Fayol that involves the people 
side of management. 
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Division ofwork Opportunity for initiative 
Authority Interest subordination 
Discipline Remuneration. 
Unity ofcornmand Centralisation 
Scalar principle Order 
Unity of direction Equity of treatment 
I Esprit de CAxps Stability of tumover 
Table 2.4 Favol's Management hinciples Source: Fayol (1997b) 
Building on Fayol's ideas, many other management writers progressed the subject into 
different specialist areas, at tines having some overlap. Crainer (1998) studied who he 
believed to be the top 50 writers about management; a sumnmV ofthe writers and their 
contribution to management is given in Appendix C. 
One of the factors considered by Craineer (1998) was to view management writers as so 
polarised, that their views ofthe subject could be classified as either an art or a science. 
While in reality a balance ofthose two extremes would seem most likely, the split between 
the different management writers and their thinking about management over the last 
century can be seen to alternate over time between the two polarised, views. It can be seen 
that over time the development of management did not build upon the existing view, but 
considered the topic from a polarised position. 
For example, l3uchanan & HuczynsId (1997) reported how in 1911 Frederick Taylor 
worked on the ideas of Scientific Management in the BetWehain Steel Company. The next 
significant view of nianagement was developed from the Hawthorne studies carried out 
between 1924-33 in the Western Electric Company. 'Ihese experiments looked into the 
conditions ofthe working environment from a people perspective. Figure 2.3 demonstrates 
the cbronological study ofmanagement as a science or an art. 
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Science Art 
1900 
Scientific managemenj 
Hawthome studies 
operations research 
Strategic managemerA 
Competitive forces 
Systems theory 
Service 
Quality 
s lEemrchy 
X and Y 
2000 
Figure 23 Management as Art or Science Source: adapted from Crainer (1998) 
The development of project management has benefited from the early work of management 
theory by adopting some ofkey topics such as planning, organising and controlling and 
introduced methods, standards, tools and techniques appropriate to project management. 
There have not been the polarised views within PrOject management that it is either a 
science or an art as can be seen to have taken place in the development of general 
management. 
Management over the last century has been the subject of several attempts to be 
understood and defined. With so many changes and often polarised views about the subject 
ofmanagement, it could be argued that the topic has suffered from adopting the latest 
ideas, rather tl= any significant attempt to develop previous knowledge. This in turn could 
reduce the topic ofmanagement to a temporary set of new ideas, which collectively has 
been termed 'fads'. Partridge and Perren (1994) advised caution in rushing to adopt new 
management techniques, citing management by objectives, work study, total quality 
management, and business process re-engineering as examples ofmanagement concepts 
and techniques not now in favour. Management can be seen not to have developed by 
building on some ofthe benefits of the earlier techniques. As new techniques emerge the 
current fad goes through a 'tarnishing stage' rendering the whole of the current technique 
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undesirable. Wastell (1996) considered management fads a fetish for weak managers to use 
as a defence mechanism and to hide behind when problems occurred. 
Tsoukas (1994) believed that the continual search for what would be considered 'real' 
management bad resulted in the subject being reduced to a '... codification of work'. As 
imre knowledge is known about what constitutes management, the codification would 
increase as it would do naturally when changes in the environment demanded new ideas to 
be used. Questions about the tools and tecbniques used on successful projects were 
therefore also included on the stage I questionnaire. 
A key difference between nmiagernent and project management is that project nianagernent 
is defirnited by time, whereas general management is an on-going process. This key 
difference between management and project management provides the basis to distinguish 
between the two disciplines. A role ofmanagement is to make today the same as yesterday, 
while naturally accepting the need for continuous improvement. Project management on the 
other hand is about change. Wormation, systems project managers bring about rapid change 
in organisations and change the way systems and people operate. Maylor (1999) Mustrated 
the differences between management and project management by listing the factors against 
a common subject. Extending that original idea from Maylor (1999) has enabled Table 2.5 
to be produced. 
The terms are largely self explanatory and it is not possible whhhi this Chapter to discuss, in 
detail, all the contents of Table 2.5. The following few examples will serve as an MustratiorL 
Change in a traditional rnaWement environment is usually a gradual process. The change 
brought about by the introduction of IS often requires the users and other stakeholders to 
make rapid changes in working patterns. The purpose ofmanagernent is to do something 
'because' that is what was expected and is based upon what has been done before. The 
purpose of project management on the otber hand is to undertake some tasks 'in order to' 
move into a changed order of work or new processes. Project management unlike 
management has at the outset a finite and agreed time scale within which an agreed task 
would be achieved. 
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Generic Variables 
Authority 
Change 
Control 
Culture 
Information 
Management Style 
Motivation 
Purpose 
Roles 
Staff 
Structure 
Task 
Time scale 
Finances 
Success criteria 
Successfildors 
Risks 
Estimating 
Skills 
Schedule 
for success 
Management 
Clear, reflects position 
Gradual/continuous 
Rules 
Role and power 
Established 
Authoritative 
Extrinsic 
Tecausel 
Clear 
Permanent 
Line, hierarchical, flat 
Repetitive 
On-going 
Operational 
Single or limited stakeholders 
Process (Doing things right) 
Continuation almost assured 
Based on yesterday (known) 
Specialised 
Static, predictable 
Gradual improvements 
Project Management 
Ambiguous 
Rapid/steptincremental 
Quality 
Task 
New, unknown 
Participative group 
Intrinsic 
'In order to' 
To be defined 
Temporary 
Matrix, project 
Unique 
Limited, finite 
Capital 
Multiple stakeholders 
Product (Getting things right) 
Cancelled if objectives not met 
Based on tomorrow(unknown) 
Multidisciplinary 
Dynamic, changing 
Right first time 
Table 2.5 Management vs. Proiect Management Source: Extended from original 
Maylor (1999) 
2.5 The Project Manager 
Lists and tables of factors are available from authors such as Dibble (1995), Bewley and 
Rafferty (1992) and Fried (1992) which act as a guide to project nkinagers, but the rate of 
failure of IS projects remains high. Atkins (1980) suggested that the individual selected for 
the post of project manager was likely to influence the focus of the project. Atkins (1980) 
produced a list of the functions to be undertaken and the characteristics that IS project 
managers should possess. If the style of the project manager is likely to influence the focus 
of a project, it is h-nportant to understand what that focus would be. 
Webster (1994) discussed and extended what is called the Herrmann Brain Dominance 
Profile, which can provide some ideas to aid understanding how the project manager is still 
likely to influence the focus of a project. That profile illustrates how the brain is divided into 
hemispheric left and right also into hemispheric top and bottom, Figure 2.4. Each of the 
quadrants or pairs has been identified as responsible for different purposes. For example, 
the left hemisphere has been demonstrated to be responsible Ibr such as linear, analytical 
thought, while the right hemisphere has been linked with emotive or spatial attributes. 
Cerebral Mode 
Logical Holistic 
Analytical Intuitive 
Quantitative Synthesizing 
xperl 
Fact Based AD Integrating 
(Rational) (Experimental) 
Planned T. Bc Emotional 
Organised (Safekeeping) (Feeling) Interpersonal 
Detailed Feeling Based 
Sequential Expressive 
Limbic Mode 
Figurc 2.4 Brain Dominance Profile Source: Webster (1994) 
Having identified that the four quadrants of the brain deal with diffýrent tasks, Webster 
(1994) has finiher catalogued into which quadrant some prqject management factors could 
be positioned, as illustrated in Figure 2.5. 
Structure 
Work Breakdown Structure (WBS 
Project Evaluation Review 
Technique (PERT) 
Critical Path Method (CPM) 
Bar charts 
Networks A 
Innovation 
Seeking opportunities 
Problem solving 
Contingency planning 
D 
BC 
Organising 
Responsibilities 
Task assignment 
Staff hire/fire 
Expediting 
Managing people 
Mentoring 
Meetings 
Negotiating 
Training 
Counselfing 
Coaching 
Fi"re 2.5 Brain Dominance Profile and Pro*ect Management Process 
Source: Webster ( 1994) 
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Project management can be seen to have links to all the 4 quadrants of the brain. This 
would sit comfortably with the view that project management is a holistic profession, 
requiring the person to have a balance of what could be termed attributes from both art and 
science. Figure 2.5 demonstrates how the different tasks and responsibilities of IS project 
management can be considered to map onto the 4 quadrants of the brain. For example, the 
top left quadrant of the brain is active with logical and analytical methods. This would fit 
with the tasks that benefit fi7orn those methods, such as work breakdown structure 
techniques or critical path networks. At the same time the lower right quadrant of the brain 
controls feeling and emotion. The lower right quadrant would be active for tasks used to 
manage people, the one that would deal with issues of trust. It would be reasonable, 
therefore, to suggest that a project manager should use (not necessarily equally) the four 
quadrants of the brain, in order to satisfy the eclectic collection of tasks needed for project 
management. Spinola (1997) discussed the results of a research study that indicated from 
over 500,000 submissions of the Herrmann Brain Dominance Profile the'... majority of the 
population have more than one dominance' as shown in Figure 2.6. The results further 
suggested that a project manager should ideally use all quadrants in order to '... maintain 
equilibrium in the team' but should'... at the least be double or triple dominant'. The 
findings from Webster (1994) indicate that while project managers do consider aspects 
from each quadrant, they concentrate their attention to the top left quadrant of the brain. 
That was the quadrant found to be active with tasks dealing with structure and logic, based 
upon facts, the quadrant which has been linked with networks, critical paths and planning. 
Figure 2.6 presents the dominance profile of a project manager. 
Figure 2.6 Pro*ect Management Dominance Profile Source: Webster (1994) 
Left: Speech, Linear, Analytical, Rational. Right: Concepts, Emotive, Spatial Holistic- 
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The key to the sectors numbered I to 4 is as foDows: 
Sector 1- Avoid using, 
Sector 2- Prepared to use, 
Sector 3- Prefer to use, 
Sector 4- Strong preference. 
Ile results indicate project managers prefer to work in the quadrant A- Having a focus 
upon the Structure quadrant would indicate the project manager prefers to consider the fact 
based topics, using tools such as Project Evaluation Review Techniques. To a lesser 
extent, project managers do use quadrants B (Organising) and D (fimovation). What the 
research further indicates is that project managers are least likely to consider or spend time 
managing people. Webster (1994) has provided data to suggest that project managers are 
triple don*=A, preferring quadrants A, B and D. The part of the brain which project 
managers appear to use most is the top left, which considers factors such as planning. If 
project managers do not at the same time consider the people issues, by using the right side 
of the brain, specifically the lower right quadrant of the brain, ie. (quadrant C), the people 
issues of project management are perceived to be of only low finportance. Most writers 
have indicated that the 'soft' issues are finportant to project success, yet the proffle of 
project managers suggests that they are least likely to consider such issues, this is a 
concern. To study this finther the questiomaire developed in this research included 
questions regarding which factors ofproject management the respondents believed to be 
important to IS project success. In Chapter 4 an evaluation of those results have been 
mapped onto the Herm3am brain dominance model to identify which quadrant of the brah 
the respondents believed, project nmners were using. 
2.6 Leadership 
Adair (199 1) provided a distinction between mariagement and leaders and identified that 
while there were management methods and techniques, there were different styles of 
leadership. According to Gretton (1995) leadership was more fiWrtant than management, 
the difference being that management was concerned with control while leadership gave up 
control and empowered staff to think for themselves. Tam (1994) bad earlier pointed out 
that if empowerment was to be used, it should be real, authentic not pseudo-empowerment. 
Schoriberger (1994) did not believe leadership was correct for IS projects and argued that 
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'teanismanship' was more important. Schonberger (1994) argued that if the composition of 
a team could be held together from project to project, this would achieve more than 
leadership styles. One possible style of leadership the project irmager could adopt, would 
be the approach suggested by Machiavelli (2003). The fifteenth century civil servant, 
Machiavelli docurnented what he believed to be the style and attributes of successful leaders 
that differed from earlier treatises which suggested that '... man should gain his ends by 
commirnication and persuasion rather than by force or treachery'. Machiavelli (2003) spoke 
of the virtue of control and the pradence ofrisk assessment. However, the basis of 
Machiavellian leadership was based on aggression; the '... bold would succeed better than 
the hesitant', was one of Machiavelli's views from which he became known as '... the 
profit of force'. 
Some modem corporations exhibit similar conditions to those described by Machiavelli. 
Project managers need to achieve a clear objective and performance related incentive 
schemes can produce aggressive behaviour when multi targets create conflicting 
requirements on stal However, Graham (1996) found no fink between having a project 
manager with a Nlachiavelllian style of leadership and successfifl projects. Neither did he 
find any support for the premise that successful project management would be linked to 
those believed to be exhibiting a so-called 'high Macs' rating. The attnibutes of those 
project mainers who obtain a high Mach rating are that they manipulate people more, 
win more, are persuadable less and persuade others more. 
The composition ofmanagenrnt and project management has been discussed in previous 
sections to detenniae the synergy for the two subjects. Trust was found in the management 
and leadership literature as unportant. Trust however has not been identified as a key factor 
in any APM BoK, or the BS 6079 (1996), so it would be unlikely to be considered 
firportant by project managers. The questionnaire for stage I bas included questions about 
how the finportance of trust is viewed in relation to IS project success. 
Hartman (2000) has also identified the m3portance of trust within project nianagement, but 
those ideas were presented 4 years after the gap in the literature was identified for this 
research. Although the Hartman (2000) work was unable to influence the questionnaire for 
this research, a discussion of that literature of tr= has been included in Chapter 5. 
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2.7 Reasons for Failure 
Before a more detailed discussion of the literature of success and failure factors are 
presented, it is considered worthwbRe at this point to indicate the generic reasons for 
failure. According to Flew (1976), the reasons for failure are twofold. Either something 
was done incorrectly, sometimes referred to as a sin of commission, or something that 
should bave been done, was missed, referred to as the sin ofornission. 
Factors ktiown to be critical to the success of a project, but were incorrectly fimlemented, 
would be an example of a sin of commission. Such as not having senior management 
support. The second reason for &ilure could be where a key success factor had yet to be 
found. In this case, a sin ofornission. had taken place within project managenmt. This 
research posits that the failtire to consider the likely influence of trust and by limiting the 
criteria of measuring success mainly to cost, quality and time, are two exaniples of a sin of 
omission within project management. 
Handy (1996) provides a connection between the 2 sins (comnlission and omission) and the 
Vj, pes of errors as defmed and used in statistics. Handy (1996) argued that the sin of 
commission coWd be considered similar to a Type I error in statistics. This is when 
something is done incorrectly. At the same time, the sin of omission could be compared 
with a Type H error in statistics-, when something bas been missed or not done as well as it 
could have been. Handy (1996) pointed to an earlier example where the distinction between 
the sin of commission and the sin of omission had been understood, comparing these with 
Type I and Type II errors. The old prayer book (1662) from the Anglican Church, 
includes the words: 
'. -- forgive us for the things we have done and ought not to have done', this is an example 
of a sin of comnission, a Type I error. 
'... and for the flags we should have done but have not done', this example describing a 
sin of omissior4 a Type II error. 
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By njaking this lirik Handy (1996) further argued that occurting wkhin management would 
be both the sin on coirmiission (Type I error) and the sin of omission (Type II error). The 
surmmxy of this work wffl considcr the fmdings wkhin this framework 
Examples of sins of conimission and omission can be found within project management. 
Quality control is used during the development ofIS projects. If undertaken correctly, 
quality control would increase the chances of project success, but if admfilistered 
incorrectly, the very control designed to help a project will become dysfunctional. Consider 
the implications , if more items than were needed for statistical significance were 
unnecessarily checked during the quality control flinction of a project. The development of 
that system would as a result be slowed down, possibly resulting in a late and/or over 
budget project. In other words, a Type I error bad taken place. The team responsible for 
quality control bad done something wrong, they were over zealous in their checking. A 
positive error had taken place, a sin of commission. The project was late as a direct result of 
too many quality control checks. 
it on the other hand, the same quality control system did not check a sufficient number of 
items, and some errors bad been allowed through to systems implementation. In this case 
the quality control team bad not undertaken the checking as well as they could have done. 
Something was missed, this time resulting in a Type II error, the sin of ornission. The 
Ariane 5 project identified earlier in Table 1.4 dated 25dJuly indicated a case of a sin of 
ornission, a Type 11 error. The testing by the quality team was not done as well as it could 
have beezi. In the case of the Ariane 5 project, existing software from a previous system 
was altered, unit testing was undertaken, but no new integrated tests were carried out. 
Quality control had been devolved from a central point to one where all the staffthought 
someone else was responsible for quality, resulting in the integrated systems tests being 
overlooked. Quality control must be administered correctly if it is to assist the development 
of a project. At the same time, all the flictors that influence the success ofIS projects should 
be considered as having two Oure options, Type I and Type II. The stage I questionnaire 
required the respondents to indicate if any Type 11 errors bad occurred on their projects. 
, therefore, that the contents of the BS 6079 (1996), APM BoK (1995) and other 
lists of 'bow to' and 'What is' project management are correct, the continuing failure of IS 
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projects could be reduced to 2 possible reasons. Eftber known success factors bave been 
administered incorrectly, i. e. (a sin of commission), or the lists of success factors are not yet 
complete, ie. (a sin ofomission). 
In the proceeding sections the description ofproject management has been discussed 
together with standards such as the APM BoK (1995) and BS 6079 (1996). These 
catalogue the factors of project management. It has further been suggested that the project 
manager would influence those factors that s/he would prefer. The generic reasons for 
failure have also been discussed. However, what is missing from these Est and tables is any 
sense of importance or ranking of the topics that would result with a successful project. 
These are known as critical success factors and are addressed next. 
2.8 Success Factors 
Factors that are considered to be important to achieving success have been produced by 
Posner (1987). Table 2.6 represents what were considered the skills for project 
managenient, which are not limited to IS. 
1. Communication SkiRs (84) 
Listening 
Persuading 
2. Organisational Skills (75) 
Planning 
Goal setting 
Analysing 
3. Team building skills (72) 
Empathy 
Motivation 
Esprit de Corps 
4. Leadership Skills (68) 
Sets example 
Energetic 
Vision 
Delegates 
Positive 
5. Coping skills (59) 
Flexibility 
Creativity 
Patience 
Persistence 
6. Technological Skills (46) 
Experience 
Project knowledge 
I Numbers in () indicate relative % following absolute replies n- 1400 
Table2.6 Pro* ect Management Skills Source: Posner (1987) 
Wbat is interesting from this relatively early attempt to rank project management skills is 
that communication skills (an example of a so called soft skill) is considered to be 84% 
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critical while technological skills (so called hard skills) were ranked last with a value of 461/o 
criticality. Yet the findings from the Webster (1994) study (discussed earlier in section 2.5) 
identified that the factors associated with left-brain dominance (so called hard skills) were 
the most used. 
Project managetnent involves nmaging different stages of a project Ibis was studied by 
Pinto (1988) who identified 10 critical success factors and 4 additional external project 
critical factors and linked them to specific project stages while also providing a rank of the 
criticality ofthose factors. Pinto (1988) tested these critical success factors during the 
following 4 phases of a project, namely the conceptual, planning, execution and tennination 
phases. The results are given in Table 2.7. 
Phase Ciitical Success factors 
Conceptual phase Project mission, Client consultation (64%) 
Planning Project mission, Top management support, client 
acceptance, urgency (E) (65%) 
Execution Pr6ject mission, Characteristics of the project team 
leader (E), Trouble-shooUng, project-schedule(plans 
Technical tasks and Client consultation (66%) 
Termination Tecbnical tasks, Project mission, and Client 
consultation (60*/o) 
Table2.7 Kev Factors for Succes Source: Pinto (1988) 
Percentages hi brackets give the criticality of the flictors with the likelihood of a successfid 
IS project. For example, during the concept phase, the project mission and client 
consultation was believed to be 64% critical to the success of a projecL The 'E' denotes an 
external factor. Geddes (1990) produced the following list of flictors and their ranking that 
are presented in Table 2.8. The Table indicates the low importance of technical skiffs and 
knowledge but a need for clear objectives and a need to include the Users. The late 1980's 
produced a sudden interest in both defining and ranking both project management criteria 
and success factors. Belassi and Tukel (1996) compiled a list of critical success factors 
taken from the authors, Martin, Lock, Cleland and King, Pinto and Slevin, and Morris and 
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Hough The sigifficant result from BeLami and Tukel (1996) was to extended the 
knowledge of how the success factors would differ between industry and project type. 
Belassi and Tukel (1996) identified that for Mamgen=t Information Systems (M S) 
projects the most critical factor was the project's project mamger. This finding was 
supported by Cooke-Davies (2002). Having identified 12 'real' successhetors, all 
unrelated to 'human factors', the conclusion made was that the 'people side of success 
factors is woven into their very fabric'. Cooke-Davies (2002) argued that the survey fimm 
and questions had produced a bias excluding people factors from the results. 
ReUtive % 
Position importance 
Clearly defined objectives 1 96 
9gh user involvement 2 80 
Executive quality ofthe Project Manager 3 73 
Well defined Project management structure 4 69 
Iligh user commitment 5 69 
Quality ofproject management team 6 57 
Choice of project 7 57 
PLarming and control methods in project 8 57 
Limited objectives 9 30 
WeR defined responsibilities 10 26 
Good estimating methods 11 23 
Technical quality of project manager 12 7 
Table 2.8 Success Factors of IS Proi Source: Geddes (1990) 
The Belassi and Tukel (1996) work has provided some differentiation of success factors by 
different flictor groups. Ward (2000) reviewed the Belmi and Tukel (1996) paper and 
pointed out that there was 'almost no commonality'. From 61 issues identified, only 3 
issues appeared in four lists with only one issue mentioned specifically on 5 occasions. 
Ward (2000) continues that '... even allowing for the different termimology, '... project 
controls could be said to bave 10 mentions, but despite this did not appear in all the lists. 
It could be argued that the infonnation known about the subject of critical success fictors 
could be likened to how Ward (2000) described creative designers as '... divergent 
thinkers, who explore and expand a problem, develop considerable knowledge of a subject 
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but do not necessarily get any closer to a solution. The solution required in this case, was 
an increase in the rate of successful projects. Ward (2000) further states that '... whilst the 
literature has identified the causes of project success and failure, it has not satisfactorily 
explained the reasons behind these causes to help us find new ways of dealing with the 
issues'. 
A reason offered by Ward (2000) is the finportance of aligment, adding that personal 
objectives will carry more weight and that finportance can be tested using the Prisoner's 
Dilemma. I he Prisoner's Dilenmia is a game where the variables under test are co- 
operation and trust between the players. The Prisoner's Dilenum was adopted and adapted 
for stage 2 of this research and is explained in detail in Chapters 5 and 6. 
Wateridge (1996) researched into critical success factors for IS projects. That research 
identified the following weightings, shown in Table 2.9 that the respondents befieved to be 
linked to project success. In comiwn with other studies, that was compiled using attitudinal 
surveys. The survey in this thesis also included behavioural questions in addition to some 
attitudiiW questions. These behavioural questions were used to test whether the replies 
obtained from the attitudinal surveys were bome out in practice. 
weighted average weighted m3x --9 
Manager/user attitudes towards vistems development 7.1 
Training in the *, stms approach for EPD staff 7.0 
Operating and middle management involvement in planning 6.9 
Technical expertise of EDP personnel 6.8 
Operating and middle management involvement in analysis and design 6.5 
User and management expertise in making their information need known 63 
The use of data base management systems 6.0 
Table2.9 Ctitical Success Facton for IS Projects Source: Wateridge(1996) 
An introduction to the Standish group results reported by Gallagher (1995) was presented 
in Chapter 1. That survey involved 365 respondents and represented 8,380 projects. 'Me 
projects were divided into 3 t)Ws, these were: 
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project success 16.2% (on-tfim on budget with alI features as specified), 
chaUenged projects 52.7% (described as over thne and budget wlich did not meet a the 
fimetions specified), 
9 impaired projects 31.1% (carr-elled at some point during development). 
Table 2.10 shows the fink between success and the costs ofprojects. 
Large Medium Small 
$500m $200m $100-200m 
Successful 90/0 16.2% 28% 
Challenged 613% 46.70/a 50.4% 
Impaired 29.5% 37.1% 21.6% 
Cost ovemm av. 178% 187/6 214% 
Time overrun 230*/o 202% 23 9% 
Table 2.10 Project Success bv Costs Source: Gal*cr (1995) 
Tables 2.11,2.12 and 2.13 contain the different success fictors that were associated to 
successful, partly successful and ffled projects, descnibed by Gallagher (1995) as 
successful, challenged and finpaired projects. 
1. User involvement 15.9% 
2. Executive management support 13.9% 
3. Clear statement ofrequirements 13.01/o 
4. Proper Planning 9.6% 
5. Realistic Expectations 8.21/o 
6. Smaller project Milestones 7.7% 
7. Competent Staff 7.2% 
8. Ownership 5.3% 
9. Clear vision & objectives 2.9% 
10. Hard working, focused staff 2A% 
11. Other 13.9% 
Table 2.11 Factors of Successful Proiect Source: GaU*er (1995) 
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1. Lack of User input 12.8% 
2. Incanplete Requirements & specifications 12.3% 
3. Changing requirements & specifications 11.80/0 
4. Lack of executive support 7.5% 
5. Technology incompetence 7.0% 
6. 12ck of resources 6.40/c 
7. Unrealistic oq)ectations 5.9% 
S. Unclear objectives 5.3% 
9. Unclear time frames 4.3% 
10. New technology 3.7% 
11. other 23% 
Table 2.12 Factors of ChaDenged Proiects Source: GaUagher (1995) 
1. Incomplete requirements 13.1% 
2. Lack ofUser involvement 12.4% 
3. Lack ofrescurces, 10.6% 
4. Unrealistic expectations 9.9% 
5. lack of executive support 9.3% 
6. Changing requirements and specifications 8.7*/o 
7. Lack ofplanning 8.1% 
S. Didn't need it any longer 73% 
9. Lack of IT management 6.20/a 
10. Technology illiterate 4.3% 
11. Other 9.91yo 
Table 2.13 Factors of Iml2aired Proiects Source: GaUagher (1995) 
Comparing the results from Table 2.11 with the work from Webster's (1994) Project 
Management Dominance Proffle, Wateridge (1996), Pinto (1988) and Geddes (1990) 
provide a useful insight into what air, believed to be the factors for success, they include: 
* baving a clear user specification, 
9 supportive senior management, 
e user involvement, 
9 phTming. 
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Although the APM BoK (1995) and BS 6079 (1996) appear to have indicated what 
constitutes project nnnernent, the management ofprojects has a focus upon a different 
set of factors. Ward (1994) points to project managers needing more importantly to 
understand the dynamics of work resources and time. For example, Ward (1994) indicates 
the importance of understanding the Law ofMarginal Utility and 'Brooks Law'. The law 
of Marginal Utility applies to systems development projects and states that while each new 
person makes a contribution, that new person makes less contribution until eventually either 
no or a negative contribution is made. 'Brooks Law' states that adding resources to a late 
software development project further delays the project. The formula to calculate 'Brooks 
Law' is that no more staffthan the square root of the total amount ofestimated man 
months is needed, Le. for a IGO man month project, 10 staff would be required. 'Brooks 
Law' would suggest that, more than 10 staff on a 100 man month project would not result 
in reduction of time, and may result in an increase in time and associated costs. Questions 
were included in the questionnaire for this thesis to specifically test whether 'Brooks Law, 
applied in the successfW IS projects surveyed. Details are given in Chapter 4. - 
Some projects are called 'runaway'. Those projects continue to fail despite early warnings, 
but project staff tend to press on against evidence that cancellation should be a valid option. 
The London Ambulance System (LAS) coWd be classified a runaway project. The final 
auditors' report for project LAS, (Williams 1993) indicated that serious problems had been 
encountered. For example, the supplier of the technology stated the equipment would not 
work where there were over-head power fines and high nse buildings. The LAS system 
was intended to operate in centW London. This warning was ignored along with several 
others. 
Keg et al (1994) investigated Ininaway, IS projects and identified three common factors: 
d, Self-justification theory (SR), 
* The concept of escalating commitment, 
Prospect theory. 
S. Tr was descnibed as '... individuals seeking to rationalise their previous behaviour against 
a perceived error injudgement'. The theory suggests that in the presence of negative 
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feedback, hxlividuals who bave nmde a prior commitment to a project are, more wMing to 
commit additional resources fl= those without any prior commitment. 
Collins (1994) identified an example of Self Justification when he interviewed the Chief 
Executive of the London Stock Exchange who cancelled TAURUS, an IS project, which 
had exceeded both cost and time budget. This is example ofa runaway project. Those 
involved in the earlier stages of TAURUS continued to support the project, despite poor 
progress. What TAURUS required was someone concerned for the project, but who was 
not too close that a decision to cancel would have indicated personal fifflure. The New 
Chief Executive of the London Stock Exchange was in such a position and be cancelled the 
TAURUS project after E150m, expenditure. This indicates that an independent decision 
maker who can divorce important project decisions from self interest or preservation, 
would be a positive Eictor from which projects would be likely to benefit. One problem is 
that although success btaors have been identified, the success rate of IS projects remains 
low, which indicates the lists produced may not be as complete as they could be. Success 
flictors however provide only one view of a project. An added benefit to build a more 
complete picture of how to achieve IS project success is to consider the fflure factors. 
2.9 Failure Factors 
Researchers such as Fortune & Peters (1995) and Avots (1969) have focused their work on 
why IS projects failed, rather than why they were successful. From Table 2.14 it is possible 
to map each ofthe failure factors identified by as sins of conunission or sins of omission. 
Basis for the project is not sound 
Wrong man is appointed as project manager 
Company management fi& to provide enough mpport 
Task definitions are inadequate 
Management techniques are not appropriate 
Project termination is not planned 
Table 2.14 Reasons for Prolect Failure Source: Avots (1969) 
Using the example, 'the wrong man was appointed as project manager'; this is a clear sin of 
commission. A project manager had been appointed, but the person was not right for the 
55 
job. The Enal factor listed was 'project ternifilation not being planned'; in this case there is a 
sin of ornission. Cavell (1998) researched 200 project managers from The Times top 100 
companies, asking what they believed were the reasons for the failure of IS projects. These 
are desenibed as '... threats to the success of a project' and are given in Table 2.15 
I Bad Communications between relevant parties 55% 
Lack ofplazming in scheduling reswrces and activities 37'Yo 
Milestones being met 36% 
No quality control 31% 
Costs getting ow of hand 2'PYo 
Inadequate co-ordination. ofresources 24% 
Poor overall management 23% 
Mis-management ofprogress 17% 
Supplier skills over stretched 16% 
Supplier under-resources 100/0 
Table 2.15 'n mats to Success Source: Cavell (1998) 
An interesting point from the Cavell (1998) results is that 31% considered that 'having no 
quality contror was a key failure factor. A lack of quality control as a failure factor was 
discussed earlier, in swion 2.7, when the example of the failed Ariane 5 rocket project was 
described. Project managers need to be aware that some critical success flictors are ignored 
during the life of their projects. Doing so transfers a critical success fictor into a failure 
factor. Flowers (1996) considered failure rather than success factors for IS project 
management and compiled the following flictors which he believed to be critical to failure 
as opposed to success. 
The fictors described as failure fictors could be considered as the foundation upon which a 
project depends. That is to say, failure fiictors are the most critical of critical success 
fiictors that need to be in place for project success to be possible. However, ensuring that 
the failure factors are addressed, would not be enough to achieve success. For success to be 
achieved it would also need the success flictors to be addressed correctly. The factors of 
success from the Standish report (Cyall*er 1995) were presented in Table 2.11 while 
Table 2.13 contained the factors of failed projects that were termed, finpaired projects. 
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Organisational context 
Hostile culture 
Poor reporting structures 
Management of project 
Over commitment 
Political presam 
Conduct of the project 
Initiation i)h 
Technology focused 
Lure of leading edge 
Comple7dty underestimated 
Analysis & Desion PbAse 
Poor consultation 
Design by committee 
Technical fix to management problems 
Poor procurement 
Development i3h 
Staffturnover 
competency 
Communication 
Implementation 1Dh 
Receding deadlines 
Inadequate testing 
Inadequate user training 
Table 2.16 Failure Factors Source: Flowers (1996) 
When Table 2.11 is compared with Table 2.13 it can be seen that factors of failure are not 
limited to success factors being carried out incorrectly. There would be some factors that 
only exist within the success or fi&ure sectors. However, in Table 2.11 it also indicates that 
15.9% of success is considered to be linked to 'user involvement'. At the same time Table 
2.13 also indicates that a 'lack of user involvement' is attributed to 12A% of impaired 
(failed) projects. This places 'user involven=t" as both a success and a failure factor. It is 
therefore important to consider both the success and the failure fictors when planning IS 
projects as illustrated in Figure 2.7. 
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Project Management: 
Success and Failure Factors 
Unique Success Factors 
Success 
and 
Unique Failure Factors 
Fieure 2.7 Success and Faffure Factors 
One success factor agreed by most researchers is having a clear statement of requirement. 
But to enable a clear statement of requirements to be of use, also requires the criteria 
against which that statement of requirement would be measured. These are known as the 
success criteria, which were previously referred to in this thesis as the 'Iron Triangle'. 
These and other possible criteria are discussed in the following paragraphs. 
2.10 Success CTiteda 
White and Fortune (2002) reviewed how the success of projects could be measured and 
concluded that cost, quality and time were the most widely discussed. Turner (1999) 
commented that '... at best this is far too simplistic, and at worst it is positively detrimental 
to good project management'. These criteria are limited and do not address the wider 
spectrum of how additional criteria could be used to measure succes& 
Delone and McLean (1992) point out the importance of identifying the IS dependent 
variable before the factors can be studied. If the IS dependent variable is not known, 
Delone and McLean (1992) suggests researching for factors is no more than speculative. 
One argument could be that project management as a profession appears keen to adopt 
new factors to achieve success, such as methodologies, tools, knowledge and skills, yet 
continues to measure or judge using limited criteria of cost, quality and time. If the wrong 
criteria were used to measure success, or some criteria were omitted, the current reason for 
projects to be classified as having failed will simply be repeated in the future. The following 
section reviews the criteria fi-equently used to measure success, together with a proposal for 
the inclusion of additional criteria. 
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The 'Iron Triangle' uses cost, time and quality criteria to measure success. If these criteria 
were achieved, that would shWly represent the chance ofhaving =tched 2 best guesses 
(time and cost) and a phenomenon (quality) correctly. Research undertaken as part of this 
study, in respect of success criteria led to the pubfication Atkinson (1999). That study 
differentiated between: 
" the criteria available to measure the success ofproject management 
" the actual outcome of the completed IS project, 
" the benefits to the organisation, 
" the benefits to a wider stakeholder community. 
From the outcorne of the study was developnrnt of a new frarnework which was referred 
to as the 'Square Route' for considering how the success of IS projects could be measured. 
To date, the criteria for IS project success has mainly focused upon the delivery stage using 
cost, time and quality, sometimes referred to as the 'Iron Triangle'. Recall that cost, time 
and quality were part of most descriptions ofproject management and have continued to be 
use to deffie the profession. The focus has been to judge whether the project was 
implemented right. Doing something right may result in a project that was implemented on 
time, within cost and to some quality parameters requested. The completed project 
however may not be used by the users, not liked by the customers and does not provide 
either improved effectiveness or efficiency for the organisation. It would be unreasonable to 
clu* such a result as a success, without having other measures of success, indicating the 
need for additional criteria to gauge IS project success. 
2.10.1 Emerging Success Criteria for Project Management 
Beniq, ein (1996) reminded us it could be dangerous ifthe criteria that are used to measure 
sucem of a subjective topic depended exclusively upon the use of numbers. In order to 
understand if a project has been successful or not, the decisions are based upon objective 
criteria, such costs and time. Bernstein (1996) suggested'... the pendulurn has swung too 
far from the early subjective decision making in search for numbers upon which decisions 
can be made'. The desire to be able to measure success using numbers has restricted the 
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wider use of subjective criteria, such as '... the sponsors, users and project team should be 
happy', as identified by Wateridge (1995). 
However, IS project management uses and relies on the use of factors that bave no natural, 
numerical value. Subjective factors such as risks have no natural numerical value so they 
are assigned a notional numerical value. Since risk analysis and management is an accepted 
and integral part of the flictors for IS project management, it would seem reasonable that 
the criteria used to measure success need not rely only on the need for real numbers. 
There is however, a more worrying problem for IS project management because in business 
it appears that only that which gets measured gets done. Having criteria with a numerical 
value, even an unreal, man made number, makes the measurement simple, so that which is 
measured gets done. Criteria such as cost or time fall within this category. It is then 
reasonable to suggest that, that which does not get measured will not attract attention, and 
so by implication does not matter or may not be considered to even exist. The choice of 
success criteria for IS projects appears to have been limited to those factors that are 
measurable, not necessarily because they were important. Limiting the criteria to those that 
could be considered to be positivistic while ignoring or not considering those criteria that 
would be considered to a phenomenon can be seen to be an example ofthe sin ofornission. 
As stated earlier, Hartman (2000) has recently identified the importance of trust as a Rictor 
contributing to project management success. The subject of tnist is subjective, making it 
difficult to measure. Consequently, to date, trust may not have been considered as an 
influencing factor for IS project management because it is not easily measured. 
On the other hand, risks which are subjective but are beheved likely to influence the chance 
ofproject success are often assigned a numerical value and are managed in a way assuming 
the epistemological position for the project, that those risks in some way represent IreaW. 
It is suggested that trust has been a forgotten or a mL%wd fiictor within IS project 
management. One method ofhaving trust elevated to a point where it is accepted as a 
success flictor would be to include it as a risk factor. Webster (1994) found that project 
rrmiagers focused upon those fimetions of project management wlich map onto the left 
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hernisphere of the brain as shown in Figure 2.6, at the expense of those functions of the 
right hemisphere, which includes trust. If bust was included as a fonnal risk, it would 
move the subject to the left hemisphere of the brain Oogical), the side found to be more 
likely to be used by project managers. 
it may be difficult to measure the exact level of trust of fix1hriduals as an output. It would, 
however, be possible to audit the level of trust as a process within a project team and 
include the result in a risk register to be managed like other risý. This suggestion is 
&-cussed Rirther in Cbapter 8. It is not unreasonable to suggest that the criteria used to 
consider IS project success may not be complete. Trust and additional criteria could be 
considered examples of a Type 11 error. That is to say, they may be omitted factors, 
because they are not currer* measured. This is a concern with regard to trust. The 
management and leadership literature identified trust as a key factor to success but has been 
ipored by the profession ofproject management. Trust is a success criterion that to date 
has not been not measured in IS projects. Placing the topic of trust as a risk factor could 
contribute to overcoming that current Type H error. 
2.10.2 The Delivery Ofteiia 
Almost filly years ago 011sen (197 1) included cost, quality and the as the success criteria 
into the description for project managcment. Wright (1997) reduced Oilsm's list by taking 
the view of a customer by suggesting only two parameters were important, time and 
budget. Many other writers Morris & Hough (1993), Wateridge (I 99S), deWitt (1988), 
McCoy (1987), Pinto & Slevin (1987), Saarinen (1990) and Ballantine et al (1996) all 
agreed that cost, quality and time should be used as success criteria, but not exclusively. 
Wateridge (1995) reported how criteria were ranked differently by project managers and 
users. Table 2.17 provides the results from his study. 
Users Project managers 
Meets users requirements (96) Meets users requirements (82) 
Happy users (71) Meets budget (72) 
Meets budget (67) Meets tfinescales (69) 
Figures in brackets indicate the frequency of mention as a% of a survey n- 100 
Tsble2-17 SuccessCriteria Source: Wateridge(1995) 
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While project managers focus upon their views ofproject success criteria, the users who 
may be asked to judge ifthe project was a success have been identified to have a different 
set of criteria. What emerged from the study carried out by Wateridge (1995) was the 
importance of clafifjbg the agreed project success criteria. If this is left to the various 
stakeholders, they will create their own criteria, based on self-interest not overall project or 
business objectives. One success factor that Wateridge (1995) found to be common to 
users, project managers, analyst and sponsors was '... value for the sponsor'. 
Some industries prefer to measure the success and failure oftheir project management 
differently. The American nuclear industry decided that to reduce the chance of error in 
distinguishing between success and failure they adopted the concept ofprudence. Hadzi- 
Pavlovic et al (1986) reported that by using prudence as a success criteria, a project that 
was implemented late and over budget could still be judged a success. The rationale for that 
focus was ifthe standard ofconduct owed to others was provided by a project rnanager, 
the legal meaning ofprudence was sound. That is to say, success is considered to have been 
achieved ifthe project manager had been seen to conduct the project in a reasonable, 
careK sensible, cautious and wise manner-, some of the requirements of being prudent. 
These are subjective criteria, without any real numerical value, but they are considered 
acceptable in life critical systems, thus demonstrating it is possible to judge and measure 
success and Mure without the need for 'real' numbers. 
On the other hand if a project manager was judged to some degree to have been negligent, 
the project performance ofthe project manager would be classed as irnprudent with the 
result that the project was deemed to have failed. Deciding whether a project manager had 
acted in a prudent or finprudent way could also be included in the success criteria. In this 
exarMle, it would be possible to suggest that IS projects could use some of the factors of 
prudence and imprudence as success and failure criteria in the same way the American 
nuclear industry decided to measure success. 
Williaim (1995) advised that using targets set at the start of a project should be considered 
as relative, not absolute. This view agrees with the ideas from Hadzi-Pavlovic et al (1986) 
who believed environnxntal and other changes from external project forces should also be 
included when success is to be judged. 
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It is interesting that we do not always rely upon the use of numbers to judge everything, 
even when 'real' numerical values are available. Colours have a numerical value measurable 
by the different electromagnetic wavelengths' each colour emits. However, we do not 
measure a wavelength to iden* a colour unless there is a need to be objective. It should, 
therefore, be possible to decide whether an IS project has been a success, by including non 
numeric criteria, such as the concept ofprudence, which uses factors such as careful or 
sensible, as fimetions ofproject, management. These have no real numerical values, but then 
neitber do most factors ofrisý yet they are included in a risk schedule. 
2.103 Temporary Success Criteria 
Temporary success criteria are considered during the delivery stage to gauge whether the 
project is going to plan. These temporary measurements can be considered to be measuring 
the progress to date, a type of measurement usually carried out as a method of control For 
example WAIiarns (1995) descnibed how the use of short term measures would indicate if a 
the project is going off track by using the earned value method, where actual and budgeted 
costs are compared. However deWitt (1988) points out that when costs arc used as a 
control, they measure progress, WHch is not the same as success. 
Natumlly some projects must have time and/or costs as the prime objective(s). A 
millennium project, for example, bad to be on time. Projects measured against cost, quality 
and tfine are measuring the delivery stage, ie. 'doing something right'. Meyer (1994) 
described flxw as 'results measurement', when the focus is upon the task of project 
management doing it right. Table 2.18 shows Meyer's (1994) 4 guiding principles. 
I The overarching purpose of a measurement system should be to help the team, rather than top managers, 
gauge its progress. 
2A truly empowered tcam must play the lead role in designing its own measurement 
"CM. 
3 Bemuse the team is responsible for a value-delivery process that cuts across several fimctions, ... itmust 
create measures to track did process. 
4A team should adopt only a handfid of measures (no more than 15ý the most common results measures 
are cost and schedule. 
Table 2.18 Results Measures Source: Meyer (1994) 
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For projects involving fife critical systems, quality would be the overriding criterion with a 
focus to 'getting something right'. Time and costs become secondary criteria While the 
resultant product is the focus. Alter (1996) descnibed process and organisational goals as 
two different measures of success. This takes the criteria away from measuring 'was it 
done right', to, 'did they get it right', a measure only possible for post implementation. 
However, projects are usua. Uy understood to bave hiished when the delivery of the system 
is complete. 
The criteria used in. the measurement of whether the delivery stage was a success does not 
include many elements of the resultant IS, or business benefits, as these can only be judged 
sometime post delivery. The criterion oftime seems to overarch other criteria, from being 
included in the decision of whether an IS project was a success. Providing that time is not 
critical, the criteria used to judge delivery are only one set against which success could be 
measured. 
When the process of IS project management is being measured Le. 'doing something right', 
the criteria are measuring efficiency. However, when the success of the resultant IS project 
or organisation benefits are being measured, the criterion changes to that of assessing 
Ggetting something right', meeting goals and measuring effectiveness. So what are these 
criteria that are judged post implementation or post deliverp. The following sections 
provide answers to this question. 
2.10.4 Post Delivery Criteria 
First, who should decide the criteria post delivery9 Stuckenbruck (1986) considered the 4 
most ftMortant stakeholders who could decide. These were: 
the project n=Wer, 
top mamgment, 
customer-client, 
the team members. 
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Two other possible criteria available to measure the success of the project are the resultant 
IS (the product) and the benefits to the many stakeholders involved, such as the users, 
customers or the project staff: DeLone and McLean (1992) identified 6 post 
implementation systems criteria to measure the success ofa systern, which are presented in 
Table 2.19. 
I System quality 
2 Information quality 
3 Informaticn Use 
4 Users satisfitction 
5 Individual impact 
6 Organisational impact 
Table 2.19 Systems Measures Source: DeLone and McLean (1992) 
Ballentine et al (1996) reviewed the attempts of other researchers to populate the Delone 
and McLean model and put forward some new ideas or approaches of searching for a 
criteria as a dependent variable. 
2.10.5 Post Project Delivery Benefits 
deWitt (198 8) argued project management and organisational success criteria were different 
and questioned even the purpose of attempting to measure project amWernent and 
organisational success and link between the two. deVtritt (1988) stated that they required 
separate measurement criteria. However, if project reviews were conducted, de)Xrln (1988) 
finther suggested the results should not be to determine success and fanure, but shoWd be 
used to investigate '... what went right, what went wrong and why. 
Project management and organisational success could be measured separately. Sbcnhar et 
al (1997) produced the results from 127 projects and decided upon a multidimensional 
universal fimnework for considering success. Only one stage was in the delivery phase that 
he decided was measuring project efficiency. The three other criteria suggested were all in 
the post delivery phase. They were the impact on customer, theses are measurable within a 
couple of weeks after the irnplementation, business success, that are measurable after one 
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to two years and preparing for the future rneasurable after about four to five years. Shenhar 
et al (1997) suggested project managers needed to '... see the big picture ... be aware of 
the results expected ... and 
look for long term benefits'. 
Measured results ofproject, managen=A seem to be needed as soon as possible. This limits 
longer term benefits from been included in the success criteria. Project managers are 
expected to deliver results quickly and those results are measured as soon as possible. A 
feature of Rapid Application Development (RAD) (Avison and Fitzgerald 1995) is that the 
results are delivered quickly and a more pragrnatic view may be taken ofhow success can 
be measured. This is a benefit ofthe RAD method, because time is considered to be 
'boxed' ie. the dates by when products are to be complete are set and are not extendible. 
The results (products) from a 'boxed' thne-scale may result in what are terined 'dirty' Le. 
they are not exactly as specified, but this is accepted as a success. 
Customers and users are stakeholders of IS projects and the criteria they consider as 
finportant for success should also be included in assessing a project. Deane et al (1997), 
looked at aligning project outcomes with customer needs, and viewed these as potential 
gaps which would exist if the performance was not correct giving an '... ineffective project 
result'. The five possible levels of project performance gaps are given in Table 2.20. 
Actual project outcome needed by the customer 
GapI 
Desired Project outcome as descn"bed by the customer 
Gap2 
Desired project outcome as perceived by the project team 
Gap3 
Specific project plan developed by the project team 
Gap4 
Actiml project outcome delivered to the customer 
Gap5 
Project outcome as perceived by the custmer 
Table 2.20 Ctiteiia Performance Gavs Soime: Deane et al (1997) 
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Mallak et al (1991) pointed out that there might be times when one group could be multi 
stakeholders. For exaniple, an IS project for the Govemn=t. With these projects the 
GovernmerA are the customers of the product, they also supply the capital and are the 
eventual users. Table 2.21 gives the list ofpossible stakeholders on an IS project. 
1, Workers involved with the projec4 
2. Corporate division/governmental agency, 
3. Parent corporation/government, 
4. customers, 
5. Capital suppliers, 
6. Subcontractors (consultants, contributors to the project), 
7. Users ofthe prcject, 
8. Aulhorities and regulatory agencies, 
9. The public are represented by the media, (special interest groups), 
10. Non human, scientific environment and die natural environment 
Table 211 Stakeholders Post hnillementation Source: Malbk et al (1991) 
Earlier in this Chapter Morris & Hough (1993), Watcridge (1995), deWitt (1988), McCoy 
(1987), Pinto & Slevin (1987), Saarinen (1990) and Ballantine et al (1996) included cost, 
quality and time, somethnes known as the 'Iron Triangle', as necessary criteria against 
which the success of the project management process of an IS project could be judged. At 
the same time, these writers included additional criteria that could be used post 
implementation, to enable a more complete assessment of whether an IS project was 
deemed successful. 
Considering all the points mentioned in. this section, in addition to the 'Iron Triangle' it can 
be argued that it is possible to position the additional criteria into three new categories, 
these are: 
the technical strength of the resultant IS (post implementation), 
the benefits to the resiiltant organisation (direct benefits), 
o the benefits to a wider stakeholder community (indirect benefits). 
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These 4 categories of criteria were represented as the 'Square Route', to enable project 
management to judge the level of success of an IS project, as presented in Figure 2.8. 
Iron Triangle to Sqtiare-Route of Success Criteria 
cost 
Quality Tigne 
Iron Triangle The Square-Route 
brioution 
Reoefits 
(Stakeholden) 
FiL, ure 2.8 Ile 'Sauare Route' of Success Ctiteria Source: Atkhmn (1999) 
A mapping of some of the criteria is offered in Table 2.22 
hvn Tdangle 
cost 
Quality 
Thne 
Ibe IS 
Nbintainability 
Reliability 
Validity 
Information- 
quality 
use 
Benefits 
(Organisation) 
Improved Efficiency 
Improved Effectiveness 
Increased Profits 
Strategic goals 
Organisational- 
Learning 
Reduced waste 
Benefits 
(Stakeholder conununity) 
Satisfied Users 
Social and 
Environmental impact 
Personal development 
Professional learning, 
Contractors profits 
Capital suppliers 
Content project teams 
Economic impact to surrounding 
community 
Table 2.22 Sguare Route' to Understanding Success Oiteria Source: Atkhson (1999) 
Table 2.22 was not intended to offer an exhaustive list. The 'Square Route' is intended to 
indicate that there are 3 other types of success criteria and provides examples of what they 
could contain, some also Meted by other authors. For example one factor leading to a 
successful project may include the degree to which tearn members trust each other. The 
BeDefib 
(Organisation) 
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project may fail in one or more of the 'Iron Triangle, criteria, but the existence of trust 
would be an additional measure of a benefit to the stakeholder conununity. 
Exchanging one set of sucem criteria for another is not a suggested option. What is 
unportant is that there are differences between the criteria for measuring project 
management and the resultant IS, that are both different from the benefits the project 
should deliver. Success for project management is usually measured against the criteria of 
cost, quality and thm. These criteria focus upon the delivery stage of a project, 'getting it 
right'. The 'Square Route' provides a consolidated view of additional criteria. 
2.11 Summary 
At the start ofthis Chapter, three domains were identified to create the boundary for the 
literature search. First was a review of the options that different types of IS projects create 
for those charged with their strategic selection for both public and private sector 
organisations. This was Mustrated, in Figure 22. By drawing parallels between the a)dom 
presented by Beer (1985) and the IS project environment, it was considered that some 
failures of IS projects could be considered inevitable. 
The second section reviewed the project management and management literature 
highlighting that many factors for management had been adopted by project management, 
with one notable exception. The suFJect of trust had been found in the managen-ient and 
leadership literature but was identified as a gap in the project management literature, 
including the APM BoK (1995) and BS 6079 (1996). It was argued that if it was 
established that trust was a success factor ofIS projects, this could be considered to be a 
'sin of ornission' for project management. It was further suggested that the profile of trust 
would be raised if it was measured. This could be achieved if trust was included as an 
integral part of a risk register, via the use of a project trust audit. 
Finally, the fixtors and criteria used in IS project management were reviewed. Tile success 
filctors identified by other researchers were considered, but despite this it was not possible 
to offer any direct cause for the low failure rate ofIS projects. However, flictors finked to 
fidilure as opposed to success factors were argued as being the most critical of critical 
success factors. The elk&jation ofthose failure factors would be required to ensure that 
success factors would have the best chance of achieving success. 
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This was followed by a discussion about the criteria used to measure the success of IS 
projects. Cost, quality and time, sometimes collectively known as the 'Iron Triapoe', were 
argued to be limited as they were only linked to the project management fimetion. A new 
method of considering additional success criteria was presented in the 'Square Route', 
Mustrated in Figure 2.8 and expanded in Table 2.22. It was suggested that the existing 
limited criteria used to measure the success of IS projects was a finther example of a 'sin 
of omission7 within project management. That is to say it was not 'wrong' to use limited 
criteria to judge success, but that they were not as complete as they could be. 
Following this literature review, it was decided to focus on; success flictors, criteria, the use 
made of COTS, trust, project duratior4 staffnumbers, project costs, tools and techniques, 
in order to research into whether the low success rate of IS projects could be improved. 
The following Chapter provides a discussion ofresearch methodologies, together with the 
reason for selecting the research approach and research methods used to conduct this 
study. 
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Chapter 3 
3.0 Research Approach 
3.1 Introduction 
niis Chapter desmibes and justifies the research approach and the nx-thods used in this 
study. 
In Chapter Ia brief statement positioned this research within the epistemological domain of 
IS project management. Research methods appropriate to this are discussed in the generic 
research literature for business and management from Saunders et al (1997), Easterby-Smith 
et al (1994), Rairnond (1993) and Hussey and Hussey (1997). More importantly, IS projects 
provided the data population from where the data was collected. This indicated that research 
approaches and methods specifically intended for IS should be considered for this research. 
These were found in the literature from the International Federation of Information 
Processing (IRP) Working Group 8.2. A colloquium, held at the Manchester Business 
School in 1984 by Mumford (1985) considered new approaches and research methods into 
IS that became a defining work for those involved in such research. That work has since 
been extended by Galliers (1992) and firffier (IFIP) WG 8.2 meetings such as Lee et al 
(1997) and informed the approach and methods used for this research as discussed next. 
A two stage research approach was devised integrating complementary research methods. 
Stage one was conducted by the administration ofquestionnaires. The questions were 
developed from the detailed secondary literature research presented in Chapter 2. This 
resulted in a focus on the influence which: success factors: criteria, the use made of COTS, 
trust, project duration, staffnumbers, project costs, tools and techniques have on the success 
rate of IS projects. 
The rationale for adopting this research approach was as follows. The subject issue of this 
research as stated in Cbapter I was 'how the low success rate of IS projects could be 
improved'. Researching reasons for success and failure ofIS projects would naturally need 
to involve people in organisational settings. In deciding upon a suitable research method, 
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Antill (1985) considered IS as a set ofhybrid activities that Mumford (1985) and Hirschheini 
(1985) believed should be researched using a range ofresearch methods. Galliers (1992) 
positioned IS as a 'social system' and a 'multi-disciplinary endeavour' with contributions 
from several sources including beha"oural science, maths, engineering, natural science and 
linguistics. Galliers (1992) believed for such a broad subject domain, no single research 
method was possible, as stated by the post positivism methodological pluralism view. 
The topic for this research could be argued to belong in part to the phenomenological 
paradigrn. At the same time there would be some discrete quantifiable data that neither the 
researcher nor the respondents were able to influence, indicating the topic could also be 
researched within the positivistic paradigm. Consequently, it was decided to use a two stage 
research methodology, referred to as a triangulation oftnethods by Gallivan (1997), Which 
had a benefit of supporting the validity ofthe data. The benefits of using multi method 
approaches are as follows. Saunders et al (1997) desenibe how '... different methods can be 
used for different purposes in a study' and that '... although questionnaires may be used as 
the only data collection method, it is often better to link them with other methods in a mixed 
method approach,. Multi methods have the advantage that they allow the triangulation of the 
results to take place. Saunders et al (1997) argues this to be of great benefit as, '... the 
results will be affected by the method used and .... since different methods have different 
effects, it makes sense to use different methods to cancel out the method effect. This would 
lead to greater confidence being placed in the conclusions. 
Using triangulation it is possible to have either within-method or mixed methods (Gallivan G, 
1997). Within-method uses two measurements using the same method within the same 
research paradigm. The alternative is a mixed methods triangulation where two different 
research methods from either a single or both paradigms (positivistic and phenomenological) 
would be selected and the results from both methods analysed and compared in the research 
findings. Following a comprehensive literature review and the setting ofthe research aims 
and objectives, the two stage, mixed method, sequential approach was designed; the exact 
method to be used for the second stage was not known until the data collected from stage I 
was anabwd. 
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Questionnaires are usually associated with the positivistic paradigm. Linking suitable 
research methods to paradigms was achieved by comparing the views of Rairnond (1993), 
Easterby-Smith et al, (1994), Gill and Johnson (199 1), Saunders et al (1997) and Hussey and 
Hussey (1997). A summary ofthe key points is presented in Table 3.1. 
Positivism 
Cross-section studies 
Experiments 
Longitudinal studies 
Surveys (large) 
Phenomenology 
Action research (apphed) 
Case studies 
Ethnographic (of people) 
Grounded theory 
Participative enqwry (with people) 
Surveys (small) 
Table 3.1 Tvves of Research Methods 
These authors all discussed the two paradigms and the associated methods most likely to 
provide reliable and valid results, endorsing the mixed method research adopted for this 
study. Research methods are not mutually exclusive to either paradigm, it depends upon 
their use, as can be seen in Table 3.1. One difference is that large surveys would usually be 
associated with the positivistic paradigm wMe small surveys are undertaken and the results 
considered using the interpretative method. 
The questionnaire used for stage I was undertaken within the phenomenology paradigm, 
using what could be considered a small survey. Why is that the most appropriate method for 
this study? One reason is the inability to identify the complete data population for IS 
projects on a global, or even on a UK basis. The Association for Project Management have 
appro)dmately 13,000 members but this is only a fiaction of the population considered to be 
linked to IS projects and project management. It would therefore be impossible to suggest 
that a true random data collection could ever take place within the subject fi-amework of IS 
projects, since the boundary is unknown. Other researchers such as Wateridge (1996), Pinto 
(1988) and the large survey conducted by the Standish Group reported in Gallagher (1995) 
could only use a snapshot of a limited set ofdata. It is suggested that understanding how the 
success rate for IS projects can be improved, would be achieved by consolidating all the 
research findings, with each individual study providing a set of unique or supportive findings 
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from an unrepeatable data boundary. Hussey and Hussey (1997) argued that the actual 
number of questionnaires used is not irnportant, what they consider important is whether the 
results provide any usefid indications. Tlie study by Peters and Waterman (1982) used 64 
companies in the USA as their data source, yet their results were generalised to represent 
excellence across USA business. 
Eastffby-Smith et al. (1994) argued a researcher should undersLTO what carm firs4 I... data 
or theory'. The first stage of this research, was to start from data relathig to successful IS 
projects leading to a theory which could studied in greater detail in stage 2. 
Having decided upon the research approach and method for stage 1, the next consideration 
was, how were the questions for the questionnaire selected? Gill & Johnson (1991) 
suggested '... prior consideration ofthe relevant theory and literature may be vital in 
determining what kinds of questions need to be asked'. This was achieved by undertaking 
the literature review and the interpretative decision by the author in selecting which fictors 
were believed to be important. Wthin a traditional scientific study the researcher is required 
to be external to the research, (value free), thus unable to influence the results. Within 
phenomenology it is accepted that it is difficult to consider that the history the researcher 
brings to the work will not influence a study, thus changing the status to value laden. Garcia 
and Quek (1997) observed, '... it is a myth that the researcher can claim value neutrality in 
social research. However, providing the bias that may be introduced by the researcher are 
declared, they can be taken into consideration during the evaluation of the results stage. This 
is seen as a strength by Garcia and Quek (1997) who pointed out that '... using qualitative 
methods in the research process is a reflective activity, constantly informing the researcher's 
actions' which in turn '... permits deeper undemanding'. Furthermore, Galliers (1992) 
reminds us that epistemology refers to our theory of knowledge, in particular how we argue 
what is valid knowledge and how it can be obtained. Naturally within this context, the 
selection of the question topics were influenced or biased by what the author believed to be 
of importance. Galliers (1992) also points out that the process of obtaining valid knowledge 
is the transformation from what we think to be true (doxa), to what we know to be true 
(episteme), wlich is a matter of societal (or group) acceptance. The subjective influence and 
possible value laden bias which the writer brings to the selection of the topics for inclusion in 
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the questionnaire for stage I provides further support that the approach was more 
appropriate to be considered under the phenomenology paradigm. 
The second stage ofthe research built on a significant finding from stage 1, which indicated 
the likely importance of trust to IS project success. The next problem was the selection of 
the most appropriate research paradigm and method for use in stage 2. It was decided to 
start from the theory developed and argued in stage one, leading to new data. Stage two of 
the research was conducted by the design and administration of a project management game, 
which had a focus on trust in project teams. Using the argume-nt of Galliers (1992), the 
method used for stage 2 could have been considered under either the scientific or 
interpretative approaches as indicated in Table 3.2. 
Scientific Interpretivist 
Laboratory experirrents Subjectivelargumentative 
Field experiments Reviews 
Surveys Action research 
Case studies Descriptive/interpretive 
Ibeorem. proof 
Forecasting Futures research 
Simulation Rolelgame playing 
Table 3.2 Information Systems Research Approaches Source: GaRiers (1992) 
It was possible to set and test a hypothesis for stage 2 using Project Paradox to collect the 
data. However, due to the interpretative nature of the experiment it was decided to consider 
stage 2 ofthis research also within the phenomenology paradigm Combining the 
phenomenology of stage I with that of stage 2, resulted in an overall mixed method research 
approach. It is possible to conduct these independently or sequentially (Craffivan 1997). Ibis 
research used the sequential method, building stage 2 upon the results from stage 1. The 
benefit of using a sequential triangulation of methods is that two sets of results are available 
for analysis in addition to the combination ofresuhs. A potential problem with this approach 
is that the results from two different methods may not produce a synergy of findings. This 
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would not be wrong, but if it occurred would not pennit a strong conchision to be drawn 
until the research was repeated, perhaps several times to ensure reliability. 
3.2 Stage 1- The Questionnaire 
The design of the questionnaire and the wording ofthe questions used in stage I for this 
research were selected following the literature review, these domains were IS, management 
and project management. 
The design of the questionnaire included a pilot study. The questionnaire was designed and 
structured into three sections. Section one contained questions about the number of 
successful and failed projects that the respondents have been involved with. These were 
closed questions which were designed to detennirie on balance, whether the respondents had 
been, involved more with successful or ffied IS projects. These questions were designed to 
collect discrete quantifiable data. The purpose of section one was to enable a comparison to 
be made between the results from this survey and the results from other researchers such as 
the Gallagher (1995) report, presented in Chapter I that indicated very low success rates. 
Section two ofthe questionnaire was designed to collect information about one specific 
successful project in which each respondent had been involved. THS section was based 
upon a range of question types in order to obtain a triangulation of data. For example, 
section two contained some questions to generate discrete quantifiable data. Data such as 
the duration ofthe project and the number of staff involved. This was specifically included in 
order to test whether 'Brooks Law' concerning the number of staff and the duration of a 
project was repeatable and applied in practice. Section two also contained some behavioural 
questions. These types of questions were used to identify the experiences the respondents 
bad in projects. 
Wateridge (1996) studied the success and failure of IS projects using attitudinal surveys, 
thereby building up a picture of what people thought were the reasons for success. Peters 
and Waterman (1982) on the other hand used behavioural questions in their study of 
successful conipanies. The questionnaire designed for this research used a combination of 
attitudinal and bebavioural questions to understwid wbat the respondents thought to be 
success factors while at the same time obtaining factual data about what was taking place. 
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As stated above, the selection of the factors used in the questionnaire for section two of the 
questionnaire was carried out after the evaluation of the literature as discussed in detail in 
Chapter 2. Naturally, not all fictors identified in the literature search could be included in this 
questionnaire. Those selected were based on the subjective view of the researcher who 
considered thern worthy of further investigation. 
The final section of the questionnaires asked respondents to consider specific issues relating 
to tug. The topic of trust had emerged as a gap in the literature, following the literature 
review The questions in section three were a categorical, dm*tive tyw question, which 
were further sub divided into 2 types. The first type was an attitudinal question where the 
respondents were asked iftheyfelt that trust had been broken in project teams. The second 
was a beliefquegtion where the respondents were asked did they believed project controls 
could replace trust. The replies to these questions infomied the second stage ofthe research, 
which underpinned the design of the new game, called Project Paradox. 
The questions for stage I were developed using questionnaire design criteria as described by 
Oppenheirn (1966), Hussey and Hussey (1997) and Saunders et al, (1997). Both qualitative 
and quantitative questions were to be used in the survey. The pflot run identified changes 
that were required to the questionnaire, such as some re-wording and providing additional 
space on a form Data were collected using a non-probability nxthod, the sample was 
chosen by employing the subjective view of the researcher. The analysis and evaluation of 
the replies to the questionnaire are presented in Chapter 4. 
3.3 Survey AdminWration 
In the third year oftheir studies at the Business School in Bournemouth University, the 
students undertake a placement year in industry. Those students who had a placement within 
an Organisation involved with IS projects were provided with a quesdomaire to admfiiister 
to project management stafl: A formal briefing meeting was held with the students where the 
airn of the research was explained and when any questions from the students were answered. 
Through this approach the study adhered to the seffadministered group distribution and 
collection method as recommended by Hussey and Hussey (1997), benefits ofwhich 
included low costs and a high return rate. 
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Utilising groups to administer questionnaires have been validated by other researchers as a 
reliable method of data coRection. Oppenheim (1966) also suggests what he called '... 
group administered questionnaires' as a reliable method of data gathering. The mwhanism of 
using students to administer the questionnaire increased the chance of delivery to the 
respondents and ensured an increase in control and reliability over the delivery channel. 
Hussey and Hussey (1997) suggest phenomenology seeks to understand human behaviour 
and this is not achieved by large surveys. The results of large surveys are easier to 
generalise, but only through the analysis of small qualitative samples are the results more 
lRely to be specific and indicate profound insights into complex problems. Such phenomena 
are especially relevarA in the field ofbusiness and IS projects. 
Hussey and Hussey (1997) further suggested a requirement for a survey is that the 
researcher '... needs a prior understanding of the attributes of the target population. To 
meet this criterion the population from which this study was conducted was known, because 
they were all involved in IS projects and employed students from the Business School at 
Bournemouth University or had experience known to the researcher. The attributes of the 
target population were therefore known and the target population filtered before the survey 
took place. 
While the names of the organisations were known, the survey was conducted in a way to 
enable then to remain anonymous, if they so wished. A record was maintaftied to identify the 
students, (not the respondents), who had not obtained a completed questionnaire. No 
comments or remarks niade are attributed to any individual or organisation. Ten of the 
organisations selected were prepared to contribute by completing the questionnaire, while 
requesting anonymity. The majority of organisations were willing to be listed as contributors 
of this research. Appendix D lists the organisations who contributed data and did not wish to 
remain anonymous. 'Me surveys were carried out between 1996 and 1998. The 
questionnaire was delivered to 70 respondents. From this 5 replies were not usable. 
Following the analysis ofthe valid replies it was decided to adrnfiiister the survey a second 
time. Survey I had produced some interesting restilts about the topics selected, but the 
specific topic of trust had indicated such a significant response that it was considered worth 
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capturing additional responses from other respondents. The questions for the second survey 
covered the same topics as survey 1, but to improve the presentation of the questionnaire 
some of the questions were re-worded. During the analysis stage it was decided that when 
the wording of the questions was not the same in surveys I and 2 the amb7sis should be 
conducted separately. The second survey bad 20 replies, representing a 100% response rate. 
On reflection, it may bave been better to have used exactly the same questionnaire for a 
second survey that was used in the first, although this is not an imperative. However, the 
second administration of the questionnaire provided information to strengthen the findings 
from the first. Copies of the questionnaires for surveys I and 2 can be found in Appendices 
E and F respectively. 
3.4 Replies to the Surveys 
In total 85 valid replies were received for analysis. For a survey Which seeks to understand 
the reasons behind a phenomenon, namely a low success rate for IS projects, Oppenhefin 
(1966) suggests that I ... a samples accuracy is more important than its size'. To ensure non- 
resPondents did not introduce bias into the data each student who was not able to return a 
completed questionnaire was interviewed. Some students were not able to submit a uniquely 
completed questionnaire because more than one student was working in the same 
Organisation for the same manager (questionnaire respondent). These duplicated replies were 
therefore excluded to Prevent bias in the data. The students bad a finite time to obtain the 
completed questionnaire. This was done to create a focused time-scale for the students and 
keep the research moving- Follow up letters were sent to students who had not returned a 
completed questionnaire from their manager, Le. for non-respondents. A random selection 
Of respondents were phoned to ensure that they and not the student bad completed the 
questionnaire. Respondents who did complete the questionnaire could be considered to 
belong to a group who shared common features. Those features would include respondents 
who were interested in the subject, held an opinion they wished to pass on, believed they 
could answer the questions and/or bad time to answer the questions. 
3.5 Stage 2- Testing for Co-operation and Trust 
The second stage ofthe research involved the design, testing, and administration of a new 
business game called Project Paradox. The overall purpose ofthis was to test whether staff 
in a simulated IS project enviromnent would have a propensity to work together in a co- 
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operative collaborative manner to achieve a successful project. The hypothesis was set to 
test whether staff would exhibit a propensity to co-operate and collaborate to achieve a 
successful IS project greater tlmn if the decisions to co-operate were taken at random 
Therefore, the approach for the second stage started from theory and lead to data as 
discussed by Easterby-Smith et al (1994). As discussed earlier in this Chapter, the second 
stage utilised the interpretative paradigm within the approaches discussed by Galliers (1992), 
illustrated in Table 3.2. Saunders et al (1997) described a deductive approach method, and 
identified the 5 sequential phases that need to be in place. These phases are presented below, 
together with a description (given in italics), ofhow this research adhered to those 
requirements: 
1. Phase 1, deducing a hypothesis (a testable proposition about a relationship between two 
or more events or concepts) - 7his was achieved by idewj6dng a gap in the literature and 
ftom the results ofthe stage I questionnaire relating to trust. 
2. The second phase required the hypotbesis. in operational tenns, which proposed a 
relationship between two specific terms.. A hypothesis was developed to test whether 
project team wouldexhibit apropensity to co-operate to achieve a successfulproject 
greater than if the decisions to co-operate were made at random 
3. T11e third phase required the testing of that operational hypothesis. This was achieved by 
developing a research instrument to test the hypothesis given in phase 2 above. Ae 
development of that instrument (Project Paradox) was undertaken by the design of an 
IS case study over the period ofa year where post graduate and undergraduate students 
were used to pilot the game to ensure the rubric was understandable. Changes were 
made to the case study based onfeedbackfirom the students and through observation 
when the simulated business scenarios were being rm 7hefinalised instrument was 
populated Wth 2100 randomly generated data items. 7his resulted in understanding the 
behaviour ofProject Paradox when decisions about whether to co-operate or not uere 
taken simply at random Yhe outputftom the simulation provided data; against which 
the results ofScenarios I and 2 could be compared and contrasted Scenario I involved 
running Project Paradox 14 times over the next year with students who had experience 
of ISprojects. In addition to cepturing the specific dataftom Project Paradox, during 
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the running ofScena7lo 1, comments and statements uere also recordedfrom students 
that indicated why they had used their chosen strateo, to make the decisions about 
whether to co-operate. 
4. The ne)a phase required the examinafion, of the outcome of the experfinent. Such a 
mechanism would either tend to confirm the theory or Mcate the need for its 
modification. 77ze resultsfirom the runsftom scenario I were analysed and conclusions 
could be drawn Changes were made to the environment ofProject Paradox and a 
fialher 14 runs called Scenario 2 were undertaken as described next 
5. The 5 th and final phase requir-ed (ifnecessary) the theory to be rnodified in light of the 
firidings. Scenario 2 was carried out in an attempt to verify the revised theory by 
repeatmg the cycle. 7hisfinalphase was done by a&wnistenng the Project Paradox an 
additional 14 times, Scenario 2 ofProject Paradox took afiviher year to administer in 
order that the same profile ofthose takingpart in the game uvre the same as those in 
Scenario 1. 
A game was used because it has often been argued to be a reliable method to collect data. 
Business games and simulations provide an environment where the behaviour of those taking 
part can be recorded. Petraneli (1994) bas designed business game-s over a 25 year period 
and produced a set of 17 principles for their design and running. A major point from 
Petraneli (1994) was that simulations '... dramatically conveyed major messages' and that 
'. .. ifyou want people to open up, play a simulation. Rather than simulations being a false 
representation ofthe real world, Petraneh (1994) believed they encourage people to bebave 
in an open manner thus reflecting reality. 
This game was designed to investigate whether those in an IS project environment would 
exhibit a trusting style of working. Should the players have known the real objective, that is 
to say, if they knew what was being measured, they may have behaved in a way they thought 
they were expected to, introducing bias into the dam To overcome this possible bias the 
game was designed as a placebo, which is discussed later in this Chapter. 
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Wolfe (1985) suggested that each simulation would have a number of effective elements 
which the design, administration, player characteristics and administrators' characteristics 
would need to ensure were present, one of these is the 'starting position. To comply with 
this, the team formation stage ofProject Paradox was achieved by having the researcher 
select the members of the teams at random from student seminar groups. Teams were 
therefore comprised of players who may or may not have previously been known to, or 
worked with each other. This method ofteam selection was carried out to reflect the way IS 
project teams are normally formed. IS project teams often have consultants working 
alongside in-house team members At the same time some team members may have 
previously worked together and could have formed some views about each other, either 
good or bad. 
Gill and Johnson (199 1) pointed out that wben an experiment is undertaken that includes 
individuals, it is important to consider elements termed the experimental 'artefacts'. These 
are artificial variables introduced by the very design of an experimental method ofresearch. 
In the same way that the stage I questionnaire survey bad to be designed to enhance the 
ralidity ofthe data, the design of Project Paradox bad to take into account what is termed 
the ecological validity. That is to say, was it likely Project Paradox would produce the same 
result if it was undertaken outside the research experiment type environment. This has be= 
achieved by running Project Paradox, on invitation, within major organisations. The purpose 
ofthis was two fold. Firstly, the organisations, wanted their project managers to experience 
the issues of trust and co-operation that Project Paradox achieved. Secondly the data 
received from the organisations provided the validity of Project Paradox in the work setting. 
Reducing the experiný arteficts was furtba achieved by designing Project Paradox as a 
placebo game. The players were not aware ofthe real purpose until it was con43leted. The 
players believed they were taking part in a game, simply as a learning vehicle, related to the 
decision rnaking of project teams within an IS project environment. The rubric for the game 
was given to players to study, with questions and d%ification taking pLwe before the first 
team decisions took place. Players had to decide whether to co-operate in a given project 
scenario as shown in Appendix G. The underpinning for the decision was whether they 
trusted the other teams. This however, raised the ethics of using people in an experiment 
within a placebo role. In this study the players were informed about the real purpose of the 
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game after it bad been completed, but before they dispersed. By doing this, a discussion 
within the leaniing environment was facilitated although the players would not be aware of 
the underling purpose while the game was in. progress. However, the discussion following a 
run of'Project Paradox enabled an open debate about what had taken place during the 
running of the game and reasons for the decisions that had been taken. The argument about 
the ethics using placebo studies is relevant when those taking part are never informed of the 
real objectives and when those taking part may be at some personal risk. Players of Project 
Paradox were eventually infomied of the real purpose, they were under no personal risk and 
the benefit was that a learning environment had been created. Interim findings from Project 
Paradox were presented at a refereed conference Atkinson (2000). The type of trust that the 
players of Project Paradox were considering is called calculus, the lowest form of trust. A 
detailed explanation of the different types and levels of trust is given in Chapter 5. 
Each run of Project Paradox took approximately an hour. Each complete run comprised of 7 
collective decisions to be made by the nve-mbers of each of 3 teams, hence 21 decisions in all. 
The design of Project Paradox incorporated elements of the well established project 
management structure, Projects in Controlled Environments (PRINCE 2) by having 
Business, Technical and User assurance teams. The teams were given time to read the rubric 
and decide their strategy of co-operation and decision making, while knowing what the 
consequences of their decisions could be. The decisions of the members of the teams to 
either co-operate or not co-operate that were recorded during the running of Project 
Paradox were relayed back to all team menabers at the end of each decision. This enabled 
team members to have the history of the decision making from the other team members 
before they made their subsequent decisions. 
A more detafled description of the developmmt and testing of the Project Paradox and the 
results obtained using random data and data from teams ofplayers, can be found in Cbapters 
6 and 7 respectively. 
3.6 Limitations to the Research Metho& 
The research approach for Stage I was via the use of a questionnaire. It was discussed how 
the researcher would be value laden and influence such as the questions usedL The question 
topics selected were a direct result of the analysis of the literature review and were stated in, 
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the surrunary of Chapter 2. For stage 2 it was decided to use a deductive method. This was 
achieved by utilising a game to test a hypothesis. However, it is not always possible to use 
deductive logic as a meffiod of reasoning even within this method. Although a correlation 
may be fourA there may still be no linkage between the research variables. When it is not 
possible to use deductive logic, the argument has to be made intuitively using inductive 
logic. Inductive logic uses the soundness of inference for which evidence is not conclusive, 
such as would be available using a positivistic approach, but on the balance of probability. 
For example, it would be unreasonable, (although not tested), to suggest that the project 
manager was the cause of every failed IS projecL Although a perfect correlation would be 
found between having a fidled IS project and the project having a project manager, this still 
represents a weak finkage or iderence to suggest that the project nwiager 'caused' the 
ffiure. 
When inductive logic is used to argue a point, bias can be introduced by the possible 
presence of flillacies. Below are some examples of Macies, which can exist within inductive 
logic. These were taken into consideration during the analysis of the results. Typically, the 
fallacies that could exist within inductive logic research are as follows: 
"a Ulacy of 'divisioif and 'composition, where the attributes of an individual cannot be 
generalised to the population, 
" thefidlacy of 'non-sequitur` where a story line does not follow in either chronological or 
logical sequence, 
"a 'statistical Macy' where non significant results are used without any other supporting 
material to argue a case, 
" The fidlacy of 'post hoc ergo proctor hoc'.. simply because that occurred after this, 
therefore that must have occurred on account of this. 
During the analysis and evaluation of the results these possible fidlacious arguments were 
taken into consideration as a source ofpossible bias. 
3.7 Summary 
The argument and rationale for using a2 stage approach with a sequentW triangulation of 
mixed methods for this research has been presented. The me-thod of data coUection used for 
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each of the 2 stages maintained the valklity of the data. Data tiangulation on the other band 
supported the data verification that in turn provided the reliability of the results. 
Both stage I and 2 were conducted within the phenomenological and interpretative 
approach. The method used to administer the survey questionnaire for stage I and the data 
population was also identifiedL Project Paradox, was developed and run for stage 2 to test 
whether IS project teams would have a propensity to co-operate, through trust, to achieve a 
successful IS project. The validity ofProject Paradox was discussed showing how the 5 
sequential phases for a deductive method were followed. Additional validity of stage 2 was 
further achieved when the possible experimental artefacts were reduced by designing Project 
Paradox as a placebo scenario. 
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Chapter 4 
4.0 Analysis of the Questionnaire 
4.1 Introduction 
The results from stage I are presented as descriptive statistics and include an analysis and 
discussion of what the results indicate and how they relate to the secondary literature 
reported in Chapter 2. Survey I had 70 replies, with 5 spoiled fonns. Survey 2 had 20 
replies, all valid. 
If a reply to a question in the questionnaire could not be included, this did not result in the 
entire questionnaire having to be rejected. Where individual questions were rejected, the 
analysis took this into account when the results were produced and the presentation of the 
results indicates the number ofrespondents. 
The Mowing sections discuss the questions in the questionnaire, together with the anabrsis 
of the responses. For each question, relevant academic, commercial and management issues 
are raissed which are foHowed by the amlysis ofthe responses. 
As discussed in Chapters I and 2, researchers such as the Gallagher (1995) report that the 
majority oflS projects resulted in fiffire. Questions one and two were included in the 
questionnaire to vm* whether the respondents bad on balance been involved with more 
successful or ffled information systems projects. 
4.2 Success and Failure Rates 
The replies to questions one and two show the respondents bad been involved in 702 
successful projects and 135 unsuccessfid projects over a5 year period. These were closed 
questions. The results from questions I and 2 indicate a success rate of 83.8% for the 837 
IS projects, success in terms ofthis research being stated on the questionnaires. This result 
would appear to contradict the results concerning the rate ofproject success published in 
the literature while accepting the criteria to measure success rnay be different. However, 
from a more recent survey by VvUe and Fortune (2002) a success rate of4 I% from a 
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fi-aw of 236 was reported which agrees more with these results. The results of questions 
one and two are presented in Figure 4.1. 
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Fieure 4.1 Success Rate of Proiects fOr Respondents 
The high success rate indicates this data population could be different from other surveys, 
yet the survey data was not stratified, nor were the respondents a self selecting group. 
'Me Gallagher (1995) statistics, taken from American projects, suggests the Uure rate to 
be as high as 54%. The Gallagher results were based on 175000 projects, while this study 
researched 837 IS projects. Adding to the picture of the high failure rate of IS projects was 
the tertiary data obtained from the Computing Journal, presented in Tables 1.1,1.2 and 1.3 
in Chapter 1. It is worth noting however that only failed projects were reported. There must 
have been successful IS projects too during the same period, but these were not reported. 
A reason for reporting failures only, could be that project success is the expected outcome. 
The examples of failed projects, presented in Tables 1.1,1.2 and 1.3 respectively could 
therefore be considered as exception reporting. 
The results from question I and 2 are a general descriptive statistic from 837 IS projects 
that indicated a success rate of 83.8% experienced by those respondents. This result is 
significant in that it challenges the literature that suggests a high rate of IS project faures. 
Attempting to indicate the true success rate of IS projects will always be difficult. In order 
to generalise the results of any research that attempts to identify the rate of project success, 
C" 
Survey I 
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it would need the data to be obtained from a random sample of the complete population of 
those involved with IS projects. There are over 13,000 members of the Association for 
Project Management (APM) in the UK, but it is estimated that there are more than 50,000 
project managers. Wateridge (1996) experienced difficulty in obtaining data about success 
and failure factors. In an attempt to increase the number of replies to his questionnaire, he 
wrote to all members of the APM and received only 13 replies. But the Gallagher (1995) 
results and those obtained by Wateridge (1996) were significant within the boundary of 
their research fi-ame. From this, it is suggested that while the rate of project success 
identified by this research was considerably higher than that indicated fi7orn other studies, 
these results are significant within the data population used. 
4.3 Questions Specific to One Successful IS Project 
The respondents for survey I were asked to select one successful project on which they 
had worked, and provide some additional in-depth information. The replies to these 
questions can therefore be used to build up a picture of some of the fimctions and factors 
taking place in successful projects. 
4.3.1 Support Tools 
The aim of three questions in section two of the questionnaire was to identify the usage of, 
a project management methodology, a systems development methodology and computer 
assisted software engineering (CASE) tools. All the 65 respondents replied to the question 
referring to the use of project management methodologies, two replies were not completed 
for the questions relating to systems development and three did not answer the CASE 
question. The responses are presented in Figure 4.2 as percentages. 
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Figure 4.2 Pro *ect Management Support Toob 
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Although the majority (631/o) of the projects had been managed using a formal project 
management methodology, clearly the success of IS projects is not dependent upon its use. 
But it was sWrising that a project management methodology was not used on more 
projects. To validate this response, on return from their placement year, the students 
confirmed that not all the organisations, were using any formal project management 
methodology. The reason why only 44% ofthe successful projects had followed a systems 
design methodology is understandable, since mmy projects were using package solutions, 
(COTS) rather than in-house development, see section 4.5. What is interesting however, is 
the comparatively small number 14% ofprojects which used a software tool to support the 
project, particularly since these were IS projects. 
The APM BoK (revised 2000) indicates the benefits ofusing a project manageinent 
methodology and systems design methodology, however, using a CASE tool is not 
specifically advised. At the same tiine caution has been given not to allow the technology 
to become the focus of a project in place ofthe stated business aim and objectives. While 
CASE tools can provide support for IS projects, success has been shown to be possible 
without their use. 
4.4 Project Staff 
Focusing upon core work is becoming a more favoured strategy within business, commerce 
and industry. The benefits of such a strategy include using the expertise of consultants for 
specialist tasks in support of a project without having to make provision for their continued 
ernployment. A question was included in the questionnaire to detemAne the extent to which 
consultants were being used on any stages ofthese successful projects 
Fibwc 4.3 shows the percentage of successfid IS projects when external consultants were 
employed. All 65 replies to this question were valid. Using consultants to support project 
work introduces a new group of stakeholders to be managed. Business contracts are used 
to control the consultants. But the selection oftemporary consultancy teams changes the 
type of trust in operation within a project. The dynamics of teams change when they have 
to engage in what is ternied 'Swift Trust' (Jarvenpaa et al 1998), caused in part by limited 
knowledge ofthe consultants. This is discussed in detail in Chapter 5. 
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4.3 Use made of Consultants 
'Me results show that 46% of the projects used only in-house staff while 54% made use of 
consultants during one or more of the stages. Further analysis indicated that it was during 
the inception stage of these projects when consultants were used most; this was discussed 
in Chapter 2 as arguably the most important stage when the strategy and direction is 
formed. 
From those 46% (30 projects) which used only in-house staff, 22 were able to confirm both 
the nurnber of staff involved and the duration of the projects. The combination of those two 
replies made it possible to analyse the nurnber of staff and the total number of man months. 
4.4.1 Testing 'Brooks Law' 
In Chapter 2 it was suggested that estimating the optimum number of staff for an IS project 
could be achieved by using 'Brooks Law'. This states that the optimum number of staff 
required can be calculated by taking the square root of the estimated total of man months. 
An analysis was undertaken of the actual number of staff used in the successful projects 
with the optimum number of staff according to 'Brooks Law' as shown in Table 4.1. From 
the 22 successful projects, 21 had used less than, or equal to, the optimum number of staff 
according to 'Brooks Law'. 
The results in Table 4.1 indicate 3 projects with a balance of zero in column F used the 
optimum number of staff to complete the project. As shown in Table 4.1 project serial 
number 61 used 6 staff for a period of 6 months resulting in a total of 36 man months. 
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Taking the square root of this total gives a result of 6 gaff, the optimum number according 
to 'Brooks Law'. 
Only one project, serial number 5 1, resulted with a positive balance in column F. That 
indicates the project used more staffthan the optimum when calculated using 'Brooks 
Law'. Using project serial number 51 with 12 staff as an example, this took 10 months to 
complete, giving a total of 120 man months duration for the project. The optimum number 
of staff for this project, calculated by taking the square root of 120 would be 10.9. This 
suggests 1.1 more staff were used when cornpared to the optimum number. However, this 
same result could have been possible, not only because there were more staff than the 
optuntun number, but because the project may have been completed earlier than the project 
plan indicated. 
Optimum number of staff 
A B c D E F 
Serial no. Number of staff Durabon Max man months Optimum Balance 
used BXC q(B x C) B-E 
4 3 3 9 3 0 
11 3 12 36 6 -3 
12 6 12 72 8.4 -2.4 
18 25 36 900 30 -5 
24 5 6 30 5A -0.4 
26 2 9 18 4.2 -2.2 
30 5 6 30 5.4 -0.4 
31 5 5 25 5 0 
32 5 15 75 8.6 -3.6 
39 15 26 390 19.7 -4.7 
42 4 24 96 9.7 -5.7 
45 3 7 21 4.5 -1.5 
48 8 12 96 9.7 -1.5 
49 8 24 208 14A -6A 50 5 6 30 5.4 -0.4 51 12 10 120 10.9 1.1 
53 10 15 150 12.2 -2-2 56 5 12 60 7.7 -2.7 58 2 15 30 5.4 -3.4 59 10 12 120 10.9 -0.9 
61 6 6 36 6 0 
62 2 8 16 4 -2 
Table 4.1 Optimum Number of Staff 
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The projects used for this survey were deemed to have been successful. A successful 
project needed to be completed on, or before, the target time. If that same project bad been 
planned to take 12 staff for 12 months the optimum number of staff would have been used. 
It is, therefore, possible for project serial number 51 to have a positive balance in column F, 
either because more staff than the optimum were employed, or because the project was 
completed ahead of schedule. 
This leaves the renmining projects all which have a negative balance in column F. This is 
suggesting that using more than the optimum number of staff is not a pre-requisite to 
achieve project success. In these cases, 21 from 22 successful projects used less staff 
resources than the optimum number, as calculated using 'Brooks Law'. 
Consider the project serial number 18, that employed 25 staff for 36 months, using 900 
man months in total. The optimum number of staff was 30, giving a balance of 5 additional 
stafE It however, the project bad used 25 staff but was planned to take 24 months, this 
would require a total of 600 man months. Tle square root of this new figure (600) would 
be 24.5 indicating an optimurn number of staffrequimxL Although it is possible for this 
scenario to have taken place, it would require the project to have been planned for 24 
months but to have been late by 50% giving a final project duration of 36 months. Tlds 
scenario is both possible and in one way probable. Project estimating is a factor that was 
described in Chapter I and Gallagher (1995) indicated in their research that 53% of the 
projects were late by an average of 222%. But the results in Table 4.1 are taken from 
successful projects and using even the basic criteria to measure success, it would have 
required those projects to have been implemented on or before the tirne estimiate, not later. 
Using the data relating to projects where only in-house staff were involved, it has been 
possible to demonstrate that 'Brooks Law' is a reliable indicator when planning project 
staff resources. It can also be argued to have remained valid over time, despite the changes 
in IS project development methodologies. When Brooks suggested his Law, systerns 
development projects were usually conducted in-house using low level programming 
languages. IS projects now use high level Languages and often use Commercial Off Tle 
Shelfpackage (COTS) to replace in house systems development. Desphe the changes in 
the development methods, a result from this research found that 'Brooks Law' remains 
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valid and can be used as a guide to calculating the optimum number of staff to employ on 
IS prqjects. 
4.5 Commercial Off The Shelf Solutions (COTS) 
In Chapter 2, Commercial Off The Shelf (COTS) was described as a relatively new systems 
development method. An alternative to COTS is to develop a system that is bespoke to the 
Users requirements. Both these systems development methods require the eventual users to 
adhere to specific strategies. If the Users will accept no less than their requirements, a 
bespoke system will need to be developed, following an analysis and design phase. These 
can be considered as problem/solution type projects, where the solution is developed to 
map onto the specific User's requirements or problems. 
If, on the other hand, the User's are prepared to consider changing some of their working 
practices, the development of the IS could be achieved by selecting and adapting an existing 
COTS package. Some of these COTS have relatively basic functionality and can be 
implemented without any changes, again providing the Users are prepared to change some 
of their oper-ating procedures. Industry best practice for using COTS suggests that changes 
to COTS of more than 40% is not advised and indicates a bespoke system should be used. 
Ile respondents were asked to what extent their project solution was based on bespoke or 
COTS. The two extreme answers were for the prqject development to have been My 
bespoke or My COTS, with three options in between, as presented in Figure 4.4. 
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Figure 4.4 Bespoke vs. Commercial Off The Shelf (COTS) 
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The modal value indicates a bespoke systems development with 31% of the replies (20). 
However, 69% (the total of columns 2,3,4 & 5) of the successful projects used packages 
to some extent. It can be seen that only I of the successful projects utilised a pure 
solution/problern type strategy for the systems development. In Chapter 2 the strategy for 
selecting packages or bespoke required several variables to be taken into consideration as 
presented in F*ure 2.2. A reason for the extent ofthe use of COTS packages can be the 
benefit of ready made systern, often with reference sites, to provide confidence if the 
COTS functionality and reliability Organisations usually benefit from an early 
implementation of an IS with profits or savings becoming available earlier than when the 
development was achieved using bespoke systems. 
The implication for project mamgcment from these results is that there is a shift in the skills 
required. The increasing use of packages requires a change of skills for project 
management, in package selection as well as legal and contractual expertise. If a competitor 
organisation uses the same COTS package, the differentiation in the organisation must be 
found from somewhere else other than from the package. This is an operational probleni 
The issues for the project manager when packages are utilised are to ensure that they will 
deliver against the specification. In some ways, as explained this is possible with access to 
reference sites. The project manager must, however, enter into a contractual agreement 
partially from a position of trust and beliefthat the package will match the claims made for 
it. Moving from bespoke towards package development requires greater trust, as control of 
the development team has been lost. The results from this research indicated that 69% of IS 
projects bad made use ofpackage sohitions, that constitutes a similar percentage shift for 
an increase of bust. The form of trust involved when COTS are used is technical trust. This 
is different from the social trust, which is required when consultants join a team and only 
limited information is know about the other team members (Tyler and Kramer 1996). T11s 
is discussed in detail in Chapter 5. 
4.6 Analysis by Costs 
The respondents were asked to indicate within 5 costing bands, the cost of the successful 
Project they were reporting. Figure 4.5 presents the banding ofthe 65 successful projects. 
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Fieure 4.5 Pro8ect Numbers bv Cost 
In Figure 4.6 the actual number of projects that used a project management methodology 
(shown in blue) are compared with the total munber of projects within the 5 cost bands 
(shown in purple). Figures 4.7,4.8 and 4.9 provide the comparison between the total 
nurnber of projects and those that used a systems methodology, CASE tools and 
consultants respectively. In all cost categories most projects were managed using project 
management software, while the results for the CASE tools indicate the opposite trend. 
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Fieure 4.6 Progect Manaizement MethodoloLwv bv Cos 
The use of consultants can be seen to increase when the cost of the projects increase. 
However, within the L50k band, consultants were used on 37% of the projects. The use of 
consultants increases to 41% for the f50 -1 OOK, rising finaHy to 62% for both the 
fI 00k -Im and fI-I Om. This has an impact on projects due to the additional temporary or 
transient nature of the project groups. In turn it requires additional trust building because 
in-house staff may have limited information of the consultants other than possibly through 
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their CV's. Consultants would conceivably have even less infon-nation about the in-house 
staff In these cases the CV has had to be used as a control to replace the trust that usually 
builds as team members work together. One additional observation is that Gallagher (1995) 
identified a fink between having a higher success rate and lower project costs. But even the 
ýsmall' projects within that research were over $200m which is much higher expenditure 
than those within this research fi-ame. However, a correlation between IS project success 
and the use of consultants can be seen to exist, but it would be a fallacy of post hoc ergo 
proctor hoc to suggest there is a fink or that either factor caused the observed change in the 
other. Nevertheless, it would be worth researching finiher into the use of consultants and 
project success, since this research has indicated consultants are used on more costly 
projects, but the Standish results reported by Gallagher (1995) identified IS project failures 
increased with a corresponding increase in project costs. 
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4.7 Success Factors 
Lists of success factors identified by other researchers were presented in Chapter 2. 
Respondents for this research were asked what they considered to be the most important 
factors leading to the success of their projects. The responses representing the success 
factors were coded by variable or theme. In turn, these were grouped into a reduced 
number of categories resulting in Table 4.2 
1. Planning 33.3% 
2. Commitment 22.3% 
3. Communication I (r/0 
4. Quality of project team 9.2% 
5. Realism of what is possible 7.6% 
6. Resources 6.1% 
7. Control 5.71/6 
8. Others 8.4% 
Table 4.2 Success Factors 
4.7.1 Quali"g Success Factors 
Table 4.2 demonstrates the order of magnitude for each factor. In addition, the respondents 
also qualified their selection, with unsolicited additional information they considered 
important. For example, when planning was suggested as a success factor by the 
respondents, they also added qualifiers to indicate the importance they considered the factor 
to be. The following sections provide responses received from the respondents in respect of 
the three factors: Planning, Conunitment and Communication. 
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4.7.1.1 Success Factor. Planning 
The qualifiers to the word planning included in the replies were: 
9 clear, 
9 realistic, 
0 careful, 
0 effective, 
* detailed, 
0 sensible, 
0 accurately, 
0 good. 
Planning has been identified by other researchers such as Wateridge (1996) as a key success 
factor and was included in early attempts to list the basic principles ofmanagement by 
Drucker (1993), (Table 2.2) and Fayol (1997), (Table 2.3). This research supports the 
conclusions ofthese, earlier works that planning is the key success factor. This could also be 
argued to be the reason why project managers favour using the left hemisphere of the brain 
as indicated in Figure 2.5 when attempting to project manage because planning was shown 
by Webster (1994) to reside within the left hemisphere in Figure 2.4. But it was also argued 
that project managers should use both hemispheres ofthe brain since project management 
involves both people and technical issues. The next 2 factors selected by the respondents 
provided this balance. Comnitment and communication were identified in rank order as the 
next important success factors with ajoint percentage identical to that aebieved by planning 
33.3%. 
4.7.11 Success Factor. Commitment 
The analysis ofthese results indicates that commitment received the second largest number 
of mentions. Ile qualifiers given below provide not only the rank order but also the 
ftnportance to be given to a comniftment from all parties involved. These qualificrs were 
found to have been used by the respondents when they were describing commitinent as a 
success flictor: 
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" user commitrnent, 
" stakeholders, 
" all parties, 
" involvement, 
" enthusiasm, from executive directors, 
" budgetý 
" project team, 
" business buyfilg-in, 
" management commitment, 
" business infonnation systems department, 
" support from design agency, 
involvement from all staff, 
total client conunitment, 
dedication, 
very high level ofcommitinent, 
" early buy-in by key stakeholders, 
" strong business buy-in, 
bay-in to objectives from suppliers and customers, 
users involved throughout, 
unlimited patience, 
total commitment and senior management. 
These qualifiers demonstrate the range of stakeholders that the respondents to the 
questionnaire considered were important factors to achieve IS project success. 
4.7.13 Success Factor. Communications 
Ile need for communications was placed third after the need for planning and 
commitment. The following qualifiers were included when communications had been 
identified as a critical success factor: 
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good, 
regular, 
everyone to be informed, 
throughout the project, 
clear, 
open access to information, 
impossible to over communicate, 
honest communications between an parties, 
frequent, 
other departments, 
at all levels, 
giving bad news as well as good. 
Plaming, Commitment and Conununications were considered the three most invortant 
success factors for the 85 successfid projects. These results reflect those of previous 
research reported in. Chapter 2. The respondents, however, also demonstrated how 
important they considered these three flictors to be by including comments in their 
responses to an open type question, without prompting, some qualifiers to support their 
decisions. 
The results from this research fiAcate an overall 62.6% response to three flictors as being 
key factors to producing successful IS projects, these are: 
Planning (30.30/o), 
Comn*nxmt (22.39/o), 
Communications (10%). 
The surnmary of the findings so far is presented in Table 4.3. 
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*63% used a project management methodology 
*44% used a systems development methodology 
* 14% used a computer assisted software engineering support tool 
*54% employed external consultants on one or more project stages 
*Using less than the optimum. number of staff (using 'Brooks Law') 
did not extend the project thim-, scale 
*The modal value indicated bespoke development methods to be the most used 
systems development method wbile 69 % to some extent used package 
solutions 
Table 4.3 Factors used in Successful IS Proiects 
These could be termed examples of good practice in successful projects. While it would be 
difficult to generalise these results back into the total population ofproject management, as 
discussed earlier in paragraph 4.2 (due to the survey fi-mie used), the agreement found with 
earlier research such as Pinto (1988), increases the reliability ofthe results. 
4.8 Ciiteria 
The criteria for measuring success oflS projects was discussed in Chapter 2. The 'Iron 
Triangle' comprising cost, quality and time were listed as the key criteria used for 
measuring success. It was further argued that the emphasis bad remained on these 3 criteria 
over the last 50 years and continued to be inextricably linked to the definitions offered for 
project management, including those from the APM BoK (I 995)and BS 6079 (1996). A 
new method to consider measuring success was presented in Chapter 2 called 'The Square 
Route'. Ibis method extended the factors ofthe 'Iron Triangle', to include 3 additional 
factors, those being: The Information System, Benefits to the Organisation and Benefits to 
the Stakeholder Community as presented in Table 2.22. 
The respondents were asked which criteria they would consider to judge whether a project 
was successful -From the replies there were 255 views expressed by the respondents. These 
were mapped agains the 4 categories identified in Me Square Route'. The number of 
mentions, which are not mutually exclusive, within each of the 4 categories can be seen in 
Figure 4.10. 
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The 'Iron Triangle' received the most number of mentions 114 (44%). However, the 
respondents also indicated that if they could select the criteria against which their projects 
could be measured for success, they would also include criteria from the other comers on 
the 'Square Route', these were: 
* ne information system 42 (16%), 
* Benefits to the organisation 46 (18%), 
e Benefits to stakeholders 53 (20%). 
These results were encouraging in so far as the respondents listed 141 (54%) criteria they 
would use to measure success in addition to the 114 (44%) who selected cost, quality and 
time. These results came from an open question, not a closed Likert scale, thus giving the 
results additional importance since the respondents were not simply validating or ranking a 
limited set of criteria from which to choose. Without any prompting, the respondents 
proposed 255 criteria they would use to measure success. All these 255 criteria mentioned 
could be placed into I of the 4 criteria options as identified in the Square Route presented in 
Table 2.22. 
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Figure4.10 Mapping Ctiteria against 'The Sguare Route'. 
4.9 Trust 
The literature search in Chapter 2 identified that the subject of management had considered 
trusl to be a factor of success but project management had not adopted the same view. This 
was considered to be an example of a Type II error within project management, one where 
all the factors had not been considered. The Questionnaire contained 3 questions relating to 
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trust. These were included to understand how important the respondents considered trust 
to be within IS project management. In the first survey all 65 valid forms were usable for 
analysis. The results of these replies indicated a significant number of the respondents 
believed trust to be important. In the second survey, 20 (100%) valid replies were received. 
The results are described using both the surveys independently while Figure 4.11 presents 
the combined results. 
4.9.1 The Importance of Trust 
The respondents were asked 3 questions in relation to trust. The first was to rank the 
importance of trust between team members and project success. Each of the 5 options had 
an equal chance of selection. In survey I (n = 65), 98 % of the respondents considered trust 
to be of some importance, while 76% placed trust at the highest level of importance. 
For survey 2 (n = 20) the results were 100% and 60% respectively. Since this was a Likert 
scale only the numbers or percentages are available for analysis. Although the rank order of 
the replies can be identified, there is no indication of the importance of the five options. It 
would be incorrect, for example, to suggest that if a respondent selected number 2 on the 
Likert scale, that choice would carry a weighting worth double had number 4 been selected. 
Nevertheless, 98% of respondents from survey I and 100% from survey 2 of considered 
trust to be important to the success of IS projects. Yet the subject of trust had not been 
found in the project management literature as a project success factor or risk. 
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4.9.2 Broken Trust 
The next question sought whether the respondents had experienced a breakdown of trust 
within IS project teams. In survey I with (n = 65), the results indicated that 89% of the 
respondents had experienced some breakdown of trust, in survey 2 (n = 20) that figure was 
70%. The results in Figure 4.12 (column 1) indicate 13 respondents (15%) had never 
experienced a breakdown of trust while at the other extreme, 5 respondents 7% (column 5) 
believed that on every project trust was broken. 
W) 
cc 50- 
11 41 
C 40 
30 
21 
CL 20 13 0 
10 55 
E 
30 z 
12345 
No projects A IIII,, All projects 
Experience loss of trust 
Figure 4.12 Expetiencina a Break of Trust 
The replies from the 85 respondents referring to trust suggested a high perception for the 
importance of trust (72% of respondents indicated a need of trust as their most important, 
while a response of 99% believed trust in some was a factor in success) and that 84% of the 
respondents have experienced a breakdown in trust. 
4.9.3 Trust and Control 
The third question about trust asked the respondents whether they believed it is possible to 
use controls to replace trust. In survey I there were 2 missing replies making (n = 63) with 
43 respondents (68%) believing that controls could not replace trust. For survey 2 (n = 20) 
the number was 12 (60%). Figure 4.13 present the results to that question. It is clearly not 
possible, and arguably nor is it desirable, to operate using total control within a project. But 
when controls are not possible, the gap has to be replaced by trust. 
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(33%) believed 
controls can 
replace trust 
'(67%) believed trust 
could not be 
relaced with controls 
Figure 4.13 Trust and Manaeement Controls 
This question was exploring whether those who work with IS project teams believed that 
controls could replace trust. The results indicate that 67% of the respondents believe 
controls are not able to do that. 
These results all involving trust go beyond lists of success factors and indicate a reason why 
some IS projects may be &ifing, what the USA PMJ BoK 1996 (Duncan 1996) risk 
literature describe as 'trigger points', but without reference to trust. To discuss this ftirther 
it was necessary to understand, what trust involves and how the functions of trust could 
impact upon the success of IS projects. These issues are covered in Chapters 5. 
4.10 Summary 
The results from surveys one and two, the first stage of this research, indicated that the 85 
respondents had collectively been involved in 837 IS projects. Questions about projects in 
general indicate the respondents had been involved in more successful projects than failures. 
These results show that 83.8% of the projects (702 in total) had been successful. These 
results do not support previous studies involving IS projects. In this Chapter, it was argued 
that although the majority of IS projects are reported to be failing, these may simply be 
examples of exception reporting while success is ignored. Attempting to identify all IS 
projects it was further argued would be unrealistic. Assumptions about success rates have 
to be drawn from the consolidated results of research, to which these will contribute. 
'Brooks Law' was tested to be a reliable method of calculating the optimum number of 
staff used on successful IS projects. 
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The use of other project management tools were not found to be a pre-requisite for IS 
project success, these were: 
"a project management methodology, 
"a systems methodology, 
" CASE tools, 
" COTS, 
4, the use of consultants. 
When the respondents were asked how they would choose to measure the success of an IS 
project, cost, quality and time sometimes termed the 'Iron Triangle' received 44% of the 
255 total number of replies. However, it was demonstrated that the renvining 56% ofthe 
criteria could all be mapped against an alternative approach to measure success as proposed 
in Figure 2.7 and termed the 'Square Route', these were the: 
o resuhant IS systern 16%, 
* benefits to the organisation 18%, 
* benefits to stakebolders 20% 
The respondents were also asked what they believed were the factors leading to success. 
Table 4.2 has the list of ten factors with, planning, conm*ment and communication being 
the top three replies. These results do support earlier research as presented in Chapter 2, 
which identified these three success factors but with different ranking and weightings. 
The responses regarding questions relating to truA were significant. The significant number 
of the respondents believed trust between project team members to be very important to 
the success of a project. Also, the respondents reported baving had experienced a 
breakdown oftrust wHe project controls were not considered to be a substitute for trust. 
When these results relating to the perceived importance of trust were combined with the 
carlier observations that there was no mention of trust in the UK APM BoK (1995), USA 
PNII BoK 1996 (Duncan 1996), the BS6079 (1996), the PRAM guide (Simonet al eds. 
1997), nor had any research taken place about the subject within project management, a 
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gap (descnibed earlier as a Type Il error or a sin of omission) within project management 
was identified. This was considered to be an irnportant Ending worthy of ffirther research 
and provided the focus for stage 2. 
The start of stage 2 began with an additional literature search with the focus on trust. Since 
at that time none bad been found in the project management literature, the review was 
widened to inchide that of other discipEnes. This is presented next in Chapter 5. 
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Chapter 5 
5.0 Trust as a Factor in Project Success 
5.1 Introduction 
The purpose ofthis Cbapter is to discuss the effect of trust and its possible Muence in 
project success. Ile structure ofthe Cbapter is presented wihin the Mowing broad 
thenrs. 
Firstly, there is a discussion about the fiWrtance and need for trust supported by some 
definitions from other researchers. Ms is followed with examples of Merent types and 
levels of trust, together with an explamfion of how it can be built and bmkerL 
NeA Game theory is introduced with a discussion of different types of games that are 
available to test for tust. The basis of the Prisoner's Dilemma is shown to be an appropriate 
method to test for calcuMs-based trust. This is supported with examples from other 
researchers who have adapted the Prisoner's Dilen= 
FinaRy, reference is made to other researchers who have rc=rAly identified mist as a new 
and worthy topic for research within project management. 
51 The Importance of trust 
For the first time in more than 50 years since the BBC Reith lectures began, the subject 
about bust was broadcast by ONeill (2002). The first point she made demonstrated that 
trust was not a new phenomenon. Ibis was done by making reference to the Chinese 
philosopher Confucius (551-479 BC) when he stated that governments needed three things: 
weapons, food and trust, suggesting '... trust should be guarded to the end' by arguing '... 
without trust we cannot stand'. O'Neill (2002) makes the case for the fimportance oftrust in 
that "-- -elaborate measures to ensure that people keep agreements and do not betray trust 
must, in the end, be backed by - trust', because she believes '... all guarantees are 
incomplete'. 
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Fukuyarna (1995) considered the economic value of co-operation and the high level of trust 
within society. High levels of trust would '... permit a wide variety of social relationships to 
emerge', while low levels of trust would require '... a system of formal rules and regulations 
which have to be negotiated, agreed to, litigated and enforced. Fukuyarna (1995) believed 
these were used to substitute for a lack oftrust, what economists call transaction costs, , ... 
a kind oftax on all forms of economic activity'. Lane (1998) focused on bust in society and 
supported the view held by Fukuyama (1995) by stating '... a nation's ability to compete is 
conditioned by a single, pervasive cultural characteristic: the level of trust inherent in a 
society'. 
51.1 The Need for Trust 
Herzog (200 1) reviewed the philosophical nature of trust and identified that trust and 
trustworthy behaviour was needed for the common good of society, and indicated that there 
were parallels with trust building in project teams. Handy (1995) described why trust is 
needed in organisations. He expressed, '... we have to manage people who we can't totally 
control' and'... we have to niinage people who we need to trust'. It is not possible to fiffly 
control people so trust has to replace gaps in the control-, This is a true reflection of what 
happens in project management. Project managers, who work within IS projects are able to 
use the Projects in Controlled Enviromnents (PRINCE) methodology now at version 2 that 
includes a structure of stakeholders to be managed (Bentley 1998). Three of these 
stakeholders represent the Busmess, Technical and User communities, collectively, called the 
Project Assurance Team (PAT). Other stakeholders who have different agendas and hopes 
were identified in the mapping of the 'Square Route' in Chapter 2. Handy (1995) proposed 
seven'... cardinal principles' to help build tug. Table 5.1 provides an edited extruct from 
each of these principles together with comments ofhow they relate to IS project 
management. 
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5-- 1. Thist is not blind It is unwise to bust people whom you have not observed in action over time 
and who are not committed to the sarne goals. 
2. Trust needs boundivies Unlimited trust is unrealistic. By trust organisations mean confidence. 
Define the goal, and the Uusted can be left to get on with it, control is by assessing the results. 
Where we are tusted to find our own means to some agreed results we have room to explore and 
put our own signature to the work. 
3. Trust requires constivit lew-ning A necessary condition of constancy is an ability to change. 
This requires groups to keep abreast ofthange exploring new options and technologies. 
4. Trust is tough When rust proves to be misplaced - those people have to go - or have their 
boundaries severely curtailed. Trust is like glass; once broken it can never be the same again. 
Where you cannot trust you have to check - with all the systems of control that involves. 
5. Trust needs bon&ng, Self-contained units, responsible for delivering speciEed results, are the 
necessazy building blocks ofan organisation based an tusL 
Trust needs touch Visionary leaders - no matter how articulate are not enough. 1he more 
vi: rtual an organisation becomes the more its people need to meet in person. These meefings are 
more to do with process thw tasIL 
Thist has to be e4rwd Organisaficus, who expect their people to trust thern, must first 
demansh-ate that they are trustwordiy. Individuals will not be trusted until they have proved that 
dxq can deliver. 
Table5.1 7 Cardinal Piinciples to Overcome a Lack of Trust Source: Handy (1995) 
Handy's fourth point suggests that where you cannot trust, you have to check with all the 
systems of control involved. But in IS project management, controls are automatically put in 
place. The automatic inclusion of controls could instil a feeling within staff that they are not 
trusted by the organisation, creating a negative feeling. Point I from Handy (1995) is that it 
is unwise to trust people whom you have not observed in action over time and who are not 
committed to the same goals, point 7 in Table 5.1 indicates the same. IS project teams often 
comprise staffwho have not worked together, for example, through the use of consultants. 
These involve working in temporary matrix teams, often without a history ofthe team 
members to enable an assessment of trust to be made, thus creating an environment of low 
trust. The temporary nature ofproject teams creates an additional problem for team 
members who have to trust each other using only limited infonnation. 
In a research study Jarvenpaa et al (1998) identified. that trust and shared commurications 
enabled such teams to be successfuL The study used the antecedents beheved to be part of 
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face to face dyadic relationships. These are the trustors' perceived ability, benevolence, 
integrity and the trustee's propensity to trust. The research results from Jarvenpaa. ct al 
(1998) indicated the strategies used with high and low trust teams, these are identified in 
Table 5.2. ffigh trust tearns were found to '... e)diibit s,, Arift trust', which is discussed in 
section 5.5.6. 
Behaviours/strate gies Hiah trust teams Low trust teams 
Style of action Proactive Reactive 
Focus ofdialogue Task output driven Procedural 
Team spirit Optimistic Pessimistic 
Leadership Dynamic Static 
Task goal clarity Teams responsibility Individual responsibility 
Role division Emergentlindependent Assigned, independent 
Time management Explici*ocess based Non-existence 
Pattern of interaction Frequent, few gaps Infrequent, gaps 
Nature of feedback Predictable/ substantive Unpredictable/non-stibstantive 
Table 5.2 Stratggies of Higb and Low Trust Teams Source: Jarvenpaa et al (1998) 
Trust has been identified as a Ewtor in successful team However, sonne of the features of IS 
projects have also been identified with an untrusting enviromient and these wM need to be 
considered when project teams are formed and managed, these include: 
* their temporary nature, 
* teams not knowing each other, 
a automatically using controls in place of trust, 
53 What is Tmst? 
When attempting to answer the question, what is trust? Barber (1983) found that in 1960 
the fifteenth volume of the International Encyclopaedia, of the Social Sciences bad m entry 
about trust. This relatively new interest in the impact ofthe topic could provide a reason for 
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the gap in the project management literature about the subject of trust, which was identified 
in Chapter 2. However, Barber (1983) concluded that there were three different meanings 
to trust. The first was to prevent an abuse of greater power by the professions, the 
population at large demand trustworthy behaviour as a social control The second meaning 
was for an expectation for technical coinpetence and finally for fiduciary responsibility. 
Technical and fiduciary trust were both used in the 1980 democratic presidential nominations 
to promote the two candidates as being trustworthy, but for different reasons. Edward 
Kennedy was perceived to have a higher level of technical competence than Jininy Carter, 
but the reverse was considered to be the case in terms of fiduciary responsibility. The New 
York Tfines reported the nominations to be operating behind a shield of tust'. 
Lewicki and Bunker (1996) reported that bust bas been studied both wnh and at thnes 
between, many different disciplines, such as: psychology, economic theory, sociology, 
anthropology, political science and history. Naturally each of these disciplines has studied 
trust from a specific point of view, relevent to that discipline. In a study of trust within 
anthropology, MacNIMan et al (2000) considered trust at a primary level. This was when a 
person under the control or authority ofanother person has to consider that the risk they 
ffice are 'non-commercial by nature'. For example, the type of trust more likely to be found 
in a family or kinsmanship type relationships. Blomqvist (1997) compiled the definitions of 
tug frorn: psychologists, philosophers and economists perspectives indicating how the 
disciplines viewed trust differently. BIomqyist (1997) concluded that a common feature 
across the disciplines was tbat, '... tmst is more a property of collective units than of 
isolated individuals', and that there was a weakness in the contemporary research, where the 
unit of analysis has focused upon the hdividual, not the relationship. 
Shaw (1997) placed trust between simple confidence and blind faith When we have 
confidence in something, it is because some facts are available to support that confidence. 
But we may still ftust someone; despite information that suggests the conmary should be the 
case. Some facts are required for trust to be positioned between confidence and faith. - 
Faith can be qualified, further as being total faith or blindfidth. Some religions are grounded 
in blind ffifth, where no argutnent or evidence can remove that level of faith Trust is not as 
strong as blind faiffi, as the later re*ects any attempt to provide alternative arguments even Ij 
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when reliable evidence is produced. Thist fiMhes that some risks have been taken into 
consideration with the hope that they will not be realised. For example, 'I trust your 
cstfimtes wiU be accurate', while accepting there wiU be some possibility of inaccuracy. 
5.4 Trust and Risk 
Ward and Chapman (1995) desmtbed four Phases, eight Stages and 31 Steps involved within 
a project risk lifecycle. None of dim involved the risk of low trust in project teams. When 
Chapman (1997) reviewed a generic process for Project Risk Analysis and Management 
(PRAM) written by Simon et al 1997, trust was not included. Chapman (1997) did 
however make a point within what he termed 'alternative perspectives, that '... a contract 
which leads to confrontation is perhaps the biggest single risk most projects encounter. 
Chapman (1997) bad described a factor ofrisk but had not specifically linked it to the 
domain of trust. 
Zaghloul and Hartman (2003) discussed the risk of mistrust within construction Projects in 
terms of the cost savings that can be obtained through the use of disclaimer clauses. Their 
summazy included the view that there was '... a s4pifficant relationship between trust and 
risk', and concluded with four stages that would help identify the risks and build a trust 
relationship between the parties involved in the contract, these are: 
" imderstanding the risks and who owned them, 
" sufficient time to manage or mitigate the risks, 
" building trust through negotiations prior to the written contract, 
" risk-sharing or risk-reward system. 
Pender (2001) argued the weakness of the probability-based fiamework that underpins most 
risk analysis and suggested an alternative, based on the management of incomplete 
knowledge. Baba, (1999) stated that '... an emerging consensus among scholars, suggests 
that trust may be defined as the subjective expression of one actor's expectations, regarding 
the behaviour of another actor (or actors). Baba (1999) continues that '... trust exists when 
one actor expects that another wM behave in such a way that the safiq and security of the 
first actor will be preserved, under conditions in which the first actor is both dependent upon 
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and vuhierable to the actions of the second, that is, the first actor does not have control of 
the second, and there is risk of harnl'. 
5.4.1 Relational and Performance Risks 
Das & Teng (2001) differentiate between relational and performance as two tý, pes ofrisks 
that would take place in an organisational, setting. Relational risk was considered to result 
from opportunistic behaviour of fi: rms having a conflict of interests. Performance risk can 
occur due to a lack of competence, orjust bad luck, even though there has been co- 
operation between firms. Das & Teng (200 1) concluded, '... unlike relational risk - which is 
unique to inter-firm co-operatiozi, performance risk is present in all strategies, including 
strategic alliances'. IS projects are vulnerable to both relational and performance risks and 
need to be managed correctly. This research does not examine the effect of performance 
mist as a factor ofproject success. Performance trust requires that all members ofthe 
project team to have the correct skills, knowledge and experience to undertake the tasks 
required of them. Reassurance ofperformance trust for example can be obtained by asking 
for references and checking that the claim made on a curriculum vita with regard to 
qualifications are correct. There is however, no test or measure of relational trust currently 
available in project management. Consequently, IS project teams have no reassurance of the 
level of relational trust that exists in their teams. This research considers relational trust in IS 
project teams. The risks involved with relational trust are influenced by the level of co- 
operation vroject teams afford each other. The results from this research (discussed in 
Chapter 7) indicate the influence that relational trust could contribute to the successful 
outcome of an IS project. 
The risks each discipline Lice, following the loss of trust; are different. While anthropology is 
concerned mainly with non-conmiercial type risks, marketing and other sectors of 
organisations are fliced with commercial realities. Humphrey (1998) stated that '... the 
question oftrust arises from the element ofrisk in economic transactions' and continued, 
under perfect corr43etition, economic twisactions do not involve risk. Individuals can 
assume that '... contracts will be honoured and risk is ruled out by the assumption candid 
rationality and perfect information'. Humphrey (1998) continued by stating '... when these 
assumptions are abandoned, the question of risk and trust arise'. In the real world it is not 
possible to obtain perfect infonmfion (Pblips 1988) as this would require everyone to know 
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all that others know, therefore, trust will alýays be required to bridge the gap between 
perfect and imperfect information. Humphrey (1998) concluded that '... entering into an 
economic exchange exposes the individual to risks arising from the action of others, if these 
risks are uncontrollable, then exchange is reduced, paralysed, or rendered costly by the need 
to take precautions, if the 'other' can be trusted, exchange is facilitated'. 
ParaUels between the findings of Humphrey (1998) and IS projects can be made. For 
example, if project team rnembers attempted to aclieve individual airns before project 
objectives this would reduce trust between team members. 
Ilie risks within marketing include an increased social distance between two or more parties 
and having to rely on impeifect information for decision making. Ilese create the 
uncertainty about whether the 'other' will honour a business trunsaction. Hart and Johnson 
(1999) used the successfal marketing of lifie hw=ce, as a poignant example oftrusting by a 
customer. Clearly an insut-ance company could take an advantage, ie. at a time when the 
customer is totally vulnerable to the actions of 'the other', because lifie insurance is only paid 
out after death. 
Trading over the Internet has some simflarities with those in marketing but at the same time 
Internet business includes an increased social distance, time delay, limited information flow 
and possibly no prior experience that the supplier wM fulfil their agreement. This has resulted 
in trust becoming an important consideration for those trading over the Internet, as 
noted by writers such as Urban et al (2000) and Gefen (2000). The unique risks of Internet 
tuft have created a need for a diflerent type oftrust. in turn these required additional 
controls to be set in place such as the use of Trusted Tbird Parties, who act as a bridge 
between supplier and customer preventing personal firiancial details from baving to be 
repeatedly sent over the Internet. 
5.5 Types of Tnist - Rational Choice 
Tyler and Kramer (1996) indicated that '... the evolving social landscape and consequent 
emergence of trust as a social issue is linked to rational choice' which also encompasses 
economic, political, legal and organisational relations. The rational choice model is founded 
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on the idea that individuals are motivated by self-interest and who aim to obtain the best 
outcomes for themselves and keep any personal loss to a minimum. Tyler and Kramer 
(1996) described how'... people's decisions about whether to co-operate relied upon their 
willingness to mist others'. This was based on the probability that others will reciprocate 
co-operation as the '... underb* assumption that trust is rationally based'. Lane (1998) 
summed-up, the literature of trust with the view that '... trust begins where rational 
prediction ends'. The above points indicate that people have to rely on imperfect 
information for decision making. The imperfection of information is also caused in part by 
there being a time delay in obtaining information, that itself is a factor of social distance. 
Projects will often operate with inVerfect information and it is unusual for all stakeholders to 
be co-located in one office. Consequently this places the reliance on tug as a central 
requirement for successful project work. 
However, rational choice is not the only model available for individuals to use for their 
decision making. For example, trust within anthropology is based on a non-commercial basis 
and it can be argued that relying only on rational choice to understand all decision making 
does not explain why some people act in an akn: dsfic way, such as entering into burning 
buildings to save someone. However, many decisions are based on rational choice and it is 
reasonable to suggest that those using the rational choice model in organisations will shape 
the outcome ofprojects; as they focus upon improving personal gain at the expense of 
organizational goals. 
Fukuyarna (1995) describes self-interest as a neo-classical economic theory. 11iis is where 
human beings will seek to acquire the best for themselves in a rational way, before they co- 
operate towards the benefits ofa group of which they are part. Not knowing which 
Mviduals are hikely to base their judgement upon rational choice, increases the potential of 
risks to the success of a project. Ibis prevents the possibility of targeting specific risk 
avoidance action and results in the reliance upon blunt, generic, project control mechanisms 
to combat potential self interests from conflicting with project objectives. 
Bachmann (1998) provided a balanced view oftrust and stated that the economic view of 
tnist was based upon'... whether man is primarily seen as a rational egoist, or whether 
social interaction is viewed as being infornied, by either moral considerations or by cultural 
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scripts and meaning system. This later view is the social aspect of trust that does not base 
decision-making only on an economic model. Ile social view of trust, also known as 'value' 
or 'norm based', starts from the point that trust is built where there is a shared common aim 
and that a 'solidarity' in society exists to create such a level of trust. 
5.5.1 Social-Based Trust 
Lane (1998) stated that social norm-based trust is Posited on the basis of '... the expectation 
on the part ofthe trustor that the trustee - particularly if s/he is in a position of power - will 
meet a social obligation and exercise responsibility'. Lane (1998) added that social, norm- 
based tust benefits from obligational. trust that acts as a support mecbanism for social tust. 
Tyler (200 1) reported that obligation trust relies on the notion that people have a duty or 
obligation to co-operate with others. It is possible to find examples of obligation trust in 
western society. However, research undertaken by Fukuyarna (1995) suggested it would 
more usually be found in a 'cultural context' such as that found in Japanese society. 
Lane (1998) pointed out that to ensure social-based trust was to firriction, it would also 
require the fiduciary forni of behaviour. Baba (1999) described fiduciary trust as '... we 
expect the another will behave in a way that preserves and advances our interests, while 
abstaining from opportunism7. This has also been called 'goodwill trust', where fiduciary 
responsibility can extend beyond the call of duty, to inspire fixfividuals to exploit 
opportunities that further another party's interests, While at the same time refi-aining from 
selfinterest. 
Clearly the economic and social-based models oftrust are almost polafised in the anticipated 
behaviour that individuals will adopt. Both groups of academics attempt to suggest that 
their model is the only one in operation. It would be reasonable to suggest that in reality, 
both the economic and social-based models would inform decision making to some extent at 
different stages within an organisational setting comprised of individuals who have different 
beliefs and intentions. 
There is believed to be a third model for trust termed cognition or expectation-based trust, 
which is discussed next. 
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5.51 Cognition-Based Trust 
Lane (1998) explained cognition also known as expectation-based trust as those who 
regarded trust as '... expectations of persistence, regularity, order and the stability in the 
everyday and routine moral world, ... where trust resides in actors' expectations of things as 
usual, with the actor being taken for granted, to take under trust, a vast array of features of 
social order'. For example, a project manager exhibiting cognition tug would expect a 
team to behave in an ethical manner when dealing with other project stakeholders and to 
demonstrate consistency in their decision making. 
It is possible that individuals and teams will use three types of trust Le. economic, social and 
cognition. This research provides a focus upon the trust from an economic standpoint, 
where the decisions made by individuals or teams, would be through rational choice, as in 
the economic model. 
The literature covering rational choice within organisation's settings has had a focus upon 
co-operation between individuals and teams. Axelrod (1984) studied co-operation through 
experiments, using a game called the Prisoner's Dilemma, a theoretical model ofrational 
choice. Tyler and Kramer (1996) viewed the results of Axelrod (1984) experiments and 
concluded that '... it is the expectation of an ongoing relationship that sustains trust in the 
actions of others' and supported the view of =9 from the rational perspective as '... a 
calculation ofthe likelihood of future co-operation'. 
Viewed from the rational choice perspective, the possibility that team members may not co- 
operate can help explain how trugfits within the boundary ofrisk. The co-operation 
required to enable tmq in others using rational choice is not a given. When this is in 
operation, individuals have to expend finite project energy and time attempting to reduce the 
risk to themselves, and expect some form of controls to be in place to protect them in 
Chapter 4, the respondents to the research questionnaire indicated that they did not believe 
controls could replace trust. In that questionnaire the types and levels of trust had not been 
specified or defined. Those questions sought to obtain the overall opinion from the 
respondents concerning their views about the ability to replace trust with controls. The 
search for a reliance upon controls could therefore, reduce limited project resources, and at 
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the same týne may not acMeve the aim ofreassuring project staff that a lack oftrust had 
been replaced by those controls. 
Coopey (1998) argued trust to be central '. -- in situations where we are interdependent in 
our work, relying on many others in complex social contexts, especially organisational 
settings', concluding that trust was far from wide spread in LJK organisations. The study by 
Black et al (2000) indicated that trust has been identified as the key success factor in 
business sectors other than in IS project management. Coopey (1998) pointed out the 
practices of management undermine the '... foundations upon which trust is built'. For 
example, when staff are required to be creative and innovative within a framework of 
organisations that expect increased profits, (encouraged by project managers who motivate 
stafl). Coopey (1998) believed that a lack of trust produces a'... dynamic that serves to 
ratchet up the controls mechanisms', thus preventing success. 
5.5.3 Trust as Encapsulated Interest 
Hardin (2001) viewed trust at a social level, but another view oftrust proposed by Hardin 
(2002) suggested that the question about trust is '... iinplicitly to ask about the reasons for 
thinking the relevant party to be trustworthy'. M is a type of truA that project team 
members would also be likely to use in detennbft the future intent of the other members of 
a project team. One factor that would help create a positive feeling would be a project 
crivironnient where both sides would want to co-operate with the othn Such an 
environment would typically have shared project objectives as opposed to individual targets. 
Hardin (2002) explains the meaning of encapsulated interest as follows, "---I trust YOU 
because I think it is in your interest to take my interests in the relevant matter seriously in the 
following sense; you value the continuation of our relationship and you therefore have your 
interests in taking my interests into account, that is you encapsulate my interests in your 
interests'. Cook (2001) bad previously suggested that when encapsulated trwt was used it 
would be for a specific reason and described encapsulated trust as: 
9 'A trusts B with respect to X wben A beheves B bas some reason to act in Ns best 
interest or take A's interests fiffly into account'. 
119 
To help create encapsulated trust, Cook (2001) advised that uncertainty could be reduced by 
knowing the competence of other staff while vulnerability could be decreased by the use of 
enforceable contracts and insurance schemes. Heimer (2001) explained the method required 
to promote a trust strategy... worked by reducing uncertainty' while a distrust strategy '... 
worked by reducing vuh=WW. Overall, Heimer (2001) suggested that trust was solved 
by manipulating vulnerability and uncertainty about intentions and competence. It is 
therefore logical that a requirement would be to provide information to address these and 
other points related to trust which, are discussed further in Chapter 8. 
Hardin (2002) suggested that to enable the developrnent ofencapsulated interest type of 
trust, would require teams or individuals to have repeated (iterated ) exchanges. These 
exchanges could be represented in the following forms of games: 
* the kerated one-way game, 
the fterated exchanges as to reflect the Prisoner's Dffemma game, 
* intwactions hi 'tWck' relationsWps. 
A common feature of the three methods available to identify encapsulated mist is that they 
are all examples of relational tnist. In all cases, the iridividuals involved must have some 
information about other team members in order to build these types of trust. IS project team 
members work with each other so it is reasonable to suggest that they could benefit from the 
use of encapsulated interested type trust. 
5.5A Thick Trast 
Hardin (2002) positioned 'thick' trust as a type of relational trust. This type oftrust is 
ossi p 'ble when hilividuals are able to build an ongoing history of others through several 
overlapping and often complex relationships. Having more than one data source of 
information about others, helps to improve the reliability ofthat information about thern. 
Hardin (2002) suggested that the trust created using 'thick trust' is also less likely to be 
broken due to the threat of the loss of reputation or worse by the '... shunning by others' if 
they do not co-operate. it is, therefore, reasonable to suggest that one measure of trust' 
within a project team would be to identify the amount of triangulation of 'thick' relationships 
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within the tearn. Such as, are there family groups or do some staff play sport with other 
staff? Hardin (2002) concluded that '... because trust in our lives is generally relational and 
is commonly to be explained by relational considerations, one may hope that empirical 
studies will begin to take relational elements into account'. 
Bacharach and Gambetta, (200 1) pointed out that the results from Rapoport (1960) bad 
identified that '... the analysis is that rational choice theory is an appropriate tool for the 
analysis of trust'. The Prisoner's Dilemma has been positioned within the area of both 
relational tnist and encapsulated trust and indicates that it is an appropmte approach to be 
used for this research. 
5.5.5 Trust as Shallow Morality 
According to Messick and Kramer (2001) a feature of trusting is that sometimes the rules 
that can be used to gauge trust are not always used. When this happens the type trust in 
operation is called 'shallow' trust. As an example, Messick and Kramer (200 1) point out that 
when people return from shopping, they do not usually re-weigh items such as pre wrapped 
goods to ensure they have not been under sold. Shallow trust, they add is used in '... 
scripted situations' when behaviour is '... habitual and automatic' and it is possible to rely 
upon others not to take advantage. 
The developmeiit of 'shallow' trust is achieved through three stages. The first stage involves 
,-.. t he insistence and coercion of trust is organisationally adaptive' but this Messick and 
Kramer (200 1) suggest is more likely to happen if trust already exists The second stage is 
the '... managing of the risks of the group'. The final stage is the outcome for the 
Organisation, when it becomes'... mansformed from an object of tnist to an arena, of 
Misting interactions'. 
The reason given by Messisk and Kramer (200 1) for the use of 'shallow' trust is that 
humans are imperfect information processors and decision makers' and that rationak may 
not be achievable since the information is '... biased and flawed' so '... good enough 
replaces best. In these situations we employ what Messisk and Kramer (200 1) called a 
heurLstic of veracity where on average it is better to give people the benefit of the doubt and 
keep trust in others intact'. When team members do not have a 'shallow' type oftrust for 
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their fellow team members it is possible that would create a spiral of distrust. For example, if 
a project team member constantly had their work checked beyond the level required for 
nonnal quality procedures. Individual team members would know whether flis was taking 
place. Collecting that information would indicate whether the organisation or project was 
operating under a culture of trust, or excessive controls, the latter of which, has been linked 
to lower levels of mist. 
5.5.6 Swift Trast 
A feature that differentiates project management from other forms of management is that 
projects have a finite time scale. Projects have a clear start and end point. One requirement 
for trust is to have ft built-up over time. This can be observed to be taking place when 
individuals do what they say they will do, thus creating a basis of trust building. However, 
with project work time is there is often United thne to bufld trust with a person and there is 
often no history of their behaviour, but they still have to work together to achieve the project 
objectives. This requires 'swift' trust as discussed by Jarvenpaa et al (1998). 
Meyerson et al (1996) studied temporary groups (projects are an example of temporary 
groups) and explored how 'swift' trust is built. Ibis entailed '. -- high risk, high stake 
projects, yet seem to lack the normative structures and institutional safeguards to minimise 
things going wrong'. Temporary systems require tearns to behave in a trusting way. 
However, those same temporary systems lack the time for hmiliarity to develop via shared 
experiences or demonstrations of none exploitation of vulnerability, from which the stable 
organisations are able to benefit. Characteristics of temporary systems considered to have 
potential relevance for the formation of trust are included in Table 5.3. 
When the factors in Table 5.3 which, together make up swift trust' are present in a project 
or organisation, the safeguards that are normally required to create a trusting environment 
would be missing. It is, however, further believed that swift' trust can compensate when 
those normal safeguards are rnissing. 'Swift' trust operates best when it is less interpersonal 
and nwre of a cogni&e form. The suggested requirements for 'swift' trust to operate are 
for the project to have: 
122 
"a focus, 
"a clear output, 
(to enable) 
" team members interacting witHn roles rather than personalities. 
For example, in respect of the PRINCE 2 project management methodology, Bentley (1998) 
includes an organisational structure where individuals and teams have titles allocated to 
tbein Being able to refer to the Business Assurance Co-ordinator in a meeting rather than to 
address individuals by name, is an example of how PRINCE 2 supports (possibly 
unintentionally) the requirement and conditions of 'swift' trusi, a flictor that other project 
teams could benefit from adopting. 
The fitetors of 'swift' trust are required when comprehensive information about the teams is 
not available. In this respect, high trust project teams are identified as those who enter into a 
state of 'swift' tug as outlined by Jarvenpaa et al (1998). It is argued that trust could be 
reduced in IS project teams due to the temporary nature of the IS project. This reduces the 
chance for team members to get to know each other, leading to the automatic use of 
controls. The conditions to enable 'swift' trust to operate can compensate where teams do 
not know each other or when little or no history of team members is available. 
1. Participants with diverse "Is are assembled by a contractor to amd oqxrtise they already possess. 
2. Participants have limited history ofworking together. 
3. Participants have limited prospects ofworking together again in the fimim 
4. Participants often are part of limited labour pools and overlapping networks. 
5. Tasks are often complex and involve interdependent work. 
6. Tasks have a deadline. 
7. Assigned tasks are non-routine and not weU understood. 
S. Assigned tasks are consequential. 
9. Continuous interrelating is required to produce an outcomm 
Table 5.3 Temporary Systems and Trust Source: Jarvenpaa et al (1998) 
Evans (1997) stated, I... the concept of trust, like that of fidth, impUes the opposite of 
security, sinceý for trust to exist, each participant bas to bave prior confidence in the 
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reliability of the other party'. It is for this reason that team-building activities are sometimes 
carried out early in the ffe of a project in the belief that they aid the future success of a 
project. But the activity of team building does not automatically produce trust between team 
members. Team building exercises provide information about team members, which could 
indicate that a person is not trustworthy. Furthermore, the type of trust that is being tested 
during outdoor team building is technical and fiduciary trust. It is unlikely that one person 
would let another become injured if they could prevent it. But when the teams are working 
on a project it is possible that the t3W of trust that could be used would be the lowest form, 
rational economic or calculus trust (see sections 5.6.1 and 5.6.2). It is, therefore suggested, 
that project teams could irnprove their team building knowledge by using a project 
simulation, to reflect more accurately the type of trust likely to be used during the project. 
Dobing (1993) considered that trusting a group ofpeople is less likely than trusting an 
individual. This is in contrast to the view that for 'swift' trust to operate it requires staffto 
work within project roles, rather than intcract as individuals. Projects operate in teams or 
groups of which fiklividuals are a part. As discussed earlier, the PRINCE 2 methodology 
(Bentley 1998) has a project structure which, includes Business, Technical and User groups. 
Other stakeholder groups also exist within IS projects, representing such as suppliers, 
contractors and consultants. The team or group culture also provides an additional reason 
why project teams may be associated with low trust. 
5.6 Levels of trust 
Tyler and Kramer (1996) described how developing trust within a working environment 
would take place by moving through three different stages, evolving into a state high level of 
stable trust. The three development stages and their respective levels of trust are discussed 
in the next sections, together with comments about how these relate to project teams. 
5.6.1 Calculus-Based Trust 
This MOde of trust is the lowest level and requires some real penalty to be imposed if ftust is 
broken, such as not obtaining a fWther business contract. However, a reward would be 
received when trust was maintained, such as an improved professional standing. People 
become more consistent in their behaviour, if a deterrent (punishment) is known to them, 
and when it is clear that the deterrent will be implemented if needed. At the same time it is 
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p He to understand the need for benefits or rewards for not breaking calculus-based trust ossi 
Controls are an integral part of calculus-based trust. Personal short-term gains are seen to 
be more unportant tI= long term potential project benefits with t1iis type of trust. Time is 
needed for individuals to demonstrate that they Will do what was agreed, and to repeat those 
actions several times, building trust slowly but gradually. 
On the other band a single failure to fulfil an agreement, would reduce the level of calculus- 
based trust, previously built by positive work. Project nmnagement uses formal methods to 
control a project that possibly prevents trust from moving into the higher levels possible. 
5.6.2 Knowledge-Based Trust 
Improved information and an ability to forgive are the key differences between calculus and 
knowledge-based trust. Regular communication provides a vehicle to enable this tyW of 
trust to develop. As information is built up, it is possible to predicted fiAure behaviour 
following repeated undertaking of expected behaviour. Some actions that would cause a 
breakdown of trust within calculus-based trust would be forgiven, within some tolerance, 
within knowledge-based trust. Within project management, it is sometimes possible for 
external factors to prevent an agreement from being achieved. For example, being late for 
meetings. Team members who work at knowledge levels of trust, would defend a colleague 
for such an event, when the person had previously demonstrated repeatedly that they would, 
ifpossible, be on time. No consequential action would be taken, neither would a penalty be 
used within knowledge-based trust, the incident is simply forgiven due to the level of trust in 
operation. Messick and Kramer (200 1) stated that '... whatever matters to human beings, 
trust is the atmosphere in which it takes placzI and that '... because the cost of misplaced 
trust are high credibility is lost only once unless the mistake is reasonable'. Wliat Messick 
and Kramer (200 1) suggested was that the forgiveness in knowledge-based trust should only 
be applied if the action to be forgiven was not a delil=ate action but simply a mistake. 
5.63 Identification-Based Trust 
Moving into what is considered the top level oftrust, can be described by using the terms 
such as having an empathy with others, or mutual understanding of others priority of needs. 
No control or proof is required that sometIft agreed will be done. Messick and Kramer 
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(2001) desenbed the four flictors that they suggested were needed to transfer from a 
laiowledge-based-tnist to identification-based-trust. These are: 
9 coUaborative coRective identity - achieved by such as a tearn name and or logo, 
co-location - through close proxhnity of working enviromnent, 
creatingjoint goals - collaboration in setting objectives, 
* commitment to common values - abBity to act on behalf of other team members. 
The three different types of trtist described above (calculus-based, knowledge-based and 
identification-based) can be niapped onto the project management environment. Firstly, all 
project management methodologies suggest some form of control mechanism, which implies 
some use of the calculus-based trust. At the same time having some flexibilfty and tolerance 
to unavoidable problems would be useful, rather than always having to invoke a penalty 
Knowledge-based trust would be a positive Lictor to help achieve successful IS projects. But 
it was argued earlier that information may be withheld in project teams, not always 
deliberately. This could prevent the calculus-based trust from developing into knowledge- 
based trust. Also, teams may have not worked with each other previously, for example, in 
cases when consultants are usedL It would therefore, be unreasonable to expect 
identification-based trust to be automatic or sometimes even possible in IS project team. 
Some professional relationships may not migrate to higlier levels of trust because ffiere is a 
need to retain business independence. Some of the features oftrust can at times appear to be 
in conflict with each other. For example, when some project team members use economic 
rational choice for their decision making in preference to considering their fiduciary 
responsibilities, thus increasing the risk for the tearn or the project, as discussed earlier. 
It would not be possible to create a level of 'perfect' knowledge-based trust because this 
would require perfect or total information for all involved, which itself is not achievable 
(PhUps 1988). However, the increase of information that is needed to build knowledge-based 
trust could itself reduce the final level oftrust in operation in an IS project. Some 
information could become known about a team member that could reduce the level of trust. 
Tampere (2004) for example, identified that bust fiWroved with a corresponding increase in 
information flow. However, when the information level reached between 80-90%, the level 
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of trust suddenly was reduced to zero. Tampere (2004) has re-affinned the 'salt curve' 
theory. This states that just because something is good and that more is better, there will be a 
point when even more is positively bad. Therefore, in addition to being unable to achieve 
perfect information, Tampere (2004) discovered there would be a point where too much 
information would create a down-tum in the level of trust. "Me issue however that remains 
is, to identify the critical information required in the 80-90% before trust become less. 
An example of too much information linked to IS projects is to imagine an organisation that 
becomes closer to some contractors, via the use of a preferred contractor list, formed often 
through higher levels oftrust, as found in knowledge or identification trust. By using 
preferred 94 the project is prevented from a fair or equal competition between other 
contractors and the opportunity is lost for those who have less information, causing the level 
oftrust to be reduced. 
There is also a potential problem with relying only on high levels of trust. When the higher 
levels oftrust are in operation, controls have usually been dispensed with. When trust is 
broken under these conditions the results are often spectacular, as shown by the collapse of 
the Barings Bank. The trader who worked for the Barings Bank and caused the losses was 
convicted of fraud and was reported to havefidsified records and fabricated letters, (Barings 
Bank Debacle 2004). The Bank ofEngland Report (1995) discussed the collapse ofthe 
Barings Bank and concluded that '... the losses were incurred by reason of unauthorised and 
concealed trading activities' and '... the true position was not noticed earlier by reason of a 
serious fidlure of controls and managerial confusion within Barings'. The trust awarded to 
the trader by the Bank bad been broken. However, the Bank of England Report (1995) 
identified that the environment within which the trader was working had failures in the 
controls used. Had the controls been in place it would have been less likely that the fraud 
would have gone undetected. The Baring Bank Debacle (2004) identified other 
organisational problems in Barings. A 'matrix' approach was operated and this would not 
have automatically been a problern, but employees bad '... coniplained that lines of reporting 
were not always clear' and '... there was no single person within Baring responsible for 
supervising' the specific trader involvedL The environment had, therefore, permitted the 
trader to take advantage of a lack of controls who had then carried out actions linked to 
untrustworthy behaviour such as falsi1ying reports and accounting entries. 
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Lander et al (2004) identified the inechanisins of trmt-building specificaUy within outsourced 
information systems development (OISD) projects and identified where they fit within the 
different three levels oftrust desail)ed above. These are presented in Table 5.4. 
Calculus based trust 
Initial interactions Using reputation 
Getting to know various stakeholders well prior to beginning of 
project 
Using early team building efforts 
Integrity Fulfilling promises, Telling the buffi 
Predictability Consistency, Dependability, Responsibility/accountability 
Rewards/punishment 
Knowledge-based trust 
Communication Encouraging communications 
Sharing knowledge and appropriate information 
Providing timely feedback, Creating common language 
Creating shared vision, Offering explanations for decisions 
Openness, Receptivity 
Identification-based trust 
Sharing control Delegating obfigatiorisý Sharing and delegating control 
Concern for others Fairness, Respecting others 
Apologising for unpleasant consequences 
Showing concem for various stakeholders' interests 
Joint identification Using a>-location, Availability, 
Involving in meaningfid participation 
Attachment to group, Interactiaris/co-operation 
Commitment Loyalty, Stressing the long-term interests ofparticipants 
Job satisfaction 
Potential for Success Achieving early success, Competence 
Managerial Decisions Providing training and personal growth opportunities 
Selection ofvendor/negotiation ofconh-dc: ts 
Commitment ofappropriate resources (people) 
Change management 
Table 5.4 Trust-building Mechanisms Source: Lander et al (2004) 
Natural1y, the date of the paper from Lander et al (2004) indicates that h did not influence 
the questionnaire and the business game that had both been developed for this research. 
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However, Table 5.4 indicates the erner&g interest in the subject of trust which is 
specifically linked to IS projects during the period of this work. 
Hardy et al (1998) considered that if we are con-fident that our predictions will come to pass, 
we trust them through predictability. It would be difficult for every stakeholder to obtain 
everything they wanted from a project. But if individuals are disappointed at the outcome of 
a project, it is likely this has been caused because their expectations had not been managed 
correctly. At the completion of an IS project some individuals may not be satisfied with the 
outcome, but provided this did not come as a surprise, there should be We disappointment. 
Dissatis&ction and disappointment are different. For example, the customers who use a 'fast 
food' organisation may not be totally satisfied with the meal. But the marketing is such that 
the customers are not surprised by what they have received, unless it is their first visit. The 
marketing activities produce a cognition or expectation-based trust (Lane 1998) and when 
the service to the customer matches what the organisation lead the customer to believe 
would occur, Lane (1998) described how the '... expectations ofpersistence, regularity, 
order and the stability ... where trust resides in actors' so the expectations of things to be as 
usual have been achieved. Customers may not be totally satisfied with their meals but they 
are not disappointed because the product and service achieved the level of expectation that 
the marketing bad created. The result is that these organisations; are trusted because they do 
not surprise their customers and this is, achieved through repeatedly meeting the customers 
expectations that organisations have originally promised. 
Individuals in IS projects can also be prepared for a level of dissatis&ction. Some 
stakeholders for example, may request more features from a new IS project than can be 
Provided, resulting in them being dissatisfied with the result if the features are not provided. 
Consider then if regular and open conununications took place during a project, the 
dissatisfaction by some stakeholders may still occur if they did not receive all their 
requirements but this would not come as a surprise. Disappointmerxt on the other hand 
comes from a mismatch ofWhat the stakeholders expected and what was achieved, 
indicating a failure in conununication. This produces a breakdown of trust. 
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5.7 Spiral of Trust 
Trust can spiral, both positively and negatively. If a relationship is to start in a state of 
mutual ftust, it would require prior confidence in the reliability of the other party, otherwise 
those involved are being asked to trust without evidence that it is safe to do so. The only 
paper found in the project management literature at the start ofthis research that attempted 
to link tug with project success was Mums (1995). In that paper Mums (1995) presented 
the Graduated and Reciprocated Initiatives in Tension reduction (GRIT) proposal as 
displayed in Figure 5.1, a model to be followed in the continual building oftnutual trust. 
Make Trusting 
Statements of 
Intent 
I 
Continue with Take Actions to Take Actions to 
Strategy Support Reduce - 
II 
Statements Eliminate Effects 
FE-xploitatii7on 
Response 
ReceTed Z, 
0 
T lEncouragcxnent: ] 
Enter Increasing 
Spiral of Trust 
I 
Fieure 5.1 GRIT Model Source: Munm (1995) 
For a positive spiral of trust to develop, the intent or desire to want to trust must be mutual. 
A relationship that starts even with only one party having a position ofmistrust will spiral 
into greater mistrust. Munns (1995) developed a mDdel to represent '. -- two parties who 
start with pessimistic intentions and expectations' as can be seen in Figure 5.2. This is based 
on a model originally presented by Zand (1972) who examined I... the dynamics of trust 
when two individuals enter into a relationship with shnilar expectation and intentions', either 
optimistic or pcssimistic. 
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Withholding information in a project team has been considered to be the key trigger to begin 
the spiral ofmistrust. Having built and broken mist, can it then be repaired? Repairing or 
rebuilding trust depends upon the reason for and severity of the breakdown. A requirement 
to rebuild trust is an acceptance that a problem exists, followed by stages of forgiveness and 
an agreement ofthe new starting point for ftust to begin, to be rebuilt with some method of 
validating the new commitment. Gray and Larson (2000) and Kobielus (1995) noted that 
there is less literature in respect of building trust, than that of breaking and preventing a 
breakdown of trust. Gary & Larson (2000) believe that the building of trust within a project 
environment appears to focus more on ftustworthy behaviour and fiduciary trust as it 
requires team selection, team building and itakeholder team building, which supports the 
view presented in Barber (1983). 
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ianner. concessions. 
Fizure 5.2 Spiral of Mistrust Source: (Mumis 1995 after Zand 1972) 
5.8 Features of Tmst 
Gill & Butler (1996) catalogued the main features of trust and distrust in joint-ventures. 
TUs is reproduced in Table 5.5. What is interesting in the research of Gin & Butler (1996) is 
the suggestion that a feature leading to trust was to have ambiguous goals but with sufficient 
agreement to proceed. Gallagher (1995) on the other hand included the need for a clear and 
unambiguous aim or goal in the list of critical successfitctors. But the findings of Gill and 
Butler (1996) given in Table 5.5 identified that high trust is generated when ambiguous goals 
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are present indicating that these two factors are mutually exclusive. A paradox would seem 
to exist: 
* trust in project teanis bas been argued to be a requirement for project success, 
o creating trust has been linked to having ambiguous gaols, 
project success has been linked to having unambiguous gaols. 
The ffidings of Gill and Butler (1996) are in direct conflict with Crallagher (1995) and other 
studies by Posner (1987), Pinto (1988) and Geddes (1990) Which, suggested the finportance 
of a clear project goal would be linked to project success. Positing that the results from the 
study by Gill and Butler (1996) are correct, the question could be asked, 'is it more 
irqportant at the start of a project to have a clear aim or to have a high level oftrust? ' 
Features Leadinz to Trust 
Parent opýctations low at formation 
Ambiguous goals but sufficient agreement 
Features Leading to DWrust 
Parent expectations high at fi3rmation 
Apparently clear goals vvith latent goal 
of one parent coming to light later 
Contract viewed as unimportant except as focus for Increasing shift to proce&n-al trust 
early discussions, low reliance upon procedural trust 
Pooled interdependence (low), parents not Sequential interdependence, dependence of one 
competitorsjoint-venture relatively unimportant to parent on the other increased due to endogenous 
each other, a situation that is maintained competition 
Personal MW built up over time and cmtingent 
upon pa-fbrmanceý high level of interaction at 
different levels maintained 
I-Egli personal trust linkage broken, performance 
disappointed, personal trust not maintained, reliance 
upon procedural trust 
Iligh and increasing autmomy 
Separate physical and organisational. identity 
Forbearance 
Lowautonomy 
Joint-ventLwe intermingled with main fivoilities and 
located on sit of one parent, lack of physical and 
organisational identity 
Preparedn 
Table 5.5 Features of Trust and Distrust Source: GM&Butler(1996) 
Starting an IS project with a clear aini, such as ideriff . 
ft the criteria against Which the 
project would be measured for success, has received support within the literature. However, 
the alternative is to have a high level of trust with some flexiibility over the aim. This may be 
more appropriate to consider at the start of a project. The project management literature 
Points towards having a clear aim, which seems to imply projects may possl'* be starting 
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with a low level of trust, whfle a high level of trust has been argued to be an fimportant factor 
to achieving project success. 
5.8.1 Rapid Applications Development (RAD) and Trust 
IS projects may have a systern to overcome the paradox of having clear aims and low trust. 
Avison and Fitzgrald (1995) described how the Rapid Applications Development (RAD) 
method does not require a fiffly defined goal at the start of a project. In RAD, change is 
expected during the development cycle and the resultant *, stem. is produced following 
several iterations to define and refine the project objectives. Using RAD would support the 
findings of Gill and Butler (1996) as it promotes high levels of trust by starting with 
ambiguous goals. It would appear reasonable to suggest that an ambiguous aim at the start 
of an IS project would appear to conflict with the main views of project management. The 
RAD systems development methodology appears to offer the opportunity of combining the 
need for a trusting team with a clear but flexible project aim. However, in Chapter 4, it was 
reported that the analysis of the questionnaire from this research indicated only 44% of the 
respondents used any systems development methodology These results indicate that the use 
of systems development methodologies (RAD in particular) and links with IS project success 
and trust could benefit from fiirther research. 
5.9 Testing for Trust 
Attempts have been made to assess organisations and teams for their trustworthiness. For 
example, Shaw (1997) developed a set ofquestionnaires to address three areas that he 
believed were the key fixtors, to identify tug: 
integrity, 
0 concem 
Cummings and Bromfley (1996) meanwhfle presented a questionnaire called 'Research 
Items in Insuument to Measure Interorganisational Trust' as part of an Organisational Trust 
Inventory (OTI). The core of the argument and the need for an Oll was '... that trust 
reduces transaction costs in and between organisations'. The OU basis ofthe OTI was that 
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tile three forms of trust orighmIly assumed by WillLvmn (1975) to be completely absent in 
organisations, was false. Cummings and Bromiley (1996) pointed out that in order for 
Williamson's transaction cost theory to be correct it would require people to: 
0 he in negotiations, 
40 cheat on any deals if it is profitable to do so, 
exploit opportunities for renegotiation to their utmost. 
Qmmiings and Bromley (1996) believed that these assumptions were incorrect and designed 
their OTI '... in a manner directly contrary to the assumptions of Williamson (1975)'. The 
foundation for the 011 was therefore based on the following explicit definition of trust by 
Curnrnings and Bromley (1996). 
'ThLst will be defined as an iulividuars belief or common belief among a group of 
ffidividuals that another Mvidual or group: 
(S' makes, good-faith efforts to behave in accordance with any commitn=ts both 1.1 
exphcit or fiVEcit, 
(b) is honest in whatever negotiations precede such conmiftnents, 
(c) does not take excessive advantage of another even when the opportunity is 
available'. 
In reality it is unlikely that only one of the polarised set ofbeliefs by Williamson (1975) or 
Cumniings and Bromley (1996) would exist at any one time. However, the questionnaires 
for tug developed by Sbaw (1997) and Cummings and Broniey (1996) bave contnibuted to 
the idea of measuring tiLq, although their structures and questions do not specifically 
address trust in IS project envirorunents or IS project teams. 
5.9.1 Testing for Secondary Trust 
Bacbarach and Gambetta (200 1) discussed the unobservable properties of a person, that they 
caUed 'Kxypta' and suggested that it was not possible to '... te. U trust from observation'. 
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Bacharach and Gambetta (2001) argued alternatively that it was possible to display some 
secondary signs of trust that called manifesta or t-Krypta (Le. trust Krypta). These being 
trust warranting properties such as behaviour A problem with secondary trust is that 
observed manifesta, are not always accurate because it is possible to mimic some of them. A 
Personal Identification Number (PIN) can be mimicked since they are an example of Krypta. 
Aherriatively, fingerprints carmot be mimicked, but they can be faked because they are 
objects. Within secondary trust, the two properties of either being able to mimic or not 
mimic are known as 'Care and 'Cannot' conditions. Bacharach and Gambetta (200 1) argued 
that manifesturn are secure against mimicry '... if and only if it's cheap enough for Krypta, to 
be displayed and too expensive for an opportunist to display'. Bacharach and Gainbetta 
(200 1) considered that the '... full analysis of trust may involve attitudes that are indeed 
peculiar to games of trust' also that it would be better if the secondary signs oftust (t- 
Krypta) '... are correlated with other things'. 
It has been discussed in sections 5.6.1 - 5.6.3 that there are different types and levels of trust. 
Although it was not possible for this research to test the complete range of trust, it was 
i possible to identify one level of trust (calculus) which is linked to project tearns and a test 
was developed to explore the effect ofthat level oftrust. Project tearns could enter into a 
calculus, knowledge-based or identification-based tnist. Factors that could contribute to the 
level of trust achieved are: 
0 the temporary nature ofproject work, 
clear or ambiguous project afins, 
0 an individual's decision whether to seek higher personal benefits or to work 
towards a project goaL 
As discussed in section 5.6.1 when calculus trust is in operation, the decisions that 
individuals make are more likely to be based upon a rational econornic transaction, where 
opportunistic behaviour is more apparent than when the higher fonns of trust are in place; 
for example, with social (norm) based trust. The latter rely upon social obligations, 
professionalism and fiduciary behaviour. Das and Teng (200 1) explained opportunistic 
behaviour would take place within relational bust rather than whhin performance trust, since 
Performance trust included a measure of luck 
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The economic model oftrust can be considered to equate to the use of 'rational choice' by 
individuals as they decide whether to co-operate with other team members. Tyler and 
Kramer (1996) described how'... people's decisions about whether to co-operate, for 
example, their willingness to trust others, are based on their estimates of the probability that 
others will reciprocate that co-operation', from the generally accepted '... underý* 
assumption that trust is rationally based'; a view not supported by Williamson (1993). 
5.9.2 Testing for Calculus-Based Trust 
To test calculus-based trust, the Pfisoner's Dilemma game may be used (see section 5.10). 
This would also explain co-operation verses opportunistic behaviour . Burt and Knez (1996) 
stated that '... the essential tension oftrmst is illustrated by the decision rule of the Prisoner's 
Dilemma% Murdoch (1999) descnbed 'game' theory in general consists of '... complex 
mathermfical formulae that shows how decisions affect each other'. Murdoch (1999) 
concluded that the business profession is only beginning to use game theory while 
economists have for some time used the theory to 'solve pwical problems'. In a dynamic 
changing environment, where stability is not certain, there is likely to be conflict or 
competition between others in the organisation, who are considered as threats. These 
possible conflict intemctions; could be considered to be similar to those involved in IS 
projects, wbcre there would be several 'stakeholder' groups each deciding whether to co- 
operate, or not, with each other. It is possible to investigate whether conflicts in teanis exist 
by using the essential tension ofthe Prisoner's Dilemma. Hollocks (2000) explained that to 
represent a competitive or conflict environment, the following 4 factors needed to be in 
place: 
"a finke number of competitors or players, 
" each ofthe competitors has a finite number of possible options, 
" multiple players make their decisions sirmiltaneously and independently, 
" outcomes of the decisions determine the return to each player. 
These fiictors are in place in the Prisoner's Dilemma, but they are not in other M)es of 
games such as the ThLq-honour game (MWer (2001), or the Thist game (Messick and 
Kramer 200 1) and (Yamagishi 200 1). 
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5.10 Game theory - the Prisoner's Dilemma 
Understanding whether project teams are operating in an environment of conflict or co- 
operation can be demonstrated using the rules of 'game theory'. Game theory can be 
divided into either zero or non-zero sum games. In a zero surn game, what one team wins, is 
at the direct expense of the other team In a non-zero sum garne the intention is not to beat 
the other people. The intention of a non-zero sum game is that both sides would benefit if 
the teams co-operated. In the Prisoner's Dilerarna, the 'Payoffs' that teams are awarded for 
the decisions taken are make by a third party called a 'banker'. When both teams co-operate, 
both receive the same value of Payoff But the Payoffs that players receive can be improved 
if they base their decisions on co-operation and not by using opportunistic behaviour. At the 
same time, for players to co-operate, they bave to trust that the other players Will not 
attempt to obtain a higher result for themselves. 
The benefit for groups or teams that can trust each other is that they will work with and not 
against each other. Miller (2001) described how groups '... can produce more as a team 
than they can working separately. An individual's 'marginal productivity' is therefore a 
fimcdon of other team member's efforts and as Miller (200 1) stated'... an individual can 
contribute more if others contribute more'. The situation this creates according to Miller 
(200 1) is an 'N' person Prisoner's Dilemma where effort is '... costly to the individual but 
rewarding to the group'. 
In other words, in a Prisoner's Dilemma environment, those taking part are vulnerable to the 
actions of others. This is a risk and the decision of whether to co-operate or not, depends on 
the ability to trust the other players, who may act from a position of selfinterest. The 
vulnerabiflity to the teams is caused by what has been described as the 'essential tension' 
within a Prisoner's Dilenum game. 
IS project management requires the stakeholders to co-operate for the benefit of the project, 
ideally this would be a non-zero surn game. However, many projects result in failure. Those 
filires may be caused by stakeholders such as the 'Users7 having obtained a greater 
proportion ofthe project's resources than it was agreed at the project inception. Vrith finite 
project resources available, those representing other stakeholders such as the Technical or 
Business would need to compensate for the increase that the Users achieved by accepting a 
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reduction in their objectives. Alternatively, the project would exceed the planned time or 
budget, i. e. criteria often used to judge the success or failure of a project. Such a scenario 
could only take place, if the environment in which the project was conducted enabled such a 
result. It is therefore clear, that to achieve success in IS projects it would require an 
environment that did not create or tolerate destructive conflict. For this to work in practice, 
it would require groups of stakeholders to accept that project success would be considered 
to have been achieved when they had only obtained a sub-optimum of their total 
requirement. 
5.10.1 Trust-honour Games vs. the Prisonees Dilemma Game 
One key difference between the Prisoner's Dilemma and the Trust-honour game was 
included as the third factor in the Est produced by Hollocks (2000). In a Prisoner's Dilemma, 
multiple players decide whether to co-operate or not simultaneously and independently of 
each other. Whereas with Trust and Trust-honour games, multiple players make their 
decisions sequentially. A consequence of taking decisions sequentially is that one team has to 
declare their intentions about whether they have decided to co-operate or not and the result 
of that decision is known to the other team. Naturally, this means that there is no dominant 
strategy for the team who have to make the first decision about whether to co-operate or 
not. 
A= 0; B=o 
A= 1; B= I 
A= -1; B=2 
Figure 5.3 Sequential Trust Game Payo Source: Ymnagishi (200 1) 
5.10.2 Sequential Games and IS projects 
In Figure 5.3 the logic and Payoffs according to Yamagishi (2001) are given for a sequential 
decision making game. The issues relating to trust in a sequential game could work in an IS 
PrOject as follows. Imagine 'A' is a project manager in an IS project who identifies a new 
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method of doing some work in a more efficient way. At the same time, the project staff are 
under pressure to deliver a project and would benefit from the additional tinie the new 
method from the project manager would produce. The project manager has the option of 
either going to the project board 'B' and infortiiing them about the efficiency saving method 
while tusting that they would share the benefits from the method. Alternatively, the project 
manager could decide not to take the proposal to the project board. The problem for the 
project manager, is that if (s)he informs the board it would be with the Itiust' that the board 
would 'honour' the efficiency method and that the board would allow the staff to benefit 
from some of the time saving. 
The alternative, is that the project board could receive the efficiency saving method from the 
project manager but decide not to share the time saving benefits, thus the project board 
'violate' the 'trust' given by the project manager. The project manager therefore has to 
decide in a sequential game (before the project board declare their decision) whether to trust 
the board with the new method. If the project manager decides that sow) cannot trust the 
project board, neither will obtain any benefit. This is showm in Figure 5.3 Jwiffi both the 
project manager and the project board receiving a Payoff value of zero. 
Miller (2001) described a situation as shown in Figure 5.3 in a game or business situation 
when only a one-shot decision was taken. This would produce what is termed a Nash 
equililflum, which was described by Miller (2001) as'... an outcome in which every person 
has done the best for herself that she can, given the actions of all others'. In a game when 
there is only one chance to take a decision the project board would be likely to violate the 
trust of the project manager, that in turn is likely to prevent the project manager from 
offering the efficiency savings. Such an outcome is described by Miller (200 1) as a'... 
Pareto-sub optimal since both could do better'. 
Yamagisbi pooi) pointed out that when people interact over time, '... threats and promises 
concerning future behaviour may influence current behaviour and that repeated games 
capture this fact of fife'. Yamagisbi (2001) continues that a defector in a repeated game'... 
weighs up the present value of continued co-operation against the short term gain'. NUIer 
(200 1) suggests'... baving safeguards (not controls) that allow employees to make product 
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enhancing actions that don't put them at risk'. This would require an organisation to have a 
culture to support such actions. 
5.103 Repeated Games 
Yarnagishi (200 1), Messick and Kramer (200 1) and Miller (200 1) discussed that when a 
game has repeated decisions, the outcomes from those decisions have been found to be 
different than ifthere was only a one-off chance to decide what action to take. Miller (2001) 
concludes that in a repeated Trust-honour game, '... a strong corporate culture firplies that 
employees and owners have consistently strong beliefs about how every-one else will play 
the game ne)d week'. The ability to take a decision in a 'one-shot' or repeated sequential 
game rests upon the level oftrust that the person or team who make the first decision have 
on those who make their decision later. A question is, how can equilibria be assured for 
games (IS projects are not games but they do have repeated decisions) where repeated 
decisions have to be taken? Yamagishi (200 1) considered that I... issues creating sustaining 
equilibria are at the forefront of research on repeated games and deserve substantial attention 
in the fifture 9. 
Cribbons (2001) added that '... according to the repeated game approach, if you understand 
my long-nin self interest, you may "true' me not to yield to certain short run temptations' 
continuing that, '... calculative trust is irnportant in the world and that repeated-game 
models can help us understand it'. Gibbons (2001) concluded that '... leadership can and 
should develop around and change equiliffiria. and that '... such a theory will grope toward 
ideas such as building and utilising trust, but even sketching the outlines of this theory must 
await another essay'. It is predictable in project teams that iterative or repeated decisions 
would be taken and that at times some ofthese decisions may need to be taken in a 
sequential order. 
Throughout the previous sections an argument has been developed to indicate that trust 
would be a flictor to influence or enable some decisions in IS projects. However, it was 
considered that while the sequential game models represented some of the flictors oftrust in 
decision making, the literature indicated that the 'essential tension' in the Prisoner's Dilemma 
game was more representative. The Prisoner's Dilermm game was therefore adopted and 
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adapted for this research to simulate an IS project, a detailed description of which follows in 
section 5.12. 
5.10.4 The Iterated One-way Game 
The iterated one-way game exists if a group or individual in a project have the opportunity 
to beat other team members. The opportunity to have an advantage over the others could be 
during any stage ofthe project, but most importantly at the final decision. Such an 
environment indicates that the relationship of power is one sided and that one team have the 
potential to exert control over the other team members, ifthey wished. The trust used is 
limited by the extent that the more powm1W team need the other team. In other words, total 
encapsulated interest is limited to one team while another team have only a limited set of 
reasons to need the others. 
5.11 Adaptations of the Prisoneies Dilemma Game 
Researchers have adapted the Prisoner's Dilenirm game to test the co-operation of 
individuals in different settings. In order to achieve this, the basic decision rule that creates 
the tension between trust and opportunistic behaviour has always been maintained, while 
other independent variables have been altered. Tichy (1999) found that women co-operated 
significantly more than men in the first round of decisions, but that the difference 
disappeared by the final decision. The reason why those women co-operated less in the final 
rounds was attributed to the experiences they had obtained from previous rounds. Tichy 
(1999) observed in his experiment that information over time bad influenced those women to 
lose their bust and develop a spiral ofmis-tust, Wlich supports the views of Munns (1995). 
Lindskold (1978) reported that the GRIT strategy bad worked in a Prisoner's Dilernrna, 
even when the game was run in a sequential play condition. TIMt is to say, the principle of 
GRIT (to reciprocate the behaviour of others) irnproves the level of trust even when one 
player knows the intended action of another Le. as in a trust-bonour type game. The usual 
method of playing exT)erimental conflict games is to operate a simultaneous selection of 
options by the players, so that no player knows the selection of the other until the results are 
given, as reflected in a Prisoner's Dilcrnrna, game. 
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Gordon (1999) changed three conditions usua. Hy held constant during his adaptation of the 
Prisoner's Dilenum resuft in a bigh degree of co-operation. The usual conditions are: 
the contestants are usually pre-selected, 
conununication is prevented, 
teams may not change their members during the game. 
Barbara (1999) also found that co-operation between players increased in a 'noisy' 
adaptation of the Prisoner's Dilemma game; that is when the history ofthe previous 
decisions taken by the players in the same garne were made known to other players. 
Bumharn et al (2000) changed the preconscious state of players in their adapted Prisoner's 
Dilemma experiment by replacing the word 'partner' with 'opponent'. The findings from the 
Burnham et al. (2000) work identified that when the Libel 'partner' was used, there was a 
100% increase in the trustworthy behaviour of the players than when the word 'opponent' 
was usedL 
Rapoport (1960) considered John Von Neunmm to be the creator of game theory and 
included a report ofhow Deutsch (1958) experimented with different adaptations ofthe 
Prisoner's Dilenum. Deutsch (1958) used four different levels of conununications between 
the players and 3 cifferent orientations. The conununications used were: 
1. No communications, the strategies were selected independently and in secret. 
2. Communications allowed before the game in writing. 
3. Reversible decisions, no prior conmiunications but players given 30 seconds to 
decide whether to change their initial decisiorL 
4. Non simultaneous decision making, Le. no prior communications but one player 
makes a choice followed by the second players deciding after seeing the selection 
of the first player. 
With each of the four types of conmiunication, three orientations were used to stress to the 
players their different hitentions, these were: 
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1. To co-operate and acbieve ajoint maNimizatiorL 
2. Each player was told to look after him or herself 
3. Each player was to play agahist the other. 
The results from the Deutsch (195 8) experiments are presented in Table 5.6. 
Orientations used 
Co-operate Individual Competitive 
Communication tyM 
No Communications 89.1 35.9 12.5 
Written Communications 96.9 70.6 291 
Reversibility 94.6 77.1 36.1 
Non-simultaneous 78.3 20.8 16.7 
Table 5.6 Adaptations of the Prisoner's Dilemma Source: Rapoport (1960) 
Figures given represent % of co-operation. 
The key findings were considered to be; when it was stressed to players that they should play 
from an individual orientation position, the co-operation increased from 35.9% to 70.6% 
when written communication was permitted. It was surprising to note that almost 23% failed 
to co-operate even when thcir dccisions to co-opcrate or not were reversible. 
5.11.1 Axeb-od's Prisoner's Dilemma Experiments 
Lane (1998) indicated that most of the work involving the Prisoner's Dilmuna bad '... built 
on the work of Axelrod (1984)1, who offered a challenge to find a winning strategy when 
playing the Prisoner's Dilenum garne. %Ue suggesting cbanges to the way that the 
Prisoner's Dilemrm could be tested, Bendor et al (199 1) and Hoffinann (2000) both cited 
the Axelrod (1984) experirnent as the key study. (Dawkins (1989) reported the results of the 
experiment initiated by Axelrod (1984) in which 15 different strategies were submitted and 
played against each other. The playing options were simply to either co-operate or not co- 
operate with the other person playing the game. The decision rule for the Prisoner's 
Dilemma presents what are called Payoffs. These have different values and are depcndant 
upon the joint decisions of the players. The values of these Payoffi and how they are 
determined are discussed in the following section. 
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5.12 Payoffi for the Prisoner's Dflemma Game 
Harper and Lim (1982) suggested that the flindarnental feature of game theory is '... the fact 
that each player has the ability to a greater or lesser extent of being able to reproduce the 
reasoning of the other'. In order for that to be possible, the values ofPayoffs linked to 
decisions are made known to all the players. Having Payoffs known to the players, creates 
an environment were as Harper and Lim (1982) stated '... he knows we know he knows we 
know he knows'. It is therefore possible, when the Payoffs are known to all the players, for 
them to act or behave in either a co-operative way or to attempt to achieve self interest, 
dependant on what the player(s) wish. The Payoffi for the 'true' Prisoner's Dilemma. are 
known to the players. The differences between the two available strategies to either co- 
operate, or not, defines the motives ofthe players in the teams. 'Ibus using the basis of the 
Prisoner's Dilemma would indicate whether team members were demonstrating the use of 
either trusting co-operative behaviour or opportunistic behaviour. The Payoffs ofthe 
Prisoner's Dilemma game are presented in Figure 5.4. 
What B does 
Co-operate Defect 
I 
Co-operate 
What A does 
Defect 
Fairly good Very bad 
Reward Sucker's Payof 
for mutual cooperation 
3 points 0 points 
Very good Fairly bad 
Temptation Punishment 
to defect for mutual defection 
5 points I point 
Payoffs in relation to A 
Figure 5.4 Ile Prisonees Dilemma Game 
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5.12.1 The Dilemma of the Payoffs 
Using the values in Figure 5.4, let us consider what will happen to 'A' when the decisions 
are made. The actual values or 'Payoffs, do not matter. What does matter is that the rank 
order of those Payoffi adheres to the following rules. 
The Payoff value to 'A' is higher when 'N does not co-operate while at the sa= 6w V 
co-operates, than when both W and V co-operate. That value in turn is higher than when 
both 'A' and V do not co-operate which is higher than when 'A' co-operates but V does 
not. A stipulation for a 'true' Prisoner's Dilenum game is that the average ofthe 
'temptation' to defect phis the 'Suckers Payoff` values, must not exceed the value of 
'reward' for mutual co-operation. 
Refening to Figure 5.4, the Payoffi for the Prisoner's Dflerrum game are as they apply to 
'A'. The following four examples refer to the Payoffi in relation to 'A' after the players bave 
selected the strategy for their decisions simultaneously and independently. 
* 'A' decides to co-operate, as does W. This scenario would result in 'A' receiving 
what is tenned the 'Reward' Payoff Note this is only the second highest rank 
order result for 'A'. 
W decides to co-operate, but IBI does not co-operate. This is the worst result for 
'A' in rank value order and is tenned the 'Suckers Payofr. 
'A' decides not to co-operate while V decides to co-operate. This is the best 
result as far as 'A' could obtain in rank order value and is called 'Temptation. By 
not co-operating, 'A' can obtain the best individual restilt, and beats IBI in this 
scenario. 
eW decides not to co-operate, as does W. This scenario is temied Tunishnxmf 
and both players would receive the same second rank order value. Both players 
have decided not to co-operate, so both receive a low result. Remembering the 
rank order ofthe Payoffi is finportant mt the values. 
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The dilenum can now be seen. It is possible to co-operate with the other player and obtain 
the (optimum) same Payoff However, should 'A' decide to co-operate, but simultaneously 
and independently, 'B' decides not to co-operatc, 'A' will receive the least Payoff value 
(the Suckers Payofl). What happens to 'A' depends not only upon what 'A' decides but 
also upon the decision that 'B' makes. The decisions needed to co-operate requires the 
players to trust each other, because there is opportunity that either player could act in an 
opportunistic way and attempt to obtain a higher score than the other. 
At the start of a new game, the player has limited information about the strategy that the 
other player may use. Phlips (1988) described this as 'imperfect information', when there is 
uncertainty about actual behaviour. At the same time the players have fidl information about 
the rules ofthe game and the Payoffs that would result ftom. the decisions. Phlips (1988) 
described these scenarios as having 'complete' information. Such a situation means there is 
a risk associated with the game as players cannot be certain about the intentions and actions 
of others. Hardin (2002) described the risks and the logic that would be used in a finitely 
repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game when rational thought is used for the decision making. 
This is discussed in the following section. 
5.12.2 The Backward Induction Argument 
When a game has a finhe number of decisions to be made, the logic that can be used for 
decision making is to consider the final decision as if the game was a one-shot game. In such 
a situation this would normally lead individuals towards defecting. 
According to Hardin (2002) '... if one should defect on the final play, however, then the 
penuhinýate play is de flicto a final play in the sense that it can have no effect on anything 
thereafter, and so one should defect on the penultimate play as well'. He continues that '... 
by tedious backward induction, one should defect already on the first play in the series'. It 
can then be suggested that if decisions are taken using the '... backward induction 
argument' individuals would not be able to trust each other. The logic of the backward 
induction argument is sound, which indicates that for society and organisations to fimction 
as they do, not all individuals are acting at a rational economic level, but as Hardin (2002) 
suggested, from '... something extra-rational' and more '... decent than rational'. It is 
therefore reasonable to suggest that some project team members would not behave from the 
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rational economic stand-point, preferring instead to demonstrate fiduciary behaviour and co- 
operate with other team members. The risks involved to a project are that some team 
members may use the backward inductive argument and attempt to achieve personal benefit 
before project success. A risk for IS Projects is having to rely on imperfect information to 
evaluate the firture intent of the stakeholders. 
The results from the Prisoner's Dilemma when only a single decision is taken was also found 
by Rapoport (1960) to be different to those when the game had iterative (or repeated) 
decision stages. In an iterative game, there is a chance to win back some of the losses from a 
previous decision, should the other player have decided not to co-operate. For a single 
decision game, the usual strategy would be not to co-operate, as there is no chance to catch 
up and make good from a previous bad decision. Axelrod (1984) argued that in an iterative 
Prisoner's Dilenuna, game, players have the chance to trust each other and are more hikely to 
do so than for a single decision game. 
5.13 Strategies used in the Axelrod Experiments 
A range of strategies were found to be used in Axelrod (1984) experiments. A strategy was 
termed as Pure, when the same decision is made each time. An alternative to a Pure strategy 
is a Mixed strategy, when the decisions taken change each time. 
From the 15 strategies which were entered into the Axelrod (1984) experiment, the top 
scoring eight strategies were those termed 'Nice' strategies, where the teams co-operated at 
the first decisiorL While, seven, what were termed 'Nasty' strategies obtained the lowest total 
Payoffs. An additional strategy, referred to as a Non-strategy was also inchided irl the 
Axelrod (1984) experfinent. The Non-strategy reflected decisions taken to co-operate or not 
at randorrL In the Axelrod (1984) the Non-strategy was beaten (Le. achieved less points) 
when it was played against all the eight 'Nice' and seven 'Nasty' strategies. 
In the Axelrod (1984) experiment a game was deemed to have started as a'Nice' strategy 
when all players elected to co-operate at the first decision. The 'Nice' strategy would change 
to a 'Mixedl strategy whenever, when the other players did not co-operate. That is to say, a 
'Nice 'Strategy would be taking place if all the teams decide to co-operate, on their first 
decision within a finitely repeated garne. By deciding to co-operate at the first decision, a 
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team was implicitly sending a message to say they trusted the other team and would not act 
in an opportunistic way for personal benefit. Such behaviour could be an example of the 
trust warranting properties that Bacharach and Gambetta (200 1) called n=ffesta or t- 
Kripta. It should, therefore, be reasonable to expect that teams, would co-operate more 
when there is trust within and between the teams. The results from the Axelrod (1984) 
experiment identified which strategies produced the higher total Payoffi, when a game 
operated under the Prisoner's Dilenuna. rules. 
The top scoring strategy when playing the Prisoner's Dilemma game is called Tit for Tat; a 
strategy devised by Rapoport (1960). Providing the other teams co-operated, the Tit for Tat 
strategy would result in the subsequent decisions to play co-operate, and continue to trust. In 
a Tit for Tat strategy the players always co-operate at the iný decision. Iý however, the 
other player did not co-operate, the Tit for Tat strategy simply mirrors the decision of the 
other players at the next decision. Tit for Tat could result in a simple strategy to always co- 
operate, however, when the players of a Tit for Tat strategy observe that trust has not been 
reciprocated, at the next decision they play not to co-operate, thus changing to a 'Mixed' 
strategy. 
Axelrod (1984) later sirnulated. a game using a strategy called Tit for two Tats which, 
resulted in a higher total Payoffthan even the Tit for Tat strategy bad achieved. 
A spiral of mis-trust is created when one team defect and the other team operate a Tit for 
Tat strategy. However, Tit for Tat could use both a 'Nice' and 'Forgiving' strategies. When 
a team play Tit for Tat, they demonstrate that they are not tying to wirL On the other hand, 
a 'Forgiving, strategy is prepared to revert to co-opcrating before the other tearn indicates 
they wM co-operate. Recall that the second level oftiist is called knowledge-based and 
relies upon team members being able to forgive actions that under calculus-based tug 
would have resulted in some penalty being applied. In order to operate the Tit for Tat 
strategy, tearn members would need to be operating at the knowledge-based level of trust. 
Also, when a team use the 'Nice' strategy, that is to say they have co-operated on the first 
decision, they have demonstrated that their aim is not to beat the other team. The Tit for Tat 
strategy can be seen to have signalled a willingness to co-operate, demonstrating a trusting 
action, one that can begin a spiral oftrust for subsequent decisions. 
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Another strategy used in the Axelrod (1984) experiment, identified what was termed a 
'Naive Prober'. This strategy gives the impression of being 'Nice' for a while and then 
changes to a 'Mixed' strategy to obtain the higher Payoflý but then reverts to co-operating. 
A 'Remorseful Prober' strategy is one that does not forget that the other team did not co- 
operate and will often much later in a game play a none co-operate strategy, as a form of 
revenge. A 'Remorseful Prober' strategy has a long memory, players who use this strategy 
never forget that trust had been broken, and eventually, play a Defect strategy of none co- 
operation. 
With a 'Grudger' strategy, a team never forgive the other team ifthey do not co-operate. 
When trust is broken in these circumstances, it is not possible to repair that trust and the 
team from that point, will play a Simple Strategy of none co-operation for the remaining 
decisions of a game. Trust is not repairable after it has been broken in a 'Grudger' strategy. 
The Axelrod (1984) experiment identified that the Non-strategy obtained the lowest result of 
all strategies. The strategies described above including the None-strategy will be contrasted 
with the results from Project Paradox, designed for this research. These results are presented 
in Chapter 7. 
5.14 Trust within Project Management 
In recent research studies into the effect of trust within project management Hartman (2000) 
and Herzog (200 1) indicated that they considered trust to be a key factor for project success. 
Hartman (2000) stated that '... virtually every aspect ofproject management requires trust 
as an enabler' and that '... the role of trust in the effectiveness of project management is 
becoming more significant, as the need for faster delivery of new products, more effective 
corporate clianýe and responsiveness to market needs continues to increase. Hartman (2000) 
continued by stating that '... managing the relationships between people and organisations is 
a significant part of the role ofproject management'. Hartman (2000) identified 36 aspects 
OfProject management where trust is considered to have a significant impact and has started 
work on the following topics: 
149 
" More accurate risk identification (through more open communication). 
" Reduced costs and schedule (e. g. through faster and better contracting). 
" More effective teams (improved confidence and trust). 
" Improved client satisfaction (better management of client expectations). 
" Better project plans (resulting from more honest specification and estimating). 
Hartman (2000) provided a fiwnework constructed of three types of trust, which he believes 
could be identified to be taking place in project teams, but that needed to be tested further, 
these were: 
* competence, 
o emotiomL 
mtegrity. 
Hartman (2000) concluded that '... trust has intuitively been an important but largely 
incidental part of effective project management" and that '... understanding the mechanisms 
of trust will help us to understand the human interaction that leads to greater success on 
projects'. Hartmari (2000) further considered that '... considerable research remains to be 
done on trust and its implications to project mariagement' and that '... the research is still in 
its infincy'. He continues by stating that '... significant new insights to how we might 
manage projects in the fimire, adapt to and adopt new technologies and generally improve 
project and project performance are potential outcomes of further study and implementation 
of findings related to trust in project management'. The conclusion by Hartman (2000) 
supports the analysis and evaluation ofthe literature review for this research, which 
identified that prior to the start of this research trust in project management bad not been 
considered as a factor in the success of IS projects. This failure is an example of a sin of 
ornission, a Type II error. That is to say, trust had not previously been managed incorrectly, 
but that it bad not been recognised as a factor for project success. 
Herzog (2001) studied the link between collaborative project tearns and trust, concluding 
that '. -- trust has been identified as a success factor in successful collaborations'. Herzog 
(200 1) maintained that '... levels of trust are based on collaborative team members 
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perceptions of themselves, of other collaborative team members and of other collaborative 
stakeholders involved with the project'. Herzog (200 1) supports the view of Hartman 
(2000), that almost all aspects of project management would be Muenced in some way by 
tnLst between team members. 
5.15 Summary 
Trust has been discussed as being based on one of three levels: 
calculus-based, 
knowledge-based, 
0 identification-based. 
Improving from the calculus-based level of trust requires prior knowledge of the other 
parties involved. When knowledge-based trust is in operation team members will forgive 
mistakes rather than invoke penalties that are used at the calculus-based levcL An argument 
was presented in this Chapter that project managers should exercise care when they increase 
to the highest level of trust that often uses no control mechanism. Some business practices 
such as using preferred contacts it was argued could limit the information to some teams and 
create low levels of trust. It has also been described that trust could be considered as being 
relational or perfonnmce-based. The second stage of this research would focus on relational 
trust. 
Several disciplines have studied trust and identified that the factors involved are different for 
eaclL For example, w*hin anthropology, the type of trust that exists is non-commercial. On 
the other band, marketing needs trust for business to operate, but this is a commercial type 
of trust and the individuals involved would be likely to use rational choice in their decision to 
co-operate and trust each other. To build trust, information needs to flow between the 
project staf I Witffiolding information creates an environment where a spiral of mis-trust 
can develop. Links were made between trust and risk with particular reference to IS 
projects. 
The RAD systems developrrient methodology was discussed. An argument was offered to 
demonstrate how it could bridge the conflict between a need to enter into a state of rapid 
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tnLq, due to a new project team forming with limited information about each other, and 
having an ambiguous project airrL 
A discussion was presented where alternative types of trust games were presented. These 
included the Basic Trust game also know as the Thist-honour game, which required the 
players to make their decisions sequentially. It was considered that two persons sequential 
games did not reflect the decision making process in IS projects in such a way that has been 
discussed in the literature in respect of an 'N' person Prisoner's Dilermm game, where 
decisions are made shuhaneously. For players to co-operate in a Prisoner's Dilemma game 
it would need them to trust that the other players in the game would also co-operate. 
Different strategies for playing a Prisoner's Dilenuna, game have been discussed, using the 
results from the Axelrod (1984), Deutsch (1958) and Rapoport (1960) experin=ts. More 
recent discussions, adaptations and variations to the Prisoner's Dile=ia by, Tichy (1999), 
Gordon (1999), Barbara (1999) and Burnham et al (2000) have been included to illustrate 
the results obtained when some conditions from a 'true' Prisoner's Dilenitna. are altered, 
such as allowing communication between players, which produced different levels of co- 
operation. 
Secondary 1hypes of trust caHed t-Krypta, were also discussed The litm-ature indicated that 
nmffesta or components of t-Krypta, were found to be difficult, or hpossible to observe. 
The various strategies tbat could be adopted by the players in the Prisoner's Dilenum game 
were also discussed. 
Cbapter 6 provides a description of how the Prisoner's Dflernim was adopted and adapted 
for this rcscarck Two different communication t3Ws and oricntations were used to create a 
new garne which is referred to in this thesis as Project Paradox. Chapter 7 discuses the 
results of Project Paradox when decisions are taken to co-operate at random (representing a 
Non-strategy). Those results are compared with the behaviour of teams who played Project 
Paradox using different strategies which, indicated the level of co-operation and ftust within 
those teams. 
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Chapter 6 
6.0 Development of Project Paradox 
6.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 5 an argument was developed which positioned trust as a possible factor in the 
success of IS projects. Different t3Ws and levels oftrust were reviewed and it was argued 
how individuals and teams would consider these from either a rational economic, social or 
cognitive perspective. I-ligher levels of trust were believed to be achieved through individuals 
and teams co-operating by sharing information. The lowest level oftrust was terined 
calculus and would entail individuals or teams behaving from a position of self interest, 
rather than for the benefit of an organisational target, such as the success of an IS project, 
which would be a risk to the project. A lack of co-operation, caused possibly by limited or 
imperfect information (Philps 1988) was associated with the calculus-based trust. The 
question could then be asked: which type or level of trust would teams in an IS project be 
likely to use? The Prisoner's Dilemma was identified as a validated method oftesting for co- 
operation between teams, with bust being the variable under test. The 'essential tension' 
created within the Prisoner's Dilemma, discussed by Burt and Knez (1996), was adopted 
and adapted to become Project Paradox. 
61 Hypothesis for Stage 2 
The hypothesis for this stage posits that, ISproject teann would co-operate (owt) no less 
than if the decisions to co-operate were decided at random 
63 Design of Project Paradox 
The basis ofthe Prisoner's Dilemma, restricts the teams to having only two options they 
could take, these were to either co-operate or not co-operate. The strategy selected by the 
teams would determine whether: 
a. they wished to maximise personal gain (demonstrating they were using rational economic 
choice and using the lowest level of trust) or 
b. they wished to co-operate (signalling they were operating at a higher level of trust by not 
seeking to nmimise personal benefit). 
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If a team co-operated they did so from a position of trust, because by so doing, they were 
vulnerable to the risk that the other tearns could take advantage of that trust and increase the 
benefit to themselves. 
Project Paradox requires the players to decide whether to co-operate, or not to co-operate 
with other tearns. In Chapter 5 an explanation was given to show how players of Project 
Paradox are vulnerable to the actions of others and the results of their decision zmking 
would reflect the level of trust they were using. These were discussed in Chapter 5 and were 
temied 'calculus' for the lowest level, 'knowledge' for the next higher level and 
'identification' based trust for the highest level. 
63.1 Communication and Orientation used in Project Paradox 
The Prisoner's Dilemna, is a two-person game. It would have been a weakness for this 
research to have used the same number ofplayers in Project Paradox, since IS project teams 
have to consider the actions of more than one stakeholder at any one time. The first 
modification or adaptation of Project Paradox was to design it as an N-person game, thus 
better reflecting an IS project environment. Rapoport (1960) believed that N-person games 
would represent a more realistic environment because they allow coalitions to form, 
( especially in the absence of communications'. Levin et al (1982) also pointed out some 
benefits of using N-person over two-person games, Le. those with more than 2 opposing 
interests. Tlis includes the opportunity for collusion by some ofthe participants against 
others. In addition, if the N-person game is designed to be non-zero sum then there is the 
opportunity for the participants to co-operate in a way to 'maxiiiise the total Payoff rather 
than maximising the payoff to one participant'. 
nx decisions in a Prisoner's Dilemma game would normally be made without the benefit of 
negotiation. This, it was also considered, did not reflect an IS project environment, hence the 
second adaptation of the Prisoner's Dilemma for the design ofProject Paradox was to 
permit conununications to take place between the members ofthe teams. Levin et al (1982) 
described these as negotiable games (known as a 'noisy' Prisoner's Dilenuna). The 
experiments by Deutsch (1958) also used the basis ofthe Prisoner's Dilenum but permitted 
different methods of communication as discussed in Chapter 5. 
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Two different scenarios were created for Project Paradox. I be fast scenario simulated co- 
located project teams, which made decisions with reduced negotiations. This was achieved 
by limiting the communication between teams. For scenario one, when communication 
between teams took place, they did so face to face, as would be possible with co-located 
project teams. 
The second scenario simulated a distributed project team, whose team members had the 
opportunity to make decisions with an un-restricted amount of negotiations, by allowing 
unlimited cornmunication between the participants. When tearns communicated for the 
second scenario, they did so without face to face contact. 
During scenario one, a random selection of comments and discussions made by the team 
members were recorded. Since the comments were collected at random, they could be 
considered to be a representation of what those playing the games were considering, before 
decisions were made. An analysis ofthe comments is included in the following Chapter. A 
summary ofthe comments indicated that in all the 14 runs for scenario one, the teams were 
discussing the level of bust between the teams. Recall, Project Paradox was developed as a 
placebo scenario, where the participants would not be informed in the rubric that a variable 
under observation was their propensity to trust. This was done to increase the internal 
validity of the data, as suggested by Gill and Johnson (199 1). However, although the rubric 
contained no mention of trust, when the teams were deciding whether to co-operate or not 
ffiey had translated this as a function of trust between the teams, as the comments indicate. 
Each run of Project Paradox lasted an hour. This included the time to read the rubric and 
make the seven decisions. Teams made their decisions simultaneously, and submitted the 
results on a pre-forma that was provided before the game started. The decisions made by 
the tbree teams and the Payoff value of the decisions were made available to the all teams 
after each decision. This provided the history of the teams actual behaviour compared with 
their stated intended behaviour before the decisions were made. 
The rubric developed for Project Paradox placed flm tea= in a realistic IS project 
environment by utilishig the structure as indicated in the PRINCE 2 project management 
methodology (Yeates & Cadle 1996). The project organisation within PRINCE 2 includes a 
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Project Assurance Team (PAT). The PAT include representatives of three different 
stakeholders in an IS project. Those stakeholders represent the requirements for the 
Business, the Technical and the User and are termed respectively, the Business Assurance 
Co-ordinator (BAC), the Technical Assurance Co-ordinator (TAC) and the User Assurance 
Co-ordinator (UAQ. VYAhin the PRINCE 2 organisational structure, there are other roles 
such as Stage nianager(s) and Project manager. But for the purpose ofthis research, only the 
three PAT stakeholders are built into the rubiic for Project Paradox to reflect a part of the IS 
environment, while acknowledging the existence of other roles vAthin the PRINCE 2 
methodology. A copy of the rubric for Project Paradox and information for the participants 
can be found in Appendix G. 
Each ofthe two scenarios involved 14 complete runs ofProject, Paradox with all runs 
requiring teams to make seven decisions. Why was Project Paradox designed as a repeated 
decision making game? In a single decision game, it is Rely that teams will opt for a Simple 
strategy, to not co-operate. This is the likely strategy because there is no chance to 'catch 
up' later in the game, as discussed by Axelrod (1984) and Dawkins (1989). Shoe decision 
games influence the decision making of teams and introduce bias into the results. A multi- 
decision game such as Project Paradox enables teams to consider playing different strategies. 
Teams could decide to play a Nice strategy and discover that the other team decided not to 
co-operate. Had that scenario been within a single decision garne, the team who played the 
Nice strategy would have received a reduced Payoff, compared with the other team, and 
would have no chance to recover from that 'poor' start. 
Designing Project Paradox with seven decisions made it specifically reflect a finitely repeated 
Prisoner's Dilemma. It was discussed in Chapter 5 that in a finitely repeated game there is 
the chance that the participants would operate a 'backward inductive' logic and not co- 
operate at any stage. In the Axelrod (1984) experiment the strategies for playing the 
Prisoner's Dilemma were developed using a matrix from a finitely repeated game. However, 
Nachbar (1992) considered that the Axelrod (1984) game '... was not a 'true' repeated 
Prisoner's Dilemmal and believed that there would be differences in the strategies that would 
be played in a finitely repeated Prisoner's Dilermna compared with an infinitely repeated 
Prisoner's Dilemma. Nachbar (1992) stated that his comments relating to Axelrod's game 
were '. -- basically methodological in nature' and '... not intended as a rebuttal to Axelrod's 
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basic intuition that co-operation is dynanically fit, in some sense, even in hostile 
environments'. However, Nachbar (1992) believed that thefinitely repeated game was '... a 
world more hostile to co-operation than the infinite game, and the environment with wWch 
Axelrod originally began7, thus supporting Neyman (1985) who stated that '... co-operative 
bebavior may emerge in non-co-operative situations when the nature of the interactions is 
long term'. 
One reason to design Project Paradox as a finitely repeated game was to reflect the typical 
number of stages or phases of an IS project, each requiring decisions to be made over a 
period of time. In Project Paradox, the time period is reduced to the duration of the garne. 
Naturally the decisions still had to be made sequentially but the outcome of one decision 
could influence the strategy for the next stage, as Miller (1996) explained; when the '... 
actual scores... become common knowledge ... based on this information, each person is 
allowed to adjust his or her own program for the next round'. Teams were therefore 
permitted to reconsider their strategy, as more information became available. 
To place Project Paradox into context, the participants were permitted if they so wished to 
name each oftheir decision stages to reflect those of a development project. They would 
typically follow these seven stages: inception, feasibility, analysis, design, development, 
testing, and implementation. However, it is acknowledged that not all IS projects are 
developmental projects. As discusýed in Chapter 2, some projects may be conducted by 
selecting and modifying a 'Commercial Off The Shelf (COTS) package solution. But these 
projects are also broken down into manageable stages and include several decisions to be 
made. The main point being made is that IS projects usually have more than one stage, 0 of 
which require decisions to be takerL This is a furdier reason why Project Paradox was 
designed as a finitely repeated decision scenario. 
Having described the design of Project Paradox, the next section presents the values, known 
as Payoffi, ofthe decisions the teams made. 
6.3.2 Payoff Values for Project Paradox 
In Chapter 5 the rank order of the Payoffs for a Prisoner's Dilemma game was described and 
the model was illustrated in Figure 5.3. Part of the design for Project Paradox was to 
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allocate a value to the Payoff for each possible set of decisions to either co-operate. or not. 
made by the teams representing the Business Assurance Co-ordinators (BAC). Technical 
Assurance Co-ordinators (TAC) and the Users Assurance Co-ordinators (I JAC). The 
Payoffi for Project Paradox are set in'Fable 6.1 below. 
Businews V 304) V -100 Y -104) V -I(H) N 500 N 250 N 7-5 0 N -10 
Technical V 300 V -100 N SM) N ? -q) V -100 V- I(M) N 7-N) N -10 
U. mc r V 3(k) N ý") V -14m) N 2-50 V -100 N 2. qI v -14m) N -10 
Table 6.1 Pavoff Values for Proeect Paradox 
In Table 6.1 the letter V represents a decision to co-operate while the letter N represents a 
decision not to co-operate by the teams. As can be seen from the Payofftable, iftbr 
example, the Business, Technical and User teams all decide to co-operate simultaneously, 
jc )ar the Payoff would be 300 to each team. Since there are three teants in Pro LtI adox the 
values of the Payoffs represent either what one or two teams will receive. In the design of 
Project Paradox key elements and tensions of the Prisoner's Dilemma as described by 
Axelrod (1984) were considered to reflect an IS project life-cycle. This is in keeping with the 
liumework. within which the Prisoner's Dilemma can be applied. 
For example Axelrod (1984) chuifies that: 
op the payoffs of the players need not be of comparable units, 
9 the payoffs do not need to be symmetric, 
* the payoffs need only to be measured relative to each other. 
Also '... the only thing that has to be assumed is that, for each player, the four payofls are 
ordered as required for the definition of the Prisoner's Dilemma'. Bringing those rankings 
forward will serve as a reminder of those given in Figure 5.3 and clemonstrate that the 
'essential tertsion' of the Prisoner's Dilemma has been achieved. 
0 Temptation to Defect (5) must be better than the reward for mutual co-olvration (3) 
Mutual co-operation (3) must be better than the Punishment fbr mutual dcfý-ction (1) 
0 Mutual defection (1) must be better than the Sucker's Payoff (0) 
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Taking the Payoff values from those for Project Paradox, it can be sem the ranking has 
remained correct. 
Using Figure 6.1 (following page), the Payoffs can be descnibed from the position as seen by 
the Business team A decision by the Business team not to co-operate (temptation to defect) 
when both the Technical and User teams voted to co-operate, would result in a Payoff value 
of 500. That Payoffis higher than the value when all three teams decide to co-operate 
(mutual co-operation), that has a Payoff value of 300. This value in turn can be seen to be 
greater than the value achieved when all three teams decide not to co-operate, (mutual 
defection), resulting in a Payoffvalue of -10. 
Finally, the lowest Payoff to the Bushiess team (the Suckers Payo: ft) occurs when they co- 
operated but both the Technical and User team have decided not to Co-operate; the Payoff 
value for this is -100. To fully comply with the Prisoner's Dilemma, the average Payoff for 
Temptation and Suckers Payoff has a value of 200, which is less than the value of the 
Reward Payoff value 300. 
The Prisoner's Dilemma could have been used to test the trust between more than two 
teams by using the following playing order. 'A' would play'B' and then play ICI separately, 
'B' would also play 'C' as a separate game. The team with highest total Payoff ident& ., 
ing 
the winner. Project Paradox, however, was designed to reflect the Payoffs to teams when 
they played as an N-person game simultaneously. This was done to represent a more realistic 
project scenario where each stakeholder has to consider the actions ofmulti stakeholders at 
any one time. 
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Business 
Co-operate Non co-operate 
rm cu 
a 
Business - 300 Business - 500 
Technical - 300 Technical - -100 User - 300 User - -100 project - 900 Project - 300 
2 
Business --100 Business 10 
Technical- 250 Technical --10 
User - 250 Users 10 
Project - 400 Project -30 
3 
I 
U 
1 
C 
z 
Figure 6.1 Matrix of Pbving Proiect Pamdox - Pavoff values for decisions 
The values of the Payoff for Project Paradox have dim far been allocated to the three 
individual teams within the game. Ilere is, however, another view that should be considered 
from the overall perspective, Le. was the project a success, at the end of a run? 
For example, if the three project teams co-operate the total Payoff value for each decision 
would be 3x 300 totalling 900. There are 7 decision stages in each run of Project Paradox 
to be made by each ofthe 3 teams. It for all the 7 decisions, the three team decide to co- 
operate, the total value of 900 x7= 6300 would be achieved. The value of 6300 was 
considered to be the optirnum value for the 'project' and was used as a basis for comparison 
purposes when Project Paradox was run with real teams. Ifthe project achieved a value of 
6300, it could be classed as being successful. 113e value the project could achieve, naturally, 
depended upon whether the three teams would co-operate or not with each other. A total 
value of 6300 in relation to the 'project', could be achieved sýnply if the teams in the game 
fiffly co-opemted. 
The following woxdd be the possible Payoff vahies achievable by the teanýs) after all 7 
decisions were made: 
The maxfinum value for a team would be; 
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7 (decisions) x the value, when they alone did not co-operate (value 500) = 3500. 
The optimum value to each team if all teams co-operate; 
7(decisions) x value for complete co-operation (300) = 2100. 
The least a team could receive would be ifthey co-operated but the other 2 teams did 
not co-operate; 
7 (decisions) x individual decisions to co-operate (-100) = -700. 
'rhe Payoff value for teams if they decided simultatmusly not to 
co-operate; 
7 (decisions) x the value for complete non co-operation (-10) = -70. 
If one team decided not to co-operate, the Payolfs to the two temns bad would be as given 
below. 
Joint co-operation and joint defection would attract the same Payoff as the individual team, 
giving 2 100 and -700 respectively. When two teams created a coalition and decided to not 
co-operate they would have a total value of 500 divided equally between them 
None co-operation by two temns over seven iterations would produce a PayofE 
7 (decisions) x 250 = 1750. 
Ilie optimum. value for a 'project' is when there is total agreement to co-operate producing 
a value of 6300, indicating the highest level offtust had existed between teams. 
6.33 Simulating Project Paradox using Random Data 
In Chapter 5, different strategies for playing a Prisoner's Dilemma, which had been identified 
by the Axelrod (1984) tournament, were described. One strategy comprised decisions of 
whether to co-operate or not, at random, this was called a Non-strategy. The Non-strategy 
when used in the Prisoner's Dilemma was found to produce the lowest overall score. It was, 
therefore, decided that a second measure of success, for tearns playing Project Paradox, 
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would be to compare the total of the Payoffi that their teamis achieved, agafiist a value that 
had been achieved using a Non-strategy. 
How was the Non-strategy Payoff value achieved? One hundred complete runs of Project 
Paradox was simulated using random data that represented whether teams co-operated or 
not for each of the 7 decision stages, for each of three teams. This equated to a total of 
2100 decisions made up as follows: 
7 (decisions) x3 (tearns) x 100 (iterations of the game) =2 100 decisions. 
2100 evenly distributed random numbers greater than or equal to 0 and less tI= 1, were 
generated using the Mcrosoft Random number generation analysis tool. A number wit1iin 
the range 0 to 0.499999 represented a decision of co-operate = Y. Num1bers between the 
range 0.5 to 0.999999 were treated as a decision not to co-operate = N. 
6.3A Output fi-om the simulation of Project Paradox 
When the simulation of Project Paradox was completed, two values became available for 
comparison with later run results. The first related to the project teams. The second was the 
value that the 'project' could be considered to have achieved, obtained as a non-participant. 
The value assigned to the project for this research was the total of the three values that the 
teams had earned. The individual Payoffs for the three teams after random decisions were: 
Business Team 919, Technical team 825, User team 824. 
Tbe aver-age Payoff to a team, after 100 complete runs using a Non-strategy, resulted in an 
average value of 856. Recall that bad each team sirnply co-operated, the value to each team 
would bave been 7(decisions) x value for complete co-operation (300) = 2100 Payoff value 
per iteration. 
In summary, using a Non-strategy produced: 
The average value to the teams = 856, 
Ile average value to the project = 2568 (Total of flum teams Payoffs). 
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To validate the average achieved by using 2100 runs using random numbers, a more 
accurate calculation would be to consider all the configuration of YYY, YNN, NYY and 
NNN equally. Using the values in Table 6.1 the calculation would be: 
Average random to the project = (900 + (300 x 3) + (300 x 4) - 30) /8= 371 
For 7 decisions making one complete iteration this produces a value of2597 
if teams fiiUy co-operate these values become: 
The value to the teams =2 100, 
The value to the project = 6300. 
These wM be tfie basis for comparison with respect to the output from teanis and the project 
when playing Project Paradox. 
The values in respect of the teams and tile project were obtained when both a Non-strategy 
was played and when fiffl co-operation between teams took place. It is unlikely in an IS 
project that the teams would randomly make their decisions to co-operate or to always co- 
operate. The literature of trust indicated, it was possible the teams would make decisions 
that would be of benefit to them, using a rational economic choice model. But that depended 
at which level of trust they considered the others teams would operate. 
6.3.5 Simulating a Coalition within Project Paradox 
Designing Project Paradox as an N-player game enabled coalitions to form; should the teams 
believe it was in their interest to do so. It was therefore decided to observe the behaviour of 
Project Paradox and obtain the values that a team and the project would achieve, if two 
teams decided to form a coalition and always co-operate, while the third team only co- 
operated at random. Consider the following example. The members of the User team are 
only prepared to randomly co-operate. This could be argued to equate to the situation of a 
team whose support or trust it was not always possible to depend upon. The other two 
teams, the Business and Technical have decided for the 'benefit' of the project, to always co- 
operate. In this example, the User team would have played a Non-strategy while the 
Business and Technical teams operated a 'simple' strategy ofco-operation. 
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To simulate this new scenario, Project Paradox was run a further 100 times, needing 2100 
decisions. The 700 decisions representing those of the User team were generated by using 
the Mcrosoft random number generation analysis tool as discussed above. The 1400 
decisions for both the Business and Technical teams were all set to a 'Simple' strategy to co- 
operate. 
For this scenario, the value to the Business and Technical teams (when they My co- 
operated) was 727. At the same tirne, the value to the User team (who decided at random 
whether to co-operate or not) was 2731 and the value ofthe 'project' Le. the sum of the 
three teams has increased to 4272. 
Con4wing the results from the decisions ofa complete Non-strategy and this Mixed 
strategy, provide the following observations. 7he value to the 'project' can be seen to have 
increased compared against a Non-strategy when two teams create a coalition to co-opcrate. 
However, the value to the teams, who, (for the benefit of the project played a Simple 
strategy of co-operation), bave been reduced. The values to the teams and the 'project' for 
both simulations are presented in Table 6.2. 
'Value of Project Paradox to team members' 
Users Decisions made Business and Technical All Teams 
at Random My co-operate, User co-operate 
co-operateS at random 
Business 919 757 2100 
Technical 825 757 2100 
User 824 2731 2100 
'Value to project' 
2568 4272 6300 
Table 6.2 Value of Plavina Proiect Paradox 
When two teams form a coalition in an attempt to improve the chance of success for the 
project, they received a reduced total Payoff value. The value for the Business Team 
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reduced to 82% of the random value. For the Technical team the value was reduced to 91 % 
of the value achieved if the decisions were made at random By not always co-operating, the 
User team achieved an finprovement of 33 1% over the value of a Non-strategy. Had all 
three teams co-operated, the Payoffs per team would have been 2100. The User team have, 
therefore, finproved their Payoffi; from 856, (when using a Non-strategy), to 273 1. They 
have also obtained a higher value than 2100, a value achieved when all teams co-operate. 
The project obviously has benefited when two teams form a coalition and My co-operated 
compared to the scenario when all 3 teams played a Non-strategy. But those teams who did 
co-operate, (the Business and Technical) each received a reduced Payoff value, con4mred to 
the time when they played the Non-strategy. 
It can be seen, from. the simulated random data, when the Business and Technical teams 
forrned the coalition in an attempt to improve the 'Project success', the User team were able 
to benefit from the 'Too Nice strategy' played by the other two teams. The User team was 
able to 'invade' the game and operated a random 'Prober' type strategy. A Too Nice 
strategy was considered by Dawkins (1989) to be one where a team would continue to co- 
operate despite the posibility that the other teams may not co-operate. The Too Nice 
strategy played by the Business and Technical teams was part of the scenario to examine the 
behaviour ofProject Paradox and the effect on the teams and the project values. - 
63.6 Payoff Value to the Project. 
The discussion so far has centred on the decisions taken by the teams and the value of the 
Payoffs the teams would receive. However, consider now the value in respect to the 
'Project'. In Figure 6.1 the direction ofthe arrows indicated the relative values the Business 
Team could achieve, depending upon the decisions of the teams to co-operate or mt. It is 
worth pointing out that the values to the 'project' have a different ranking to those ofthe 
values to the teams. The top values for a project would occur if the tbree teams co- 
operated. As can be seen in Figure 6.2, if the Business team co-operate the 'project' would 
achieve a value of either 900 or 400 dependent upon Whether the Tecbnical and User teams 
co-operate or not. 'Ibe arrows in Figure 6.2 reflect the sequence of the values with respect 
to the project, starting from the top left box. 
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The paradox for the teams and the project (a non-participant in the game) has therefore been 
set. If the team(s) decide to co-operate, the project receives the best value. The teanis 
however, have the chance that they may recerve the lowest Payoff (- 100 points), depending 
upon which decisions the other two teams make. On the other band, the Business team may 
decide to obtain the highest points for themselves (500) with only a value of (-10) points 
should the other two teams decide not to co-operate. 
Business 
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Co-operate Non co-operate 
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When reading Figure 6.2 it is possible to see Payoffs for an individual tearn, a coalition and 
the project. For example, if all flm teams co-operate they all receive the same Payoff equal 
to 300, While the project receives a Payoff value of 900. The values in Figure 6.2 reflect a 
coalition between the Technical and User teams, but could equally represent any individual 
or coalition team combination. 
Project Paradox has been designed with a built-in paradox, hence the reason for the name. If 
each team co-operated, giving the project the best chance of success, this carries with it the 
possibility for the lowest team score (-l 00). To make a decision to co-operate, required 
teams to bust that the other teams would also co-operate. The alternative was for teams not 
to co-operate WWch was less risky. A decision not to co-operate would either produce a 
Payoff of small a penalty (40) for the team or the highest higher Payoff for themselves 
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(500). But a decision by the Business team not to co-operate could produce the lowest 
Payoff to the project. 
6.4 Running Project Paradox 
The players were placed in teams and given a copy of the rubric, a copy of which can be 
found in Appendix G. Postgraduate and undergraduate students with previous project 
experience participated in the teams. Sufficient time was allowed to read the rubric and to 
answer questions from the players who were seeking clarffication before the run started. 
The values for the decisions both to teams and the project were provided with the rubric and 
explained to the players. The consequences of the decisions that each team made, were, 
therefore, clear to all before the game formally started. The players understood the rank 
order of the Payoffs and that the Payoff values the teams would receive, which would 
depend, not only upon their decisions, but also upon those made by the other teams. The 
orientation set for the Project Paradox games was for the players to do what they thought 
was best. Built into the rubric was a performance-related bonus for the team who achieved 
the highest team Payoff at the end of a complete game. What the players were therefore 
considering was whether to co-operate for the bmefit of the project, or whether to attempt 
to achieve an improved Payoff for their own tearn. As a Project Paradox game progressed, 
the teams intuitively realised that a vote to co-operate also required them to trust the other 
teams. 
6.5 Summary 
IUs Chapter has descrfl)ed how Project Paradox was designed as a finitely repeated non- 
zero sum game that included the 'essential tension' and rank order of the Payoffi used in the 
Prisoner's Dilemma. At the same time it was also adapted to be a 'noisy' and N-person 
game. 
Payoff values were obtained for the teams and the project, by observing the behaviour of 
Project Paradox by playing different strategies. The first used what was temied a Non- 
strategy. This was achieved by sinitflating Project Paradox using random decisions by all 
three teams to co-operate or not. 
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The second value represented two teams who formed a coalition to play a Simple strategy to 
always co-operate, while the third team played a Non-strategy of random co-operation. The 
results indicated that if two teams co-operated to achieve a successful project, the project 
would achieve a higher Payoff, but the two teams who co-operated would receive a reduced 
Payoffthan if they adopted a Non-strategy. 
The third value represented the optimuin for a tearn. This was obtained by the teams playing 
a Simple strategy of fiM co-operation. The fbal value was the optimum value for a project. 
This was the product of the three optimum values achieved by the teams. 
The rubric was written to reflect the enviromment of an IS project with a perfonnance related 
scheme for the teams, to help create the 'essential tension' of a Prisoner's Dilemma. 
The following Chapter presents an analysis ofthe results from each ofthe two Project 
Paradox scenarios. Full communication was used in scenario one and limited connuunication 
in scenario two; this required 28 runs using 54 teams. The results from the strategies used in 
the two scenarios are compared with those from the Axelrod (1984) experiment. The 
Payoffs achieved in the two scenarios are compared with the results obtained from the three 
sinrulations. The first simulation used a Non-strategy, the second used a coalition between 
two teams and the faial was a Simple strategy of M co-operation. Finally, the hypothesis set 
at the start ofthis Chapter is tested and an indication of the type and level of trust that the 
teams were using in their decision making are discussed. 
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Chapter 7 
7.0 Output from Project Paradox: scenarios 1 and 2 
7.1 Introduction 
The layout of this Chapter is presented as follows. First, the outputs obtained from running 
scenario I (that used limited communications) are presented. An analysis ofthe strategies 
used by the teams are discussed in detail and compared with those obtained from the 
Axelrod (1984) experiment, which were described in Chapter 6. This is followed by an 
analysis of the ovez-a outputs from scenario 2 (that used unlimited. communication). 
Next, tables containing the overall results from all 28 games from scenario's I and 2 are 
presented. The tables contain the number of the decisions to co-operate and their associated 
Payoffvalues. These are compared and contrasted with the results obtained when Project 
Paradox was sfinulated using: 
a Non-strategy (random co-operation), 
a Simple strategy (total co-operation), 
a Coalition strategy (two teams always co-operate While one team co-operates at 
random). 
These discussions are supported with tests to determine whether the results from scenarios I 
and 2 were significantly diflerent from those obtained when either the Non-strategy (ie. by 
cbance) or the ShMIc strategy were used. A final test was presented, to indicate whether the 
populations from which the teams for scenario I and scenario 2 came from were different 
(Le. did unlimited cornniunication cause the difference in the results) or again could chance 
have produced the differences observed. 
In the next section, the recorded comments made by the players of scenario I are discussed. 
From the analysis ofthese cornments it was concluded that tile players in all 14 runs of 
scenario I were discussing the bust, or lack of it, between the teams, was influencing their 
decisions about whether to co-operate, or not. 
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It was argued in Chapter 5, that the decisions taken by players of the Prisoner's Dilermm 
game could be based upon the rational choice model oftrust. This factor identifies whether 
teams were prepared to co-operate with each other. A competitive element was included in 
the Project Paradox rubric, in the form of an incentive for each team to achieve the best 
result for themselves. The competitive element helped to create the paradox that the teams 
had to consider before making decisions about whether they would co-operate. 
7.2 Strategies Used in Scenario 1 
In scenario 1, the rulkic reflected an IS project having co-located project teams, using 
Ifinited information, upon which they made their decisions. The results from scenario 1, run I 
are shown in Table 7.1. 
7.2.1 Analysis of scenario 1- run I 
From Table 7.1, it can be seen that both the Business and TecMcal teams voted to co- 
operate at the start of the game. The User team on both the first and second decisions 
decided not to co-operate. 
Decisions 
Teams 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Business y y N N y N N 
Technical y y y y y y N 
User N N y N y N N 
Table 7.1 Decisions taken in scenario 1: run 1 
l'bree other obsarvations from the fm run are as Mows. lbe Bush)ess team did mt stnke 
back until the User team defected twice. This is what Dawkins (1989) reported as a Tit for 
Two Tats; stmtegy which, he found produced a result to 'beat' all other strategies. In run 1, 
the Technical team continued to co-operate despke having had both the Business and User 
teams voting not to co-operate. TNs is an example of a'Too, Nice strategy, and 
denionstrates how the Business and User teams were able to use an alternative strategy to 
'invade' the Technical te= who were trying to co-operate. 
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Optimum strategy 
2500 2100 Business User 
2000 1750 1750 
1500 Non strategy 
856 1000 
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> Technical 
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I- 
-500 
Teams -500 
Figure 7.1 Pavoffs from scenado 1: run I 
The result fi7om the Technical team point of view is an example of a 'Grudging Finisher', a 
type of strategy identified in the Axelrod (1984) experiment. The Technical team can be 
seen to have never forgotten that the other teams had previously decided not to co-operate, 
and when the final decision was taken, they also did not co-operate. From Figure 7.1, it can 
be seen that the Business and User teams in their attempt to achieve a higher individual 
Payoff by not co-operating, can be shown to have received a better value than they would 
have achieved had they used the Non-strategy. However, they still only received 83% (value 
of 1750) compared with a strategy of full co-operation (value 2100). Following the final 
decision, the Technical team commented that they considered themselves to have been 
'beaten', by the other two teams in the same project. 
7.2.2 Analysis of scenario 1- run 2 
The results from Table 7.2 indicate the Technical and User teams started by co-operating 
while the Business team elected not to co-operate. Before the second decision was taken, 
the teams spent some time discussing the various decision options and their ramifications. 
At the second decision, the Business team did not to co-operate. This was contrary to what 
was observed by the author, when they agreed to co-operate during a meeting between the 
teams. At the third decision, the Technical team played the Tit for Two Tats strategy 
against the Business tearn, but reverted immediately at the next decision to co-operate. This 
is an example of a Nice strategy. Where the first decision was to co-operate, changing to, Tit 
for Tat (or Two Tats) when the other teams did not co-operate, but having a level of 
forgiveness and returning to co-operation. The Technical team was dernonstrating that they 
were not fimctioning at the lowest level of trust (calculus). They were prepared to forgive 
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having been invaded by the Business teams, which indicated a higher level of trust. Lane 
(1998) caUed this norin or the social trust, one where a team was not attempting to obtain a 
competitive advantage. 
Decisions 
Tcams 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Business N N N y N N y 
Technical y y N y y N N 
User y y y y y y N 
Table 7.2 Decisions takcn in scenado 1: run 2 
Optimum strategy Business 
2500 
2100 2200 
2000 
.2 1500 
U 
0 
M Non strategy Technical 
IV 1000 856 
.2 
750 
5w User 
50 
Teams 
Fieure 7.2 Pavoffs from scenario 1: run 2 
The values for run 2 can be seen in Figure 7.2. The strategy played by the Business team, 
was predominantly based on none co-operation and achieved their aim of invading and 
beating the other teams. Tyler and Kramer (1996) described how some teams would 
attempt to play a strategy base upon self interest, which demonstrated they were operating at 
the lowest level of trust. The Business team achieved a score of 2200 that was higher than 
both the value of the Non-strategy and the optimum value for complete co-operation. The 
User team co-operated on six decisions yet received only 50 points. The strategy used by the 
User team was a finiher example of a Too Nice strategy. As the game progressed, the User 
team was able to witness that the strategies played by the other team were not to co- 
operate, despite this, they continued to do so. At the sum time, the Business team was able 
I imohimmill 
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to analyse the strategy played by the User team and 'invaded' the Too Nice strategy played 
by the User Team As can be seen from Figure 7.2, Too Nice is not a sensible strategy in a 
game where rational choice coii1d, and in this run did, invoke others to adopt a position of 
self interest. The Payoff to the project was 3000, better than a Payoff value of 2568 which 
would have been obtained had the decisions been taken using a Non-strategy. However, the 
Payoff to the project was less than the possible 6300 value had all three team decided to 
play the Simply strategy of complete co-operation. 
From run 2, in scenario 1, a further example ofthe 'Grudging Ffiiisher' strategy identified in 
run I can be observed. Having attempted to co-operate during the game, these teams finally 
decided there was little to lose and did not co-operate at the final decision. These are teams 
who do not forget and eventually do not forgive the decision by other teams who have 
previously not co-operated. A good example of this can be seen in Figure 7.2, the strategy 
adopted by the User team. The lack of forgiveness by the Technical and User Teams and 
the decision by the Business team to act out of self interest both indicates the lowest level of 
trust was in operation (calculus). In addition, a new t3W of end game strategy can be 
observed from run 2, this has been termed a 'Remorseful FinIsher'. This was not discussed in 
the Axelrod (1984) experiment. The Business team co-operated at the last decision, but this 
was only after first of all, securing a winning Payoffposition. The conversations overheard at 
this point ofthe game indicated the Business team was trying to repair the trust they had 
broken earlier in the game with the other 2 teams. The Business team appeared to be 
attempting to provide some rationale for their actions ofnot co-operating and were t*g to 
end the garm on a positive and friendly note, hence the term chosen for this strategy, the 
'Remorseful Ffiiisher'. 
713 Analysis of scenario 1- run 3 
Run 3 started with two teams playing a none co-operate strategy and continued to play none 
co-operate until the third decision when, communication between the teams took place. At 
the third decision, all three teams agreed to vote yes, and did. In this run, after teams 
comnunicated, (observed by the author), the result was for the three teams to all decide to 
co-operate. However, the results show that despite the discussion, all the teams attempted to 
bluffthe other teams into believing that they were about to co-operate. At decision 4, all 
teams voted not to co-operate, resulting in a 'punishment' value of -10 for each of the 
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teams. The communications in this case had clearly not worked and producing a vote to not 
co-operate. 
Decisions 
Teams 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
Business y N y N N y N 
Technical N N y N N N N 
User N N y N N N N 
Table 7.3 Decisions taken in scenajo 1: run 3 
Optimum strategy 
LOW 
2000 
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0 
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Non strategy Technical User 
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Business 
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Fieure 7.3 Pavoffs from scenado 1: run 3 
The Technical and the User teams can be seen to have adopted a 'Grudger' strategy by not 
forgiving the Business team after a previous decision not to co-operate. None of these teams 
managed to produce a strategy equal to that achieved by using the simulated Non-strategy. 
As a consequence, the Payoff for the project was 1580, lower than the value (2568) 
achieved when the decisions were taken randon-fly. 
What can be seen to have taken place is that before the third decision was made, the teams 
communicated, and agreed to co-operate, which they all did. All three teams also entered 
into fiWher talks before decision 5, but it would appear with the intention of not honouring 
that agreement. After that meeting, before decision 5, only I from 9 decisions were made 
to co-operate. All parties involved had broken trust, they had attempted to operate a 
I /l+ 
strategy of self interestý resAing in the teams dista=tipg the other teams. Mums (1995) 
commented that when this happens, there is low level of tug operating without a level of 
forgiveness, making it likely that a spiral of distý will develop when teams have learned 
that they cannot tust the other teams. 
71.4 Analysis of scenario I- run 4 
Run four produced a unique result. After the teams bad read the rules and having had their 
questions answered, the User team, was prepared to hand in all 7 of their decisions without 
baving had any communications with od= teams, thus having no knowledge of the decision 
intentions ofthe other tearns,. The User team bad decided at the start of the game, to 
operate a Simple strategy of none co-operation. 
The User team was asked to band-in their decisions throughout the game when requested, 
As can be seen in Table 7.4 all 7 decisions from the User team were not to co-operate. This 
scenano could happen in a live project, when a stakeholder has not been able to achieve their 
requirements, following which, they withdraw all co-operatiom 
However, the decision was taken by the author, not to release the Strategy of the User team 
to the Business and Technical teams until each ofthe decisions had been taken, thus 
retafift the consistency of the way the runs were executed. 17he overall Payoff for the 
project for nm 4 was 1540, a poor result compared with even a Non-strategy value of 2568. 
Decisions people make are based upon anticipated events, but can also be influenced by the 
knowledge oftistorical events. What is surprising for run 4 was that the Business and 
Technical teams, could, over the, have observed that the User team were not co-operating 
and may have anticipated that they would continue not to co-operate. Yet the Business and 
Technical teams continued to do the best for the project and not themselves. 
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Decisions 
Teams 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Business y y N N y y y 
Technical y N N N y y y 
User N N N N N N N 
Table 7.4 Decisions taken in scenario 1: run 4 
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Fizure 7.4 Payoffs from scenario 1: run 4 
The User team generated 2230 points. Had all teams simply co-operated they would have 
obtained 7x 300 = 2100 points. Their strategy of not co-operating was used to obtain the 
best result for the team, while for the project, the Payoff was worse than could have been 
achieved with a Non-strategy. This was a deliberate Simple strategy of none co-operation, 
and had been decided at the start of the game. This strategy was simulated prior to scenanos 
I and 2 being run and the results were presented in Chapter 6, although it was not envisaged 
that any team would play such a strategy. The results identified in Chapter 6, and repeated 
in this run, have demonstrated that the team who for self interest play a Simple strategy of 
none co-operation, have achieved a value greater than the optimum value of 2100, at the 
direct expense of the other two teams. 
If, in five projects, staff took similar decisions, the project would not be a success. One 
difficulty for project teams is when the staff publicly appear to be co-operating, but in reality 
they are not, possibly with the intention to deliberately sabotage the project. This behaviour 
IY 
Business Technical 
-170 
520 
User 
, ), rm 
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can be considered to be dominant or recessive trust. Trust could be on show, while actual 
distrust is hidden. This is difficult to identify for live projects and is an example oftlic 
manifesta or t-Krypta of secondary trust as discussed in section 5.9.1 (Bacharach and 
Gambetta 2001). However, the results of run 4 have demonstrated the consequences of a 
team that decided not to co-operate for the duration of a project. 
7.2.5 Analysis of seenaiio I- run 5 
In run 5 the User team asked whether the other teams would communicate before any 
decision was taken. Both the Business and Technical team rejected that opportunity where 
decision intentions could have been discussed. The result from the first decision was for the 
Business and Technical teams to play a 'Nasty' strategy. Before decision 2, the User team 
again requested for talks, the other teams also rejected this request. At the second decision, 
the strategy of all the three teams was not co-operate, resulting in all the teams receiving the 
value of 'Punishment'= -10 points. 
Decisions 
Teams 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Business N N N y N y y 
Technical N N N N N N N 
Users y N N N N N N 
Table 7.5 Decisions taken in scenaiio 1: run 5 
Optimum strategy 
, &DUU 
2000 
1500 
1000 
"ij 500 
0 
-r, nn 
Technical 
970 User 
m 620 
Teams 
Figure 7.5 Payoffs fiom scenario 1: run 5 
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As with run 4, one ofthe teams in this case, the Technical team decided they would play a 
Simple strategy ofnone co-operation. The Merence between run 4 and run 5 was that 
while in run 4 the Users played a strategy oftotal none co-operation that produced a Payoff 
value of 2330. In run 5 when that sarne strategy was used by the Technical team the Payoff 
value of 970 points was achieved, only slightly better than the Non-strategy Payoff value of 
856 points. The difference was caused by the none forgiving behaviour of the other team in 
run 5 compared to the run 4. Following the first decision of the Technical team not to co- 
operate in run 5, the Business and User teams decided for nine occasions not to co-operate. 
It could be considered that these decisions were taken in retaliation. In contrast, during run 
4, following the first decision ofthe User team not to co-operate, the Business and Technical 
teams decided not to co-operate on only 5 occasions. 
One observation from run 5 is that because the User team requested a meeting at decision 
stages I and 2, it demonstrated they started by operating at a higher level of trust than the 
base level of calculus trust. The User team wished to share information at the start, although 
their actual strategy was not known. After the first decision, the User team never co- 
operated again. 
The teams did bave some discussions before the decisions 3 and 5 were taken. But the spiral 
of distrust had started for the User team, following the rejection for talks before decision one 
and after the otber teams selected not to co-operate at the first decision that resulted in the 
User team receiving the lowest value, the 'Suckers PayofF. As can be seen from Table 7.5 
following the first decision, the User team played a 'Grudger' strategy. 
The project manager should be aware that teans who iný co-operate, can 'switch off 
for the reminder ofa. project by playing the 'Grudger' strategy caused by the actions of 
other teams who have attenipted to obtain the best outcome for theniselves. 
7.2.6 Analysis of scenado 1- nm 6 
Both the Business and the User tearns started by adopting a Nice strategy to co-operatc. 
Ilis resulted with the User team receiving the 'Suckers Payoff causing them not to co- 
oPerate for the next decision, while the Business, team continued to co-operate. Talks 
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between the teams took place before decisions 3 and 5. Neither of these communications 
resulted in all teams co-operating. 
When the teams entered into talks, they decided to select one member from each team to 
negotiate on their behalf. Those representatives decided to leave the room and talk in 
private. 
Decisions 
Teams 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Business y y y N N y N 
Technical N N y y y N y 
User y N N y y N N 
Table 7.6 Decisions taken in scenaiio 1: run 6 
Optimum strategy 
2500 [ 2100 
2000 M 
1 
2 1500 
looo 
500 
0 
Non strategy User 
Business 950 856 850 Technical 
600 
Teams 
Fieure 7.6 Payoffs from scenario 1: run 6 
Representatives of the teams, who carried out formal discussions, produced a written 
agreement to co-operate. Meanwhile, the remaining members of the three teams, entered 
into informal talks while the formal meeting took place in private. The decision finally taken 
by the teams, did not reflect the written agreement to co-operate that was agreed during the 
forn-al talks. After the negotiations but before the vote for decision 5, the Business team 
members had ftirther internal talks, resulting in the written agreement to co-operate being 
reversed. The private internal decision by the Business team resulted in a 'temptation' Payoff 
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of 500 points. The Technical and User teams both retaliate in the next decision (No 6) and 
did not co-operate, a clear example ofa. Tit for Tat strategy. 
The problem for this project was identified by the teams to be the ability for the Business 
team not to respect an agreement, even when the agreement bad been written down and 
signed by representatives from all the teams. This provides an example, of the view 
presented by ONeill (2002), given in Chapter 5, where she believed that '... elaborate 
measures to ensure that people keep agreements and do not betray trust must, in the end, be 
backed by - trust since all guarantees are incomplete'. The Business team clearly was 
operating at the lowest level of trust (calculus) seeking team benefit before project success. 
At the end of the ran 6 the teams suggested that one reason for the project failure could be 
due to the broken agreements, in particular when the culprits were seen to have benefited 
from their reftsal to bonour that agreement. The conclusion by the teams ofrun 6, was that 
if decisions were vested in representatives, the agreement should be made at the meeting, 
and not referred back to the teams for finther discussion. The players firrther concluded that 
project teams needed autliority of decision making and must accept responsibility for their 
decisions. What the teams were suggesting was that some form of controls and sanctions are 
needed to be in place for projects to be successful. The players were, therefore, suggesting 
that projects should operate at the lowest level of trust, since calculus trust relies upon 
sanctions to be used against teams who have not flilly co-operated, while the higher level of 
trust, (ie. knowledge-based trust), includes forgiveness. 
One way to prevent teams from succumbing to ten4)tation of higher personal team benefits 
is to remove having the dual objectives of the team and the project. Fukuyarna (1995) stated 
that one way to achieve that was to have some sense of 'reciprocal obligation' and to 
achieve this ability to associate, depended in turn on shared norms and values. The impact 
for IS projects and project managers seems clear. A project contract that is written as a zero 
sum will cause conflict for teams by have competing targets. Project Paradox was a non- 
zero sum game but the teams still bad the paradox to overcome due to the performance 
related element of the game, thus preventing the shared norms and values for co-operation 
from being automatic. 
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Dawkins (1989) described a system where all parties work towards a common good as 
being what he termed reciprocal altruism; this term could however be considered to be an 
oxymoron because altruistic behaviour is usuaUy associated with those who do not expect 
any return for their effort. Nevertheless, what Dawkins (1989) was suggesting with the term 
reciprocal altruism was to consider a system where all sides needed each other to the same 
degree, and that if either side did not fiffi their obligation then all would be equally 
penaliseA An example Dawkins (1989) gave to demonstrate reciprocal altruism was of 
birds that feed on the ticks in crocodile mouths, where both creatures needed each other to 
survive. This example could also be considered to be a symbiotic relationship rather than 
reciprocal altruistic. However, the parallel for project teams can be made. The ideal system 
would be one where all stakeholders contribute without thought ofpersonal gain. Tlus is 
unrealistic in projects where one ofthe objectives could be the creation ofprofits for some of 
those involved. The conclusion that can be drawn from this is to consider how at the time of 
a project launch a contract could be written that would produce a 'reciprocal obligation' as 
suggested by Fukuyama (1995) from all stakeholders. One solution to create such an 
environment would be for all sides to accept a sub-optimurn of their overall requirements. 
Tlis idea was also suggested by the past Head ofthe London Stock exchange when asked 
how more IS projects could be successful during an interview with Collins (1994). 
7.2.7 Analysis of seenaiio 1- nm 7 
In run 7, the teams decided to negotiate before the first decisiorL However, the Business 
team opted to play a none co-operate strategy for decision one. The Technical and User 
teams played a strategy to co-operate at the beginning of the game, but immediately changed 
to Tit for Tat following the Business decision not to co-operate. 
Decisions 
Teams 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Business N y N N y N N 
Technical y N y N N N N 
User y N y N N N N 
Table 7.7 Decisions taken in scenario 1: run 7 
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Fieure 7. Payoffs from scenario 1: run 7 
Following further talks before decision 3, agreement to co-operate seemed to have taken 
place. However, the Business team decided not to co-operate, a decision worth 500 points 
to thern. Following that decision, fluther talks took place before decision 5. The Technical 
and User teams entered into a spiral of distrust, playing a 'Grudger' strategy to never forgive 
the Business team for their two earlier promises to co-operate, which were not honoured. 
Prior to that both the Technical and User teams played what is termed a 'Benevolent Prober' 
strategy, as identified by Axelrod (1984). With this type of strategy a team may not co- 
operate for one decision as a form of punishment against another team which had not co- 
operated. But a Benevolent Prober strategy quickly reverts to co-operate rather than 
immediately entering into a 'Grudger' strategy. As can be seen from Table 7.7, the Technical 
and User teams both played a 'Nice' strategy at the start by co-operating. At the second 
decision they both played Tit for Tat due to the Business team not co-operating at decision 
one. However both the Technical and User teams reverted to co-operate for decision 3, 
demonstrating they had only played a Benevolent prober strategy at decision 2. Finally, since 
the Business team continued not to co-operate the Technical and User teams both spiralled 
into the Grudger strategy for the remaining decisions. 
From this game, it can be seen that the Technical and User teams were both attempting to 
operate for the good of the project with a high level of trust. First because they started with 
the intentions of co-operating, followed by forgiving the Business team who had not co- 
operated, but finally deciding trust was broken beyond repair. 
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None of the teams aeWeved a value at the end of the run that was adievable using a Non- 
strategy, resulting in a poor outcome for the project. 
If this scenario occurred for an IS project, it would have little chance of success. The aim or 
perhaps even a rule at the start of a project must be to obtain agreement about future 
intentions and prevent the spiral of distrmt from taking over. 
7.2.8 Analysis of scenario 1- run 8 
The start of rim 8 was unique when compared to the other 13 runs, because it was the only 
run to begin with all three teams voting not to co-operate. They all received the punishment 
Payoff of -10 points for that first decision. Negotiations took place before the second 
decision, however, despite those the Business team decided for the second time, not to co- 
operate. That decision produced another unique feature. The Technical team at this point 
decided to band in a sheet stating that the next 5 decisions would all be not to co-operate. 
They left the room and took no further interactive part in the run. The decisions that the 
Technical team had niade, were used to calculate the later Payoffvalues. In this run it was 
not possible to keep the decision of the Technical team not to ever co-operate for the 
remainder of the game from the other two teams, as was possible in nm 4. 
Decisions 
Te2rns 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
Business N N N N N y y 
Technical N y N N N N N 
User N y N N N N N 
Table 7.8 Decisions taken in scenatio 1: run 8 
The reason given by the Technical tearn for leaving the room was that the Business team bad 
twice voted not to co-operate and the Technical team could not 'trust' the Business team 
any fUrther. With 21 decisions to be made, these three teams had a combined total of only 4 
decisions to co-operate. The remaining 2 teams continued with the game without the 
Business team in the room. If some stakeholders leave a project, the work still has to be 
done either by those already involved or by others. 
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1 
A 1500 
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500 
2100 
Non strategy 
&96 
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Business Technical 
260 260 360 
Teams 
Fieure 7.8 Pavoffs from scenatio 1: run 8 
All the Payoffs achieved by the 3 teams were well below the value of 856, the Payoff 
achieved in the simulation of a Non-strategy. The Payoff to the project was 980, a poor 
result, when compared with a Non-strategy Payoff value of 2568. The Technical team as 
with other teams had entered into a spiral of distrust and decided to play the 'Grudger' 
strategy to the point of publishing their remaining decisions before leaving the room. The 
User team also played a 'Grudger' strategy following the second decision by the Business 
tearn not to co-operate. What seems an almost perverse decision by the Business team was 
to co-operate for the last two decisions when they could have defected and received a better 
Payoff, a strategy earfier termed a Remorseful Finisher. The action by the Technical team to 
leave the room changed the game from one where decisions were taken simultaneously and 
independently (Hollocks 2000), in keeping with the Prisoner's DiIemma rules, to a game 
when the decisions were taken sequentially as in a Trust-honour game (Yamagishi 2001). 
Although the orientation for the games had been set at the beginning of the runs, the players 
in run 8 changed the way game was played. It is interesting to note that the value for the 
project in run 8 (see Table 7.16) was the lowest for all 14 runs. Stakeholders in an IS project 
could behave in the same way that the Technical team did in run 8, when trust between team 
members was broken. A role for the project manager is to decide how to create a high trust 
project environment that can prevent actions such as those from the Technical team in run 8 
from taking place. 
7.2.9 An*sis of scenatio I- run 9 
In run 9, the tearns did not discuss their decision strategies before the first decision. Run 9 
resulted with two teams adopting a Simple strategy, not to co-operate for all 7 decisions. 
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The Business and User teams were not at any time prepared to co-operate. The last 3 
decisions from the Technical team had been reduced to none co-operation, (a Grudger 
strategy) due to the behaviour of the other 2 teams and the spiral of distrust once started for 
the Technical team was not overturned. 
Decisions 
Teams 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Business N N N N N N N 
Technical y y y y N N N 
Users N N N N N N N 
Table 7.9 Decisions taken in scenado 1: run 9 
Optimum strategy 
2500 
2100 
2000 
1500 Business User Non strategy 
970 970 
1000-- 856 
a 500-- 
> Technical 
0 
-500 -430 Teams 
Figure 7.9 Pavoffs from scenado 1: run 9 
The strategy for the Business and User teams had beaten the Payoff value for the simulated 
Non-strategy (856), but these decisions had produced a Project Payoff with a value of only 
15 10, well below the value of 2568 which could have been achieved using a Non-strategy. 
7.2.10 Analysis of scenatio I- run 10 
In run number 10, there was complete agreement to co-operate, a 'Nice strategy', for the 
first decision, giving each team 300 points and the project 900 points. 
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Decisions 
Teams 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Business y y N N N N N 
Technical y N N N N y y 
User y N N N N N N 
Table 7.10 Decisions taken in seenado 1: run 10 
Optimum strategy 
LOW 
2000 
1500 
1000 
500 
0 
Non strategy User 
856 Business 
1020 
670 Technical 0m 
320 
1 
Teams 
FiLrure 7.10 Pavoffs from scenario 1: run 10 
At the second decision, however, both the Technical and User tearns decided to vote not to 
co-operate. If this run had been a live IS project, the result would have been a failure. Only 
2010 points were generated for the project, when a Non-strategy had been simulated to 
produce a Payoff value worth 2568. The result was a 'poor' for the project. 
Before decision 3 was made, the teams decided to have some further discussions. An 
agreement was made that all three teams would co-operate. However the results show that 
all the teams voted not to co-operate resulting in a 'penalty' Payoff of -10 points to each 
team. The Business team and the User team both entered into a spiral of distrust, playing a 
Grudger strategy for the remainder of the game. The Technical team finished with a strategy 
identified earlier, a 'Remorseful Finisher'. The strategy played by the Technical team again is 
difficult to rationalise. The Technical team obtained the lowest of the three Payoffs, but their 
action to co-operate produced a Payoff value for the project that came close to the value 
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achieved if they had adopted a Non-strategy. The Payoff to the project was still a 'poor' 
result when compared with the optimum value of 6300. 
This decision is difficult to understand, especially since the previous decisions of the 
Business and User team indicated that they would vote not to co-operate. 
7.2.11 Analysis of scenario I- run 11 
The unique feature of run II was that the Technical team were prepared to co-operate until 
the last decision, even though, the Business and User teams had voted not to co-operate on 
6 earlier decisions. Yet again, a team had unexplainably, adopted the strategy, termed, 'Too 
Nice' and continued to co-operate, even when they became aware of the strategy adopted 
by the other teams. This enabled the other two team, at will, to 'invade' the Too Nice 
strategy and improve their individual team scores. 
Decisions 
Teams 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Business y y N N y N N 
Technical y y y y y y N 
User N N y N y N N 
Table 7.11 Decisions taken in scenario 1: run 11 
Optimum strategy 
I- zzw 
2000 
1500 
1000 
500 
0 
_CM 
User 
1690 
Business 
Non strategy logo 
856 
Technical 
-91 n 
Teams 
Figure7.11 Pavoffs from scenario 1: run 11 
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To prevent a Too Nice strategy from being played, Dawkins (1989) recommended that 
teams should adopt a strategy which could not be invaded by other strategies, and called 
these, Evolutionarily Stable Strategies (ESS). Naturally, even a Non-strategy or Tit for Tat 
strategy can invade teams who choose always to co-operate. A Tit for Tat strategy, 
remember, always co-operates at the first decision but whose next decision is a mirror of the 
other player's, last decision. However, when playing Project Paradox, a Tit for Tat strategy 
would need to mirror the worst decision of either the other 2 teams, because it was designed 
as an N-person game. A team playing Tit for Tat are themselves therefore unable to be 
invaded as they indicate they are not 'Too Nice' and will withdraw co-operation temporarily 
if other teams do not co-operate. 
The Technical team have almost played a 'Too Nice' strategy by co-operating despite 
having received 5 'Suckers Payoffs', each with a value of -100. The Payoff for the project 
was 2570, just beating a Non-strategy Payoff of 2568. Neither the User team nor the 
Business team was able to equal or better the optimum Payoff value of2l 00. 
7.2.12 Analysis of seenatio 1- run 12 
Run 12 started with fiffl agreement of the 3 teams to work together, one of only 2 nms with 
all 3 teams co-operating and started playing a Nice strategy. As the nm developed, 2 
different strategies were observed. 
Decisions 
Teanm 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Business y y y N y y N 
Technical y N y y N y y 
User y y y y N N N 
Table 7.12 Decisions taken in scenaTio 1: run 12 
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Fieure 7.12 Pavoffs from scenario 1: run 12 
Firstly, the Technical team appeared to have played a 'NaYve Prober' strategy. TvAce the 
Technical team struck against the other two teams. The Business and User teams appeared 
to ignore, or forgive the decision of the Technical team that was not to co-operate for 
decisions 2 and 5. When the Business team, played a 'NaYve prober' strategy for decision 4, 
the Technical team struck back in decision 5, but then continued to co-operate in the 
remaining 2 decisions. 
Secondly, following the 5" decision, the Technical team behaved with a 'short terrn 
memory' and forgiveness. Having played a Tit for Tat strategy against the Business team 
who had not co-operated for decision 4, the Technical team reverted to co-operating. On 
the other hand, for decision 2, the User tearn allowed the Technical tearn not to co-operate 
without retaliating. But when the Business tearn decided not to co-operate at decision 4, the 
User teaxn entered into a spiral of distrust and played the 'Grudger' strategy, never forgiving 
and not co-operating for the rernainder of the run. 
In a strategy such as Tit for Tat, teams quickly forget the past behaviour of other teams, but 
in other strategies, at some point, the team lose afl confidence in what is happening and 
refuse to co-operate for the remainder of the rurL 
The point, for IS projects korn this analysis, is that some staff will have short memories and 
forgive a 'NaYve Prober' strategy; that is, one who decides not to co-operate for one 
decision and then returns to co-operate for the next decision. 
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However, some teams have demonstrated that they were not prepared to, or able to recover 
frorn, even a single decision made by other tearris not to co-operate. These teams have 'long 
term memories' and play the 'Grudger' strategy. The reasoning being that they would rather 
lose than give the other team a chance to win. This analysis is consistent with the view that 
the lowest level oftrust (calculus) does not include a level of forgiveness. The players of the 
Project Paradox could be considered to be sinular to those at the beginning of an IS project. 
The teams for Project Paradox demonstrated that they were at times not prepared to 
'forgive' tearris who had previously not co-operated. These players of Project Paradox could 
have moved through the team forrning stage to a point where they trusted each other. 
However, it has earlier been discussed that staff who have sonic knowledge of each other, 
p 'bly obtained during team building activities, are still not able to fiffly trust each other in ossi 
a business enviromient. The 'Grudger' strategy operated by some ofthe teams is an 
example of where the lowest level of trust (calculus) is in operation. Team members who 
played a 'Grudger' strategy have not forgiven other team's who have not co-operated. 
The issue raised by this for project mmiagers is first how to prevent teams from not co- 
operating and what action could be taken ifthey are identified to be in such as a Grudger 
state? Writing rules and setting controls are two possibilities to achieve this but do not 
reflect the stronger and self regulating option of creating an Evolutionary and Stable strategy 
combined with reciprocal obligations. 
One option is naturally to use a team who has a history of working successfully in a trusting 
environment. These could be found in organisations that use a 'strong', rather than a 'weak' 
matrix structure; when teams move from project to project rather dm returning to their 
fimetional roles after a project is complete. The answer certainly must include creating a 
trusting environment in which staff can operate. 
7.2-13 Analysis of scenado 1- run 13 
The highest project Payoff was achieved for ran number 13. It is significant that 17 
decisions were made to co-operate, the most for any run of Project Paradox. The strategies 
from these three teams show that the teams used a 'short term memory' strategy and did not 
harbour Grudges when a 'NaYve Prober' attenTted to invade the run 
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Decisions 
Teams 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Business y y y N y y y 
Technical N y y y N y y 
User y y y N y y y 
Table 7.13 Decisions taken in scenario 1: run 13 
Optimum strategy Technical 
2500 - 2100 2100 
2000 -- 
Business User 
1500 1250 1250 Non strategy 
1000 856 
500 
0 
Teams 
Fizure 7.13 Payoffs from scenado 1: run 13 
At decision one, the Technical team decided not to co-operate, but both the Business and 
User teams continued to co-operate at the second decision. When the Business and User 
teams decided not to co-operate in decision 4, the Technical team played Tit for Tat in 
decision 5, but returned to co-operation in the following decisions. No team played a 
'Cyrudger' strategy and all teams played using the 'short term memory' strategy. 
The Payoff results for this run supported the view that a good strategy for the project is not 
to automatically react or punish a team who makes a decision not to co-operate. Also the 
strategy of playing Tit for Tat, together with a short memory strategy, enables a return to 
co-operation. This strategy can also be seen to be operating at least at the second level of 
trust, called knowledge-based, or nonn-based trust, the level of trust that does not produce a 
'Grudger' strategy but is able to forgive a team who do not always co-operate. These could 
support an Evolutionary Stable Strategy that was discussed earlier would be a strategy 
conducive to achieving a positive working environment. 
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With five IS projects, an invasion from other teams is almost inevitable, when stakeholders at 
times attempt to obtain the best result for their teams, rather than focus on a prqject or 
business objective. It is possible to argue that without a single criterion focus, the 'reciprocal 
obligation' teams should have for each other, believed to be required to build trust, would be 
missing. 
7.2.14 Analysis of scenario I- run 14 
In run 14, both the Business and Technical teams started by co-operating. Without allowing 
a second chance to co-operate, the Business team defected for the next 4 decisions and 
played finally, what has been termed in this research, the 'Remorseful Finisher'. That is to 
finish a game with a decision to co-operate, when both the historical evidence of the other 
teams' strategy and potential for the project would not indicate co-operating was the best 
option. 
Decisions 
Teams 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Business y N N N N y y 
Technical y y y y y y y 
User N N N N N N N 
Table 7.14 Decisions taken in scenario 1: run 14 
O 
2500 
ptimum strategy 2500 
2100 
2000 
71 1500 Non strategy Business > 4) 2 1000 &% 700 
500 
Technical 
> 0 User 
-500 
-1000 
Teams 
UU!: K. 7.14 Pavoffs from scenario 1: run 14 
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Within game 14, the Technical team played a 'Too Nice' strategy by co-operating every 
time, regardless of the information available from the other teams. Having played the 'Too 
Nice' strategy, the Technical team received the lowest value for the team, which in turn 
reduced the total Payoff value to the project to 2500. Ironically, a 'Too Nice' strategy has, 
therefore, been demonstrated to be one which teams should avoid playing. The User team 
on the other hand decided upon a strategy never to co-operate at any decision stage. This 
produced a better Payoff to the User team than a Non-strategy or the optirntim strategy of 
total co-operation. 
Clearly, the User team was able to invade the good will of the Technical tean-L Had the 
Technical team changed from their Simple strategy to a Mixed strategy or at times played a 
Tit for Tat strategy, the User team would have received a lower Payoff and would have bad 
to reconsider their own strategy. The Business team started with a 'Nice' strategy to co- 
operate at the first decision, but changed to none co-operate for the subsequent four 
decisions. The Business team also played the 'Remorseful Finisher' strategy, a strategy 
Which has earlier been argued to have no logical underpimiing, other than possible regret for 
not co-operating earlier in the run and a wish to fmish on good terms. 
The unselfish 'Too Nice' strategy in run number 14 produced a project Payoff of 2500, but 
at a team Payoff value of -700, the lowest team result in all 14 runs. This same scenario was 
demonstrated in the second simulation of Project Paradox, that used 2100 randornly 
generated decisions to co-operate or not. If a tearn was prepared to play a Simple strategy 
and always co-operated, the result would be a reduced Payoff for the team concerned, while 
the Payoff to the project would be improved, but still not to the value had an tearns co- 
operated. 
7.2.15 Summary of Strafties used in Project Paradox 
The decision to co-operate at the Last decision when previously a team had decided not to 
CO-operate was not unique to run number 8. It was suggested that a new strategy existed 
which was not detected following the analysis of the Axelrod (1984) experiment. The new 
strategy identified by this research, referred to as a 'Remorseful Finisher'. This type of 
strategy seems to bave a final guilt complex, and decides to co-operate, when it is too late 
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and often of no benefit to a project. Other teams who finished a run of Project Paradox with 
a Remorseful Finisher decision to co-operate having preNiously not co-operated were: 
Business: run 2, 
Technical and Business: run 4, 
Business: run 5, 
Technical: run 6, 
Technical: run 10, 
Technical: run 12 
and 
Business: run 14. 
In 50% of the nins of Project Paradox, the teams played a Remorseful Finisher strategy. 
Ile reasons why these decisions took place are not clear and there may not have been only 
one reason why such a strategy was used. It is interesting to note that as the final decisions 
of Project Paradox approached, 50% ofthe team; appeared to finish with a 'positive' 
decision to co-operate, even though that decision was not taken from a rational economic 
standpoint, despite some previous decisions having been taken for that reason. 
In Chapter 5 the strategies were identified from the analysis of the Axelrod (1984) 
experiment which were used in the decision making for a Prisoner's Dilemma game. During 
this Chapter, the diiTerent strategies used in the 14 runs of Project Paradox were discussed. 
Table 7.15 provides a summary ofthe strategies used in the 14 nins of scenario one of 
Project Paradox which, other than the Remorseful Finisher were also used in the Axelrod 
(1984) experiment. 
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Too Nice: This strategy will be to co-operate, irrespective ofthe strategy ofother 
teams and consequently is an easy strategy to invade. 
Tit for Tat: The Erst decision ofthis strategy is to co-operate, demonstrating that they 
were not intending to achieve self interestý and that they trusted the other 
teams started from the same position. However, the Tit for Tat strategy 
mirrors the previous decision taken by the other teams making it a 
difficult strategy to invade. 
Tit for 2 Tats: This strategy also starts by co-operating, but will allow the 
other teams to not coýýe twice, before they begin to mirror the 
actions ofthe other teams. It is a tolerant and forgiving strategy and the 
one identified by Axelrod (1984) as the strongest. 
Prober: A temn playing the Prober strategy elect not to co-operate for a 
single decision, in an attempt to obtain a higher Payofý but immediately 
return to co-operate. 
Short term: Ibis strategy includes the ability to forgive, if another team, such as 
Prober have not co-operated. This strategy indicates a 
teams members operating at the second level oftruist, (knowledge or 
norm based trust). 
Grudger: With this strategy, when trtLi is broken by a team by not coý-operating, a 
Grudger strategy will not co-operate any further within a game. This 
demonstrates there is no forgiveness with this strategy indicating the 
lowest level oftrust (calculus) is in operation. If two teams played a 
Grudger strategy, it would result in mutual none co-operation, 
Nkhich Munns (1995) descnil)ed would develop a spiral of distrust. 
Remorseful Ibis is the strategy identifiedwithin this research. It was observed to 
Finisher. be taking place after a teams' bad secured a victory by first of all operating a 
strategy ofrione co-operation, but then changing to a co-operate strategy for the final 
decision of Project Paradox The comments from the participants indicated that they 
were embarrassed or ashamed oftheir selfish actions of winning by not co-operating 
and wanted the game to end on a friendly basis. 
Table 7.15 Strategies used dwing scenario I 
73 Analysis of the Overall Results for Scenario I 
The results of the fourteen runs from scenario one are consolidated in Table 7.16. Using the 
results from run mmber one as an example. The value in column 2 represents the total 
number of decisions made to co-operate, eleven in all. Similarly the values in column 3 gives 
195 
the total number of decisions not to co-operate. There were ten decisions made by the 
players not to co-operate, which indicated that they either did not trust the other teams or 
had acted selfisMy indicating the lowest (calculus) level of trust was in operation. 
Columns four, five and six, each present the total Payoff values for the three teams, based 
upon the value of decisions taken during the runs. Column seven shows the Payoff the 
project received based upon the decisions the teams made. The players of Project Paradox 
were told that the value to be attributed to the 'project' would be the combined totals of the 
scores or Payoffs that the three teams obtained. The value to the Project being the result 
obtained after all the 294 decisions were taken. 
Run Decision Decision to Business Technical User Value to 
to co- not co- value value value the project 
operate operate 
(total) (total) 
I I1 10 1750 -500 1750 3000 
2 12 9 2200 750 50 3000 
3 5 16 60 760 760 1580 
4 9 12 -520 -170 2230 1540 
5 4 17 -80 970 620 1510 
6 11 10 850 600 950 2400 
7 6 15 770 270 270 1310 
8 4 17 260 360 360 980 
9 4 17 970 430 970 1510 
10 6 15 670 320 1020 2010 
11 11 10 1090 -210 1690 2570 
12 14 7 1400 1050 1050 3400 
13 17 4 1250 2100 1250 4600 
14 10 11 700 -700 2500 2500 
124 170 
Table 7.16 Results from scenario I 
7.3.1 Payoff Value of Project Paradox from the Project Perspective 
The key results from scenario I indicate some diffierences in the results compared to those 
obtained from the Axelrod (1984) experiment. For example, in the Axelrod (1984) 
experiment, the lowest score was achieved when using a Non-strategy, Le. every other 
strategy beat the None strategy. However, from the runs within scenario 1, it can be seen in 
Figure 7.15 that only 19 from 42 individual teams, (45'Yo), beat the score of 856 created 
when the Non-strategy was simulated. In addition, only 4 teams (9.5%) achieved a value 
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equal to or better than the optimum value for the teams (2100). Figure 7.15 presents the 
results of 42 team decisions, obtained from 14 (runs) x3 (teams). 
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Figure 7.15 Pa-yoff for the Teams compared with a Non-strategry 
The Payoffs to the project if the teams randonýy decided to co-operate or not co-operate 
were presented in Chapter 6. These are brought forward to facilitate the discussions of the 
3 (number of teams) x 856 (random Payoff) = 2568. 
This is the Payoff to a project when teams used a Non-strategy. Only 5 runs had a Payoff 
equal to or greater than 2568. This indicates that 68% of the PayOffis to the project was 
worse than if decisions were taken randomly. This again is a concern. Project teams could 
be argued to be either not trusting other teams which leads them not to co-operate, or teams 
may have decided from a point of self interest, not to co-operate. Had the teams played a 
Simple strategy of full co-operation they would have received a Payoff of 300 for each 
decision. For more than 50% of the decisions taken, the teams were not prepared to trust the 
teams in the same project or were operating out of self-interest which indicates that they 
were operating at the lowest level of trust, calculus. As mentioned earlier, some of the 
reasons why teams did not co-operate and trust each other were collected as comments and 
Individual team Pay-offs 
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statements from the teanis as they played Project Paradox, these are presented and discus-sed 
in Table 7.17. 
In an attempt to behave in an opportunistic way, the teams achieved scores lower than it' 
they had used the Non-strategy of randomly deciding whether to co-operate or not. 
Consequently the results of the Payofls to the project were also lower than the value 
achieved by chance. Figure 7.16 illustrates that from the 14 runs in scenario 1, only 5 runs, 
representing 35%, obtained a value of (2568), which was achieved using the Non-strategy. 
None of the projects achieved the score of 6300, the optimum value for the project. These 
results indicate that co-operation and trust was low between the teams. 
7000 
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a: woo 
s 
E 4000 
3000 
2000 
looo 
0 
Total value to project for (Reward) Co-operation = 6300 
Games in Rank order 
Fieure 7.16 Value's of Prooect Pavoffs vs. Random and Co-operation Stratezies 
It could be argued that the teams had selected a strategy to deliberately obtain a higher 
Payoff or because the teams could not trust other teams. Nachbar (1992) indicated that the 
results for a game such as Project Paradox could be expected to be lower than those 
achieved for a 'true' Prisoner's Dilenima. This was because Project Paradox is an example 
of a non-zero sum, finitely repeated adaptation of the Prisoner's Dilemma. Teams knew 
they had more than one but not an infinite number of decisions that they could use to catch 
up later in the game if needed. Alternatively, the teams could have used the Backward 
Induction Argument (Hardin 2002) and decided that although there were 7 decisions to be 
made, the logic for the first decision would the same as for the last, i. e. to not co-operate. 
This is a possible reason why the User team in the 14'h run and the Technical team in the 8 th 
run never co-operated. 
12345678910111213141516 
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A collective decision not to co-operate would have resulted in a Payoff value of -10. Teams 
could predict that, should they not co-operate, the other team may decide to play a Tit for 
Tat strategy at the next decision and not co-operate. The long term potential for a team 
using a strategy to not to co-operate would be likely to result in a spiral of distrust where the 
fnal Payoff value was low. When the players decided to attempt to obtain a higher Payoff 
they did so knowing that the other players were likely to lose trust at the next decision. It 
could be further argued that most teams were at some point trying to beat the other teams 
and obtain a higher final Payoffi Once again the long term options should have prevented 
this strategy from taking place. 
Each complete run ofProject Paradox required that 7 decisions were taken. A team could in 
theory produce a maximum, value of 3500, comprising 7x 500 (the Payoff for not co- 
operating when the other teams did co-operate). 
From the 14 runs in scenario I of Project Paradox the three teams had, in total, 42 attempts 
to obtain the optimum Payoff worth 2100. Ofthose 42 games, 38 (901/6) of the teams did 
not reach the value of 2100, the value they would have obtained had they simply tnisted 
each other and co-operated in each decision. 
A further result is that 23 teams (54%) obtained a Payoff lower than the value obtained 
when the decisions to play Project Paradox were taken randomly. This result is also a 
concern when it is compared with the results of the Axelrod (1984) experiment where the 
lowest value achieved was by using the Non-stratcgy, ie. in the Axelrod (1984) experiment 
all strategies beat the Non-strategy. In contrast however, the participants of Project Paradox 
bad produced a result where 54% of the Payoff values were lower than if the members of 
the teams bad played a Non-strategy. 
The question is why did the teams produce such poor results, with 55% using a strategy 
that did not even produce a result achievable had they taken their decisions to co-operate 
randomly'? The indications from the analysis point to the teams using a range of strategies 
that demonstrated they did not trust each other and were operating at the lowest level of 
trust (calculus). For example, by starting with a Nasty strategy of none co-operation, or by 
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playing the Prober strategy to increase their points, or the Grudger strategy that indicated all 
hope of co-operation from at least one team was lost and irretrievable. 
731 Comments Emm Team Members 
During the running of scenario 1, comments made by the teams were recorded from each of 
the 14 runs. The author collected the comments at random. No decision was made to 
record any particular team. The data could, therefore, be argued to be a random sample of 
what was being discussed by the teams. In addition, the team were not aware their 
comments were being recorded. Alternative data analysis methods could have been adopted 
to interpret the meaning of those statements. For example, Easterby-Smithet al (1994) 
discussed some differences between 'Content analysis' and 'Grounded theory'. Content 
analysis was considered to be more appropriate for deductive and object research data. 
However, Pasterby-Smith et al (1994) explained that a weakness of content analysis was 
assumed that if '... something had been mentioned, it had happened, if it was not mentioned 
then it had not happened. This assumption could produce some bias in the interpretation 
between what had happened and what had been recorded as having happened. On the other 
band, grounded theory was considered to operate best with... large amounts of none 
standard data. The 150 comments recorded during scenario 1, although collected at 
random, were not a 'large amount'. It was clear that both analysis methods had their 
benefits and weaknesses but that the most appropriate method to analyse the comments 
recorded from the teams was via content analysis, while accepting a limitation ofthe method 
as discussed above. Table 7.17 contains 14 of the comments from the total of 150, one 
example being taken from each ofthe 14 runs. 
When these were analysed, it was found that every team, Jn all 14 runs, at some time had 
discussed the subject of t= and how it was Hluencing the decisions being taken. Recall 
that Project Paradox was designed as a covert placebo simulation, where the teams were 
taking decisions about whether to co-operate. The rubric had no mention of t=, neither 
was trust discussed before the nms took place, yet every team mentioned trust in their 
unsolicited comments. These identify that at some point the teams considered that trust was 
an influencing factor during all 14 runs in scenario 1. 
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Run. Comment. 
1. There is stabbing in the back going on. 
2. We don't bug you anymore. 
3. You can't rust people. 
4. Are we trusting each other? 
S. You were too trusting. 
6. Dog eat dog world. 
7.1 knew something was wrong when you would not complete the sheet. 
8. What we will do is lead them to believe we will co-operate and then stitch them 
up in the last phase. 
9. Imagine that lot, we came to a business decision bid you let us down, 
we tried =4 it did not work. 
10. When trust is broken, move stafE 
11. We don't believe them. 
12. Why is there no trust? 
13. It was not a mistake not to co-operate. 
14. At the last decision the Business and Users went against me, so I have changed 
because you changed your mind. 
Table 7.17 Comments recorded during scenatio 1 
7.3.3 Tests of Significance for Scenario 1 
The ahn of scenario I was to test whether the tearns would have a propensity to co-operate 
no worse than had been achieved with a Non-strategy. To test this, the results were entered 
into chi squared. The nuff hypothesis was: 
Ho = There is no difference between the co-operation in scenario 1 and the figures obtained 
using a Non-strategy (random decisions). 
Ha = That Ho is incorrect 
The formula for Cbi-squared =E (Fo-Feý /Fe 
The expected results Fe when teams co-operated would be for 50% ie. 10.5 decisions 
would be to co-operate i. e. Fe = 10.5 
With 14 classes of data giving 13 degrees of freedom at a 5% confidence level, cM-squared 
must be less than or equal to 22356 to accept Ho. The calculation is given in Table 7.18 
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Fo Fe Fo-Fe (Fo-Fe )2 (Fo-Fe )2 /Fe 
10 10.5 -0.5 0.25 0.02 
9 10.5 -1.5 2.25 0.21 
16 10.5 5.5 30.25 2.88 
12 10.5 1.5 2.25 0.21 
17 10.5 6.5 42.25 4.02 
10 10.5 -0.5 0.25 0.02 
15 10.5 4.5 20.25 1.92 
17 10.5 6.5 42.25 4.02 
17 10.5 6.5 42.25 4.02 
15 10.5 4.5 20.25 1.92 
10 10.5 0.5 0.25 0.02 
7 10.5 -2.5 6.25 0.59 
4 10.5 -5.5 30.25 2.88 
11 10.5 0.5 0.25 0.02 
Total 22.75 
Table 7.18 Scenado I vs. Non-Strat 
The value requirrd to accept Ho was 22.36 or less. The result was therefore, to reject the 
Ho. The statistical test has identified that with Fo = 50% it was with more than 95% 
probability that the difference in the results were not achieved by chance. Rejecting the null 
hypothesis means that something else other than chance had caused the difficrence between 
the two results. The variables were minimised during the running of the games. The 
conclusion that can be drawn is that the players of Project Paradox had decided not to co- 
operate with the other teams. Had they done so they would at least have achieved the value 
that bad been obtained by chance. The results from the Axelrod (1984) experiments 
indicated that the Prisoner's Dilemina. was a non-zero sum game and the players could trust 
each other and co-operate. Alternatively they could use the rational choice model and 
attempt to benefit more than the other teams by taking advantage of them when they were 
vulnerable. 
7.4 Analysis of the Overall Results fivm Seenaiio 2 
In scenario 2, the 14 additional runs were operated as within scenario 1 with one exception; 
the orientation of the runs in scenario 2 allowed the teams access to unrestricted 
communications; and negotiations before and during all of their decisions. The questions are, 
would the teams in scenario 2 co-operate more than in scenario I? and would the possibility 
of self interest still limit the amount oftrust displayed by the teams? The results of scenario 
2 are presented next in Table 7.19. 
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Game Decision Decision to Business Technical User Came 
to co- not co- 
operate operate 
(total) (total) 
1 9 12 -120 58 1780 1718 
2 17 4 1100 1700 1100 3900 
3 is 3 2700 900 700 4500 
4 10 11 400 1450 1350 4200 
5 11 10 490 1340 740 2570 
6 7 14 320 670 920 1910 
7 20 1 1700 1700 2300 5700 
8 3 18 -250 700 100 550 
9 9 12 840 1440 490 2770 
10 6 15 1130 180 430 1740 
11 10 11 830 480 830 2140 
12 9 12 580 820 830 2240 
13 5 16 620 170 620 1410 
14 10 11 1290 940 -260 1970 
144 150 
Table 7.19 Proiect Paradox Results scenaijo 2 
Scenario 2, used a further 14 runs of Project Paradox, which simulated a distributed project 
tearn. The teams could talk to each other or pass written notes, but the teams were not face 
to fitce, reflecting the environment of a distributed project team. Having provided a detailed 
summary of each strategy for the 14 runs in scenario 1, to avoid repetition, only the ovemll 
results wiU be presented from scenario 2. In scenario 2, the nurnber of decisions to co- 
operate increased compared to scenario 1, as can be seen in Figures 7.17 and 7.18. Also 
there was a slight improvement from 35% to 42% in the number of runs that achieved the 
value compared to using the Non-strategy. 
For scenario 1 more, than half the decisions (581/6) made by the project teams were not to 
co-operate, 170 decisions from a total of 294. The co-operation level between teams 
improved in scenario 2 as can be seen Figure 7.18. 
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Decions to co-operate or not to co-operate 
Decisions not to Decisions to co-operate 
co-operate 
42% 
na 294 
Figure 7.17 Decisions to Co-operate or not Co-overate for seenado 1 
Declons to co-operate or not to co-operate 
Decisions not to ecisions to co-operate 
to-operate 
51% 
(10 
49% 
n= 294 
Figure 7.18 Decisions to Co-operate or not Co-operate for scenario 2 
As with scenario 1, a test was conducted to the results from scenario 2 to identify whether 
they were significantly different to those obtained using the Non-strategy. Table 7.20 
presents the statistical test ofthe data obtained from scenario 2. The hypothesis was the 
sarne as for scenario 1, that: 
Ho = There is no difference between the co-operation in scenario 2 and the figures obtained 
using a Non-strategy (random decisions). In these figures the expected results are again 
He = 50% of the decisions were to co-opemte = 10.5. 
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Fo Fe Fo-Fe (Fo-Fe )2 (Fo-Fe )2 /Fe 
12 10.5 1.5 2.25 0.21 
4 10.5 -6.5 42.25 4.02 
3 10.5 -7.5 56.25 5.35 
11 10.5 0.6 0.25 0.02 
10 10.5 -0.5 0.25 0.02 
14 10.5 3.5 12.25 1.16 
1 10.5 -9.5 90.25 8.59 
18 10.5 7.5 56.25 5.35 
12 10.5 1.5 2.25 0.21 
15 10.5 4.5 20.25 1.02 
11 10.5 0.5 0.25 0.02 
12 10.5 1.5 2.25 0.21 
16 10.5 5.5 20.25 2.88 
11 10.5 0.5 0.25 0.02 
Total 29-98 
Table 7.20 Results from scenado 2 
The value required to accept Ho was 22.36 or less. The result therefore was to reject the 
Ho. With the second set of results, the value of chi-squared indicated with 99% probability 
that the results were significantly different from those achieved by chance. Communication 
between the players in scenario 2 had produced more co-operation tl= in the first scenario. 
The second scenario provided the validation for the first, and at the same time indicated that 
the teams did not trust the players from other teams. The teams were using opportunistic 
decision making to firprove their personal gain rather than co-operating to achieve a 
successful project. The level oftrust that was under test was 'calculus' a lower level than 
'knowledge-based' or 'identification-based' trust. 
A third test of significance was undertaken to see if the results from in scenario I were 
significantly different from those for scenario 2, or whether chance could have produce the 
difTerences 
Chi-squared was used with the hypothesis: there would be no difference in the results from 
scenario 1 and scenario 2. For this test the expected results (He) were taken from the 
scenario I results. Table 7.21 presents the results ofthe comparison between scenario I and 
scenario 2. 
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Fo Fe Fo-Fe (Fo-Fe )2 (Fo-Fe )2 /Fe 
12 10 2 4 0.4 
4 9 -5 25 2.77 
3 16 -13 169 10.56 
11 12 -1 1 0.08 
10 17 -7 49 2.88 
14 10 4 16 1.6 
1 15 -14 196 13.06 
18 17 1 1 0.05 
12 17 -5 25 1.47 
15 15 0 0 0 
11 10 1 1 0.1 
12 7 5 25 3.57 
16 4 12 144 36 
11 11 0 0 0 
Total 72.54 
Table 7.21 Scenario I vs. scenario 2 
The value required to accept Ho was 22.36 or less. The result obtained was 72.54 and the 
decision was to reject the Ho. The result indicated that with more than 99% probability that 
something other than chance had created a difference between the outputs from scenarios I 
and 2. The rubric was held constant for scenarios I and scenario 2. However, in scenario 1 
communication was fitnited between the teams while in scenario 2, teams had the 
opportunity of unlimited communications. 
The use of communication bad been identified as a success factor for IS projects in stage I 
of this research and by other researchers such as Ga&&er (1995) and Wateridge (1996). 
These results support the claim that communication can improve co-operation and trust 
between team and by 4lication improving the success chances of projects. However, 
there is an overriding proviso that communication will not always prevent teams from acting 
in an opportunistic way and using self interest when they could personally benefit from using 
such a strategy. In addition to improved communications, it is also suggested that a non-zero 
sum project environment would enable a more focused team approach. This would prevent 
confUcting targets being used that encourage teams to act in a way to benefit them 
personally, rather than the project. 
Another approach used to analyse the results was to investigate whether the teams were 
more hkely to tnist other tearns and co-operate, over time. That is to say, did the teams tend 
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to co-operate more at the start of a run of Project Paradox, just after the run had started, or 
as the end of the run approached? In addition to the tests of significance, it was possible to 
observe how the levels of co-operation, over time, from scenario I and scenario 2 diffiered. 
Figures 7.19 and 7.20 demonstrate the levels of co-operation over the seven decision points 
for the 14 runs of scenarios I and 2. The total number of decisions for each scenario was: 
3 (number of teams) x7( number of decisions) x 14 (number of iterations) = 294. 
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Fieure 7.19 Scenado 1: Decisions to Trust and Co-operate over Time 
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Fieure 7.20 Scenario 2: Decisions to Trust and Co-operate over Time 
It can be seen from Figure 7.19 that as Project Paradox progressed through the decision 
stages, the teams made decisions to co-operate less. In both scenarios, co-operation was 
higher at the first decision. However, as can be seen from the shape of the graphs, the level 
of decay in scenario I was significantly greater than in scenario 2. The amount of 
information obtained through communication was the controlled difference between the two 
scenarios. The limited information in scenario I required a greater dependency on teams to 
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trust other teams, which they demonstrated they were not prepared to do. T'his may be 
because the teams bad no time to build trusting relationships. Scenario 2 resulted with a 
higher exit level of co-operation and in total, more decisions to co-operate than in 
scenario 1. 
However, even when there was unrestricted inforination. to enable co-operation to take 
place, the results demonstrated that the tearns were not operating at the higher levels of 
tust. 
The shape of the graph in Figures 7.19 identifies that as the project stages progressed and 
subsequent decisions were made, the teams became less trusting. In Figure 5.2 it was shown 
that a spiral of distrust was possible and that the spiral had been created due to the 
withholding of information. It can be seen that co-operation has improved in scenario 2 
when teams shared more infonmtion about their decision strategies. 
Ilese results can be compared with the three t)Ws of trust; calculus, knowledge-based and 
identification-based trust as suggested by Tyler and Kranier (1996) as described in Chapter 
S. 
The lowest form of trust was ternied calculus, this uses controls to be in place to ensure it 
worked. The next level oftrust was knowledge-based trust. This was only possible when 
teams had improved information, about how other teams would behave, ad and read. 
Possibly more importantly is the finding from this research indicating that an increase in 
information alone does not automatically increase the levels of trust. For this to happen there 
also has to be a need or intention to co-operate. A shared and agreed project aim would 
facilitate the development ofan IS project organisation that operates at a higher level of 
trust. Knowledge-based trust also contained a degree of forgiveness. 
Identification-based trust is the highest level oftrust. At this level of trust, teams could 
become the agents for other tearns, again through a shared understanding and vision of 
objectives. 
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7.5 Discussion and Summary 
If the teams do not trust each other, or the level of trust is at the lowest level (calculus), 
communication may be dysfunctional, with dis-information being used. But improved 
con-ununications, it could be argued, is a vehicle that can help move trust from the lowest 
level to the next level where there is a degree of forgiveness. 
A lack of trust could therefore be considered to be a critical failure factor. One that (it was 
argued in Chapter 4) must be in place to produce an environment where the critical success 
factors, such as Planning, Commitment and Corrununications were able to have a better 
chance of supporting a project, to become successful. 
When Project Paradox was played, the teams could have adopted a strategy to co-operate. 
This would have required a high level of social trust, because the teams were vulnerable to 
the actions of other teams. Alternatively, the teams could have used a strategy to represent 
self interest for the teams, not the project. This was achieved by not co-operating and 
attempted to obtain an improved Payoff for the teams. If the teams decided upon this 
strategy they were signalling they were operating at the lowest level of trust, called calculus. 
The Payoffs of the 14 mns from the first scenario were presented in Table 7.16 indicating 
low levels of trust and Mgh levels ofteam. decisions not co-operatirig as they used a strategy 
of self interest. Tic 14 runs from scenario I were discussed and analysed in relation to the 
strategies they had used. Some ofthe strategies identified in the (Axelrod 1984) experiment 
were found to have taken place in scenario 1, indicating low levels of trust were in 
operation. 
In addition to these strategies being used a new strategy was identified in this research, this 
was termed the 'Remorseful Finisher' and was found to be used by teams who had beaten 
other teams but then decided to co-operate, appearing to be concerned for having not co- 
Operated earlier. The analysis of the random cornments recorded from the teams in scenario 
I demonstrate that at some point during all 14 runs the teams believed the lack of trust 
between the teams prevented higher scores from being achieved. 
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The results obtained from the first scenario were compared with the results of a Non- 
strategy. A test of statistical significance was undertaken, this identified with 95% 
confidence that the population for the Non-sft-ategy was different from that used in scenario 
1. Similar tests were conducted using the output obtained from scenario 2. Those tests 
identified that the results obtained from scenario 2 were from a different population than 
both the simulated Non-strategy and those from scenario 1. 
Figure 7.19 demonstrated that in 14 nins of scenario 1, co-operation reduced over Lbe life of 
the 7 decisions indicating a decay of trust had taken place. Figure 7.20 identified that for 
scenario 2, there bad also been a decay of Mist over the 7 decisions, but at a lower rate than 
that for scenario 1. An argumeiA was developed that the difference in the running of 
scenarios I and 2 had produced a shift in trust. Scenario I represented a co-located project 
team using limited information obtained using face to face communications. Scenario 2 on 
the other band represented distributed project teams who bad unrestricted communications 
to build improved information, but not through face to face contact. 
The results from both scenarios I and 2 indicated that when teams were placed in a position 
where rational choice could be used, they were not able to trust the other teams. The overaff 
results demonstrating that the znajority of the teams would have achieved a better score bad 
they sinVly played a Non-strategy, and decided to co-operate at random 
In the Axelrod (1984) study, the summary advice to those in a Prisoner's Dilenum 
enviromnent was as give in itaficsý the ramifications to the Project Paradox results are 
presented next to these: 
1. Don't be envious. In a non-zero sum game, such as Project Paradox the ideal advice for 
players is not to use the relative gains ofthe others players as a point of reference to 
judge how well they are doing. Axelrod (1984) also played his experfinent with student 
teams. He found that the students at some point would compare their currentwinnings 
with those of the other teams. This invariably led to one or other team to be envious of 
the higher points the other team bad achieved. T'his was followed by a team not co- 
operating and trying to beat the other team. In the Project Paradox runs, although it is a 
non-zero surn game, extra conflict was introduced where the team with the highest points 
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would receive the performance pay, subject to the project having achieved the target 
points. So by the very nature ofthe performance pay, the teams would want to know 
where they stood in relation to the other teams and possibly wish to increase their points. 
This was the very condition (and paradox) under test within this research i. e. would the 
teams attempt to achieve personal benefit, that is, to make a rational economic choice and 
demonstrate the lowest level of trust. Or, would teams act on behalf of the project and 
demonstrate that a higher order of social or fiduciary trust was driving the project teams 
decision making? The results indicate teams playing Project Paradox were using 
calculus, the lowest level of trust. Teams who reproduce this level oftrust in five projects 
and fail to co-operate with each other could be responsible for some ofthe failures in IS 
projects because this behaviour will overarch all other success factors. The accuracy of 
estimates or the precision ofthe planning and schedules will be negated if teams simply 
cannot co-operate. It is suggested that the risk induced by none co-operative project 
teams caused by a lack of trust is a primary critical success factor for project managers to 
consider. 
Other recommendations were: 
2. Don't be thefirst to defect. By this, what is being recommended is to play a 'Nice' 
strategy by co-operating at the first stage. Teams should be encouraged to do this by 
bavmg: a project envirom=t that encourages and supports higher levels of tnLq. 
3. Reciprocate both co-operation and defection In other words, the best strategy is fuR co- 
operation. However, if this does not happen, it is better play a Tit for Tat strategy in IS 
projects, which it has been argued is a strategy wMch cannot be invaded by any other 
strategy and prevents a team from taking advantage of a Too Nice strategy. 
4. Don't be too clever. The message for IS project managers is that the fundamental model 
of rational self interest is a temptation that is likely to be used bY Project teams. In 
particular when they are faced with a joint option of either increasing self interest or 
working for the benefit of a larger project. In particular this is likely when the teams have 
little or no trust in the future actions or behaviour of the other teams. 
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sin of omission, by not trusting, or have committed a sin of commission by attempting to 
obtain a higher Payoff than chance could have produced. If these decisions had been made 
in an IS project environment, none of the projects would have been successful. 
It would appear reasonable to suggest that a challenge for those involved in IS project 
management would be to create a project environment that adhered to the rules of a non- 
zero surn game and select tcarns who would operate at the fiduciary higher levels of trust. In 
such an environment the decision making strategy of those involved would be created 
without the temptation to beat other team. This would prevent dysfunctional project 
members who preferred to increase self interest. It is also important to consider that trust in 
an IS project may not reach the levels of a Prisoner's Dilemma. This is because IS projects 
are an example of an N-person finitely repeated game and the stakeholders may use the 
Backward Induction Argument and use rational economic reasoning to make their decisions, 
leading them to not co-openate and instead attempt to achieve an improved personal 
outcome before team objectives. 
The friction required in the implementation of an IS project could become competitive rather 
than destructive. Excluding con1licting targets could be one measure ofreducing the 
members of one team from wanting to beat members of other teams. If it is not possible to 
create a non-zero sum environment for project tearns, it would be possible to control the 
benefit teams could achieve. 
For example, Project Paradox adopted the essential tension ofthe Prisoner's Dilemma. 
However, in Project Paradox the penalty for joint none co-operation was -10. WHe the 
ranking for the Payoffs of Project Paradox could be retained, the team would naturally be 
more waxy of none co-operation if the Payoffwas increased to say -100 as discussed by 
Miller (1996). But tlýs implies that controls, not forgiveness are in operation. Controls in the 
form of increased penalties for none co-operation are likely to improve co-operation but 
admit the lowest form of trust is operating. 
These findings provide reasons and explanations that extend beyond the existing Hsts of 
success and failure factors in the literature for improving the chances of IS projects success. 
It is also possible to suggest how the Project Paradox experiments could be extended. For 
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example, in run 6 the team changed the decision of their representative who had agreed in 
writing with other teams that they would all co-operate. It would be interesting to observe 
when individuals rather than small teams played Project Paradox whether the levels ofco- 
operation iticreased. Also to increase the level of the punishnwnt from say - 10 to - 100 and 
observe whether teams would be less Mely to attempt to benefit from not co-operating. 
These results would help project managers understand probable behaviour patterns given a 
change of environment and enable the creation of more trusting project enviromients. 
Attempting to influence IS project environments to reflect a non-zero sum game has been 
suggested as a possible way forward to increase the level of trust in IS project teams. A 
finilicr approach would be to understand the t3W and level of trust that existed in a project 
team and project environment. By knowing these it would be possible to direct specific 
controls and actions to individuals and organisational systems to counter the negative 
outcome of low levels oftrust. 
Curren* there is no mechanism available to help those involved with IS projects to identify 
and control the mist in their projects. An outcome from this research is the proposal of a 
fimmwork for of a Trust Audit for IS projects. Included in the fiwwwork are examples of 
the: 
" stakeholders involved, 
" types of trust used, 
" typical questions, 
" thning of the Thist Audit, 
" method of presenting the results. 
The fimnework of a Trust Audit for IS projects is presented in the following Chapter. 
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Chapter 8 
8.0 A Trust Audit for IS Projects 
8.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this Chapter is to present a framework of Trust Audit for IS projects. 
There are three reasons that have combined to demonstrate the need for such an audit. 
Firstly, the questionnaire used in this research sought to identify the factors for successful 
IS projects. The results showed that 98% of the respondents in survey I and 60% in 
survey 2 believed trust in respect of IS projects to have some importance, while 76% of 
the respondents in survey I and 100% in survey 2 thought trust was the most important 
success factor. 
Secondly, trust has been identified as a factor lilely to impact on the success of IS 
projects. Chapter 5 contains a discussion of the levels and types of trust and indicated that 
many generic issues of trust identified in other disciplines have parallels with IS Projects. 
For example, the environment within which projects operate are susceptible and prone to a 
lack of trust. 
Finally, The results from the Project Paradox runs presented in Chapter 7 identified that it 
should not be assumed that stakeholders in an IS project would co-operate for the benefit 
of the project. The results from the Project Paradox games identified that the decisions 
made by the participants reflected rational economic reasoning rather than fiduciary 
responsibility. This indicated that for the majority of the players were operating at the 
lowest level of trust, called calculus. It was, therefore, argued that factors should be 
identified to enable the level of trust in IS projects to be improved to the higher levels, 
such as knowledge-based trust. One suggestion was to provide information about the 
specific types and levels of trust in operation in IS projects; hence the reason to propose a 
framework of a Trust Audit for IS projects. 
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8.2 Framework for an IS Project Management Trust Audit 
It is proposed that a Trust Audit could be operationalised in three stages. 
9 The first stage would be conducted prior to the conunencement of 'day zero' i. e. 
during the team forming stage. This would identify potential issues and enable 
them to be managed as risks. 
* For the second stage of the Trust Audit it is proposed that the 'process' would 
be monitored during the development of the project. This would identify whether 
the original risks had changed and identify any new issues that had emerged since 
the project had begun. These on-going trust audits could be carried out prior to the 
start of subsequent project phases. 
o The final stage of the Trust Audit would take place at the completion of a project 
as an element of a project evaluation review (PER). There would be two objectives 
from the PER Trust Audit. The first objective would be to learn from the audit. 
The second objective would be to ensure that issues identified in those findings are 
implemented for subsequent IS projects, to activate a learning project environment. 
This would help to ensure the mistakes or problems related to trust that were 
identified are not repeated in later projects. Having the three stages of a Trust 
Audit would address the '... necessity for continuous project learning' as 
suggested by Schindler and Eppler (2003) to '... harvest' project knowledge as a 
success factor. 
To enable an accurate Trust Audit to be compiled, it is further suggested that all 
stakeholders should have the opportunity to register their contnibutions anonymously. 
The knowledge obtained from projects relating to issues of trust could be embodied as 
goals or target for subsequent projects. This will take time to develop and mature. It is 
filrther envisaged that a practical enhancement from this research would be the 
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development of an open Trust Audit repository, where project managers could (again 
anonymously) place their IS Trust Audit results from which others can benefit. 
It is proposed that the Trust Audit would be undertaken in a manner to ensure that the 
views of all the project stakeholders are represented. To achieve this, the project 
stakeholders as identified within the PRINCE 2 structure (Bentley 1998) will inform the 
framework for the audit. For example, the Project Manager would report upwards to the 
Project Board through the Quality Team. The Project Manager therefore has to trust the 
Board will continue to: ftmd and support the project. At the same time the Project 
Manager also has to trust that the Project Team are technically competent to carry out the 
development work in conjunction with the support of the Configuration Team Also, the 
Project Manager would expect that all the stakeholders would undertake their 
responsibilities in a professional way and would need to 'trust' that they did not attempt to 
obtain an advantage over other stakeholders who were vulnerable to their actions. 
It can be seen that the success of a project is vulnerable to the trustworthiness of many 
stakeholders, but for different reasons. At the same time it can be seen that all project 
stakeholders would be expected to act in a professional and fiduciary way as identified by 
Baba (1999). It is, therefore, possible to identify that some aspects of trust will be specific 
to the individual stakeholder, while there will also be elements of trust that are common to 
all the project stakeholders. To reflect these differences it is proposed that each 
stakeholder group Will have Trust Audit questions that are unique and other questions that 
are common to all the different stakeholders. For example, the Project Manager would not 
necessarily be aware of the continual personal development of the staff, but would be 
aware of their qualifications. Figure 8.1 presents the proposed stakeholders who would be 
involved in IS projects within the PRINCE 2 structure (Bentley 1998). Naturally, the 
Trust Audit could expanded through the development of new questions specifically aimed 
to accept the input from other stakeholders, such as the Project Sponsors. 
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Fieure 8.1 Trust Audit Questionnaire Participants 
8.3 Contents of the Trust Audit 
Trust can be considered to bridge the reality gap that exists between having perfect and 
imperfect information. Phlips (1988) describes the distinction between '... games with 
imperfect information and games with incomplete information'. The players of a game are 
'... said to have imperfect information when there is uncertainty about the actual behavior 
of the players' while, '... on the contrary, information is incomplete when the players do 
not know some of the elements which define the rules of the game itself'. Using these 
definitions, Project Paradox would be defined as a game involving imperfect information, 
because the players did not know the strategy that the others players were about to adopt, 
since the decisions were made simultaneously. However, the rules for playing Project 
Paradox and the Payoffs achievable were known to the players before the runs started. 
Using the Phlips (1988) definitions, Project Paradox would be defined as a game using 
imperfect but not incomplete information. The design of the Trust Audit has therefore 
taken into account the likelihood that the respondents will only have imperfect and 
incomplete information available to them to complete the questionnaire. 
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In 'soft' systems with open boundaries it is not possible to achieve perfect information, 
there will always be a requirement to rely upon trust to some degree. Trust can be 
considered to be a cognitive lunction that if measured could be used to gauge what project 
stakeholders believe, think or feel about the coming project and possibly beyond. When 
the results from all the stakeholders are combined, a detailed view of the how they 
consider the organizational and project issues would then be avaflablc. 
It has been discussed that there are primary and secondary indications to identify trust 
(Bacharach and Gambette 200 1). For the purpose of the Trust Audit, only primary factors 
will be considered to indicate trust within the team as the stakeholders see it. The 
secondary factors of trust discussed by Bacharach and Garnbette (200 1) such as judgments 
based on personal appearance are considered to be too vague to be included, but they 
would continue to be considered as the Trust Audit is updated. From the literature, 
several aspects of trust were found as were discussed in Chapter 5. These include topics 
such as shown in Table 8.1. 
expectations of technical and fiduciary responsibility (Barberl983), 
all guarantees are incomplete (ONeill 2002), 
a need for trust 01andy 1995), 
expectations of others behavior (Baba 1999), 
relational and performance bust (Das and Teng 2001), 
focus on relationships not the individual (Blomqvist 1997), 
imperfect information, shared airns, rational choice and types of trust (Lane 1998), 
likelihood of firture co-operation and levels of trust (Tyler and Kramer 1996), 
competence of staff is needed (Cook 200 1), 
manage trust via uncertainty, manage distrust via vulnerability (Heimer 2001), 
thick trust and overlapping relationships CFIardin 2002), 
competitive, emotional and integrity trust (Hartman 2000), 
joint goals common values (Messick and Kramer 2001), 
trust building in teams (Herzog 2001). 
Table 8.1 Examples of Trust Topics Source: as given above. 
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For the purposes of a draft Trust Audit specific to IS projects, it has been possible to 
identify four main areas that bound and define trust. 
The first is being 'Vulnerable' to the action of others. The stakeholders of an IS project 
are all vulnerable to the actions of each other, and as stated above the success of the 
project relies on the trust of all the stakeholders. The Project Manager is vulnerable to the 
actions the Project Board and the Development team, but for different types of trust. An 
example of an indicator of trust in this category would be staff who have previously 
worked together (Handy 1995) and have started to build a history of being trustworthy by 
not having acting from a position of self interest. 
The second area is knowing the 'Credibility' of the staff and this itself has two factors. 
These involve having the knowledge that the stakeholders 'can' and 'U111' do what is 
required. Holding a belief such as 'I think the project staff can do the job' is a weak state 
of trust. What is preferable is knowing that those involved 'can' do the job. That is to say 
the stakeholders have the technical skills, acadernic ability and necessary experience. 
The second factor within the 'Credibility' of trust involves knowing, 'will' the team 
members do what is expected of them. This is a measure of their past actions and future 
intent to discharge their professional and fiduciary responsibility. Methods of measurement 
for the requirements of credibility include obtaining references, checking qualffications, 
memberships of professional bodies and other indications that they are managing their 
continual personal and professional development. 
The third area involves the 'Culture' of the organization and project itself A culture of 
fear, excessive control, frequent disciplinary actions based on finding fault would indicate 
a low level of trust. In contrast, an organizational culture that encourage risk taking linked 
to the expectation that some Mures would be expected, and then use the outcome of 
these failures as a learning vehicle indicate an organization operating a high trust culture. 
Questions that would identify a trusting organization and project culture would include 
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having staff who feel free to speak out without fear of reprisal. Also, if there are low levels 
of personal control such as only requiring staff to account for project not personal time. 
The fourth and final area involves the 'Visibility' and openness of infonnation. It was 
discussed earlier that project staff need to make informed decisions. In order to do thýis, 
they will require accurate and timely information, albeit that information will be 
'imperfect'. So, given that there will be a limitation of available information, the question 
therefore is, do the team members believe that more information is required or some 
available information is being withheld? 
Having good, regular, honest cominunications between all parties, at all levels in a project 
have been identified as a key success factor in this research. The Trust Audit would, 
therefore, include questions to determine whether there are clear and frequent charinels to 
facilitate the 'Visibility' and openness of information. Withholding information was 
identified as one of the major triggers to begin a spiral of mistrust by Munns (1995). At 
the start of a project it may not be known if information was being withheld; consequently, 
one of the questions to measure trust would take place during the development stage of a 
project, by asking the stakeholders if they were surprised by some of the occurrences 
which, had taken place after the project had started. A control question would be, are the 
stakeholders disappointed over some issues? It was argued in Chapter 5 that being 
disappointed by the outcome of project events is unfortunate. However, being surprised 
indicates that stakeholders expectations had not been correctly managed, indicating that 
Communication between staff had not been as good as they could have been. 
It was argued in Chapter 5 that one criterion for measuring success of a project could be if 
all the stakeholders achieved only a sub-optimum of their total requirements. This 
indicates that some level of disappointment from the stakeholders would not automatically 
be a problem. On the other hand, having stakeholders who experience a feeling of surprise 
would indicate that there was a problem with managing their expectations and that in turn 
indicates a lack of conununication. An argument has been given to demonstrate how the 
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framework of a draft Trust Audit for IS projects can be represented by four key factors, 
these are: 
d, Vulnerability (to the action of others), 
o Credibility ('can' professioml and technical and 'will' fiduciary), 
* Culture (of the organization), 
* Visiffiffity (and openness of infonmtion). 
Some examples of the types of questions that would address the four areas of trust have 
been given with an explanation for their inclusion. A questionnaire will be designed to 
have an even number of possible reply options from which respondents could select their 
answers. The extreme of this being a simple dichotomy of yes/no type answers. An even 
number of options has been selected to prevent the respondents from 'sitting on the fence' 
in their replies. An example of typical questions that could be asked in the Trust Audit are 
given below in Tables 8.2 to 8.5. Also included are the reply options from which, the 
respondents could select their answer. Reasons why the questions could be included are 
offered and an indicator shows which of the four areas of trust the questions wiU address. 
Vulnerability 
1. Have you worked with the project Answer options: All, Most, Some, None. 
team members before? 
Reason: to test prior knowledge of others, as evidence suggests 
this reduces uncertainty which, has been linked to low trust. 
Remember that an increase in information does not necessarily 
increase trusý the additional information could produced 
distrust. 
2. Do you believe some Answer options: Definitely, 1-fighly probable, Unlikely, No. 
project team members would 
if possible maximize their personal Reason: this question is testing the level of future 
benefit? intent of the staff. 
I Are you aware of any team members Answer options: All, Most, 
ý7o-me, None. 
who do not agree with or dislike the 
project objectives? Reason: Indicates either likelihood of encapsulated 
trust or staff who are possibly detached from the team. 
Table 8.2 Examples of Trust Audit Questions: Vulnerabilit3: 
221 
Credibility 
1. (Individual) Are you an Answer options: Yes, No. 
active member of a professional group 
for example, a Member Reason: to understand the professional credibility of 
of the Association for Project the person, it also indicates positive attention to improving 
Management APM? personal development and reduces uncertainty. 
2. (Organisational) Do you Answer options: Yes, No. 
have any first hand knowledge that 
records have been retrospectively Reason: retrospectively altering information indicates a very 
changed, such as minutes of meetings, low level of trust, with examples of catastrophic failure being 
project objectives, annual reports linked when it has occurred, such as at the Barings Bank. 
accounts? 
3. Do you have links or commitments to Answer options: All, Most, Some, None. 
project team members through other 
contacts such as; family, sports clubs, Reason: to test for further levels of encapsulated trust, 
religious groups, education? through inquiring whether team members know each other 
through other contacts. 
Table 8.3 Examples of Trust Audit Questions: Credibility 
Culture 
1. Do you feel empowered to Answer options: Yes, No. 
take risks? 
Reason: a risk taking culture is associated with a trusting 
culture. 
2. Do you consider the culture Answer options: Blameworthy, Mostly Blameworthy, Mostly 
to be blameworthy or one that learns from learning culture, Learning culture. 
mistakes? 
Reason: a reply of Blameworthy would indicate that there is 
little or no forgiveness. That in turn points towards an 
organization that operates using calculus, the rational 
economic (lowest level) of trust. 
3. Is there a strong or weak culture of Answer options: Strong consistency, Tends towards 
consistency within the organization? strong consistent, Tends towards weak consistency. 
Weak consistency. 
Reason: to test for uncertainty, supported through 
social reinforcement. This is achievable via 
organizational culture. It is reasonable that team members 
could predict how others will bchave. 
Table 8.4 Examples of Trust Audit Ouestions: Culture 
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Visibility 
1. Is the information that you Answer options: All first hand, Most firsthand, Most second 
have for decision making first hand hand, All second hand. 
second hand? 
Reason: to identify the quality and credibility of information. 
Increases in first hand information enables high levels of 
reliability, hence reducing uncertainty. 
2. Are there clear guidelines of expected Answer options: Yes, No. 
behavior linked to action if these are not 
met? Reason: clear guidelines indicating the expected level of 
behavior and knowledge that action will be taken if these are 
broken are linked to trust building through controls 
considered reasonable. 
3. During the project have you been Answer options: Yes, No. 
surprised by an outcome or event? 
(11is is an example of a trust Reason: a surprise comes from mismanagement of 
audit question linked to expectations or withholding of information. Both these 
the development and final stages). increase uncertainty and trust is reduced. Disappointed on 
the other hand could be accepted to some degree. For 
example, when a sub-optimum of stakeholders requirements 
is accepted as success. 
Table 8.5 Examples of Trust Audit Questions: Visibility 
8.4 Presentation of the Trust Audit Results 
It is proposed that the results of the four question topics from the Trust Audit could be 
represented as a point on a diagram as shoN; m in Figure 8.2. The calibration of Figure 8.2 
indicates that the results are worse the closer they are to the center of the diagrarn. 
Moving outwards from the center towards the edge represents an increase in trust within 
each of the four question topics, with a score closer to 100% indicating the desired levels 
of trust. To provide a guide for the initial calibration of Figure 8.2 the area inside the 
rectangle has been divided into three equal size sectors, these are: 
* Red inner most sector indicates cause for concern, 
e Yellow middle sector indicates an acceptable level of trust, 
* Green outer sector indicates a high level of trust. 
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For illustration purposes the three sectors represent a third of the scores obtained fiýom the 
replies to the Trust Audit questionnaire. A sample of the questions were given in Tables 
8.2 - 8.5. It is suggested that further research would ensure that the selection of' 
stakeholders, topics of trust, questions and calibration of the replies used within the Trust 
Audit are as appropriate as possible. 
100% L 
Vulnerability 
Acceptable 
level 
of 
trust 
Credibility 
Visibility 
for concem 
Culture 
Fieurc 8.2 Framework of Trust Audit Analvsis 
Each of the stakeholders identified in Figure 8.1 would, therefore, have an individual 
output for the Trust Audit. Figure 8.3 provides an illustrative example of the results based 
on the replies that could be received from a Project Manager's participation in the Trust 
Audit. 
Using Figure 8.3 as an example, the result would indicate that the Project Manager had 
rated trust in relation to 'Vulnerability' as high. However, the issues of trust relating to 
'Credibility' and 'Culture' are at an acceptable level while the results involving the 
'Visibility' and openness of information indicate cause for concern. Having now examined 
these results it would then be possible to focus on these and take action to rectify the 
specific area where the level of trust is considered to be causing the concern. 
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Following the analysis of the responses from each of the individual stakeholders scores in 
the Trust Audit, we can now consolidate all the scores, and consider the overall levels of, 
trust within the fours specific areas of trust used in the Trust Audit. Figure 8.4 provides 
an example to illustrate how the consolidated results could be presented and how they 
show the responses of all the Stakeholders in respect of a project. 
:e 
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Fieure 8.3 Individual Trust Audit Analysis by Question Sectors 
Comparing Figure 8.3 with Figure 8.4, they show that at an individual stakeholder level 
(Figure 8.3 the Project Manager) the 'Visibility' and openness of information was a cause 
for concern. At the consolidated level (Figure 8.4 the overall results) the area of trust that 
is now cause for concern i. e. a risk for the project has moved to areas of 'Culture' and 
'Credibility'. 
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Fieure 8.4 Consolidated Trust Audit Analvsis by Ouestion Sectors 
Examples of how the individual and consolidated stakeholders views within the four 
specific areas of trust can be represented have been demonstrated. The next stage 
presents the output in a form to reflect the framework of all stakeholders that were 
identified in Figure 8.1. The level of trust for the IS project from the stakeholders' 
perspective can be seen be in Figure 8.5. 
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Fieure 8.5 Consolidated Proiect Trust Audit bv Stakeholders 
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Figure 8.5 shows how each stakeholder could perceive the level of trust within an IS 
project. Figure 8.5 illustrates that the Project Manager's view of the level oftrust in 
respect of the project was high. The Project Board, Quality team and Users however, 
perceived the level of trust as acceptable. Staff in the Development and Support teams 
both consider that there is a cause for concern insofar as the risks associated with trust 
were concerned. 
Finafly, a trust 'gauge' can be used to present the responses from all the stakeholders who 
have considered the issues of four specific areas of trust. Figure 8.6 provides an example 
of an overall indication of trust issues within an IS project. 
Acceptable 
ýh 
DIrusl 
Fieure 8.6 OveraH IS Prooect Trust Audit 
This is an important output because trust is increasingly being reported by researchers 
such as Lewis (2004), Chia (2004), Tampere (2004) and Watts (2004), who discuss how 
it could appear that the topic of trust is sometimes used as an emotive term. The trust of 
the Government, individuals, education and the medical profession were reported to be 
being brought into question by O'Neill (2002), without it being clear what type of trust 
was involved. In contrast, the Trust Audit from this research can be seen to be linked to 
the stakeholders viewpoint of IS projects and the questions have been grounded in the 
literature to be specific to four areas of trust. 
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When the results of a Trust Audit indicate that a person may lack 'Credibility' insofar as 
having a lack of knowledge is concerned, it would be possible to implement corrective 
action by offering specific training. A Trust Audit that identifies concern with the 
'Visibility' and openness of inforination, could then be followed by research to trace the 
likely causes to enable corrective action to be taken. In all cases when the word trust is 
used within the Trust Audit, it could be linked to one or more of the four specific areas of 
trust and would not simply generate an emotive generic use of the word. 
8.5 Operating the Trust Audit 
Having demonstrated the approach, structure, output presentation alongside a method to 
run the Trust Audit, the final issue is, how the output can be consolidated and managed as 
risks? When risk factors are identified in IS projects they are usually evaluated and 
categorized in terms of their potential and impact to the project. The factors that are 
identified as both high potential and high impact and are then targeted with risk 
management techniques. The options to manage project risks include avoidance action, 
such as not employing staff who were found to have low professional credibility. Reducing 
the risk of a member of the team who has a shortage of specific skills can be remedied by 
training. Risks can be transferred through an insurance, thus financially hedging against the 
impact should the risk materialize. Eventually the residual risks that are not able to be 
transferred, reduced or avoided, must be managed through risk absorption. The 
management process of the risks associated specifically with trust could be undertaken as 
descnibed in the Project Risk Analysis and Management (PRAM) Guide (SIMON et al 
eds. 1997). For example, there could be the opportunity to manage risks as identified in a 
Trust Audit by managing the expectations of the project stakeholders through refined 
communications during regular feedback and other risk absorption control strategies. 
The most appropriate timing for communication to take place would be during the project 
team formation stage. By setting the scene early through communication, it would be 
Possible to reduce for example, concerns the stakeholders may have inaccurately believed 
were caused by the withholding of information. Also, at the start of the project it may be 
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possible to enable the staff to meet and begin the process of building 'rapid' trust for those 
who have not worked together before. Tearn formation and building techniques have often 
been limited to outdoor team buflding adventures. It is suggested that they only address 
part of the trust that would be required in an IS project, as it was argued in Chapter 5 that 
trust used in outdoor activities is limited to the higher order types of trust. It was further 
argued that it was unlikely that a person would neither deliberately nor passively allow 
another person to receive an injury in a dangerous situation, such as climbing. 
Consequently, in order to provide project team members with a more balanced view of the 
range of trust that may exist in an IS project, it is suggested that in addition to outdoor 
team building techniques the team could also take part in such as a Project Paradox 
workshop. The learning that has been shown to take place during and following a Project 
Paradox workshop would alert those participating to levels of trust such as calculus. The 
results from Project Paradox runs presented in Chapter 7 have demonstrated that 
participants acted from a position of self interest rather than to achieve project objectives. 
Having participated in a Project Paradox workshop the stakeholders would also become 
aware and better informed to answer the Trust Audit questions. For example, feedback 
obtained after running Project Paradox in the European Aeronautic Defence and Space 
Company (EADS) Systems and Defence Electronics in Gern-iany in 2003 indicated that 
prior to completing the Trust Audit questionnaires the participants could benefit from the 
education relating to trust obtained from participating in a Project Paradox workshop. 
Examples of the feedback from the EADS (2003) Project Paradox workshops can be 
found in Appendix H. 
8.6 Summary of the Trust Audit 
A framework for an IS Project Trust Audit has been presented. The stakeholders who 
could contribute to the framework have been identified as defined by the PRINCE 2 
project management methodology. 
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Four key areas of trust were presented, these were: Vulnerability, Credibility, Culture and 
Visibility. Examples of typical questions that would test the condition of these four areas 
of trust were discussed. A method that could be used to present the results from the Trust 
Audit has been provided in Figures 8.2 to 8.6. These demonstrated how the overall trust 
within an IS project could be presented. Using techniques similar to that of executive 
information systems (EIS), it is possible to drill into the consolidated figures and identify 
both the stakeholder groups and the four specific areas of trust that indicate a cause for 
concern. 
The framework for the Trust Audit is clear, however, the exact questions and calibration 
of the instruments continue to be refined and form part of the further research for the 
development of the Trust Audit in practical applications. Feedback received from 
participants of Project Paradox workshops (Appendix H), suggested that prior to 
competing the Trust Audit questionnaires the stakeholders would be better informed to 
answer the questions after they had been a participant in a Project Paradox workshop. 
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Chapter 9 
9.0 Summary, Evaluation and Conclusions 
9.1 Introduction 
At the start of this thesis it was reported that the success rate of IS projects was low. 
Examples of the failures from both the UK and USA demonstrated the unacceptable scale of 
the problerm The literature review provided evidence to show this bad been occurring for at 
least the last 2 decades. The chronic nature of the problem was exacerbated when repeated 
research confirnied that the success rate of IS projects was not improving. This produces a 
negative impact and consequential loss both financially and otherwise for the many different 
stakeholders involved with IS projects. Naturally such a problem is a concern and provided 
the rationale for the research. The airn of this research was to provide an understanding into 
how the success rate of IS projects could be improved. In order to focus the work, two 
research objectives were proposed. 
Consideration into the research approach resulted in the use of a triangulation of multi 
methods that were conducted in two sequential stages. The first stage used a questionnaire. 
For the second stage a new business game was developed. Both research methods were 
considered to be positioned within the interpretative paradigna of phenomenology. 
91 Summary and Evaluation for Research Objective 1 
The first objective of this research was, to identify factors and criteria in IS project 
niaragement wMeh, could lead to project success. 
92.1 Success and Failure Factors 
A review of the literature with a focus on the factors for IS project success and failure 
proved to be inconclusive. Many studies had attempted to identify key success factors, but 
have offered only Ifinited help in identTying the reasons for failure. The standards and 
publications, such as the BoK, produced by professional bodies in the UK and the USA 
indicated 'what is' and 'how to' for project management, but were found to difler within and 
between different countries. One problem encountered was that the subject domain covered 
a broad eclectic group of topics that included the factors of information systems, 
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nmnagernent and project rnanagement. Combining all these points led (Tsoukas 1994) to 
conclude that the lists of critical success factors were no more than a '... codification of 
work'. Ward (2000) considered that the uncoordinated research into project fflures, '... 
explore and expand a problern, develop considerable knowledge of a subject but do not 
necessarily get any closer to a solution. 
However, although no clear agreement could be found into the reasons or causes for failure, 
the literature review in Chapter 2 did provide an indication into the topics suitable for further 
research. The factors selected for this research relied on the interpretative approach of the 
author. The first factor to be considered was the influence of the systerns enviromnent within 
which IS projects takes place. 
The literature of systems' theory informs us that '... the variety ofthe environment' would 
always be greater dm '... the operators that serve it', while in turn '... the operators will 
exceed the management which attempts to control or regulate them' (Beer 1985). 
Therefore, as project managers attempt to control and regulate a unique undertaking within 
a changing business environment, some project failures could be considered to be inevitable. 
To help understand the complexity involved in mapping the correct type of IS projects with 
different business requirements, a fimnework was developed and presented in Figure 2.2. 
This was supported by an argument that the failure of an IS project could also be influenced 
by an incorrect strategic or political decision rather than failure being a factor of the project 
management or the technical validity of the resultant IS. 
Furthermore, providing the loss from failed IS projects does not represent a sigrOcant 
percentage of a business profit, some project failures could also be considered to be 
acceptable. Whether or not a central or local Government department who bad a Uded 
project could ever accept Mure as acceptable is debatable, because they involve a 
consequential loss of limited taxpayer contributions. Nevertheless, it would be useful to 
know the threshold level of failed but acceptable and unacceptable projects that the IS 
community are prepared to tolerate. 
Included within the stage I questionnaire were questions that related to the number of 
successful and failed projects which, the respondents had been involved. The analysis 
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indicated that the respondents had been involved with 852 IS projects, with 84.7% resulting 
in success. This indicated a higher success rate than the statistics showed in Chapters I and 
3. A reason for the difference in these findings was argued to be in part because it was not 
possible to take a true random sample of the complete boundary of project management and 
project success. Each research has therefore to be conducted using only a United or 
stratified sample of the total population for project matiagement. The evaluation of this 
finding was that the high reported failure rate of IS projects may be due to exception 
reporting. 
It should also be pointed out that the majority of the failures are reported from the 
Govenunent projects. This information is available because these projects need to be open to 
public scrutiny, through the National Audit Office and Public Accounts Committee. It was 
Rifther argued that Private sector companies would have little incentive to report project 
failures that could in any case cause a reduction in shareholder confidence. The accuracy of 
the reported high rate ofproject failures is, therefore, challenged by this research and is 
worthy of finiher research. It is suggested that this could be achieved by conducting some 
large-scale surveys to determine whether exception reporting of IS project failures is 
producing a biased view or whether the reported high failure rate is indeed correct. 
Factors such as the use of a project managernent methodology, systems methodologies and 
CASE tools, were not found to be critical to project success, validating the findings of other 
researchers. Planning, commitment and communicating were linked to the successful IS 
projects. The use of COTS in place of bespoke systems development was found to be 
associated with a high level ofproject success. 
Using consultants on IS project stages was found to increase with a corresponding increase 
in project costs. This was interesting when compared with other research that indicted the 
rate of IS project success reduced when the project costs increase (Gallagher 1995). This is 
not suggesting that the use of consultants cause the higher project failures; however, further 
research into the area of increased costs linked to project outcomes with and without the use 
of consultants would be worthwhile. An additional research topic would be to identify the 
level and type oftrust that existed in IS project teams when consultants were employed. For 
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example, would the temporary nature of a consulant's contract with an IS project team 
fiffluence how the team co-operate with each other? 
The 'Brooks Law' (Ward 1994) that defmes a method to calculate the optimum number of 
staff resources was repeatedly verified as a reliable estirriating tool for plaming. 
The literature review indicated that the project manager was considered to be a critical 
success factor. The results from a large survey ofproject managers showed that they 
considered project tasks associated with people issues (dealt with in the right hemisphere of 
the brain) to be the most important aspect of a project managers role/task (Webster 1994). 
When the same project managers were asked what role/tasks they had completed recently in 
practice, their responses indicated it was the technical tasks such as planning, (dealt with in 
the left hemisphere ofthe brain) to which they had devoted most of their time. A potential 
conflict was found to exist in that project managers talk about using the right brain functions, 
however they mainly use the left brain functions when dealing with project management 
issues as illustrated in Figures 2.4,2.5 and 2.6. 
A significant finding from the literature review concluded that while other disciplines had 
considered trust to be a factor of success, this has not been expressed in project 
management. At the start of this research there was no reference to bust as a success factor 
in project management literature. It also seems that no research had been conducted in 
connection with trust and project management. In addition, the subject of trust was not 
included in the UK APM BoK (1995) or the BS 6079 (1996). The literature of risk and the 
risk analysis and management (PRAM) guide (Sinion et al eds. 1997) also excludes any 
reference to trust. A gap in the literature had been identified that was considered important 
to wan-ant further research and becarne the focus for stage 2 of this research. 
Finally, in this section concerning success and failure factors an observation is offered 
concerning the potential for confusion between the two. Some authors have specifically 
researched success factors; others have focused only on failure factors, while yet others 
discuss both success and failure in the same way. For example, analysis of the litera: ture 
revealed that User involvement was identified as a success factor (Geddes 1990). At the 
same thme User involvement was also included in the tables of failure factors (Gallagher 
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1995). However, the factor of having smaller 'n-@estones' was linked only to success, whi1c 
'a lack of resources' was exclusively catalogued as a failure factor (Gallagher 1995). It is 
suggested that having two categories of success and failure factors is confusing. An 
illustration ofhow these could be combined into one framework was presented in 
Figure 2.7. 
Clearly sorne factors are only linked to failure and it is suggested that these are the most 
critical of critical success factors. These are the foundation upon wWch success will depend, 
because if they are not in place, the literature suggests that success is not likely. 
The next category of factors are those that reside as either success or failure. nese should 
be considered to be the second order of importance. Finally, to achieve success, the factors 
that are unique to being identified as success factors need to be satisfied. The pinnacle of 
Figure 2.7 represent success factors which it is suggested would be specific to each project. 
It should be noted that even with these in place, success is not guaranteed since the 
unknowable risks will always be present. On the other hand the foundation level of success 
factors would be generic to all projects. 
The confusion becornes greater when the success and failure factors are mapped against the 
content of the APM BoK (1995). Since not a factors in the BoK are represented as either 
success or failure. Unless of course it is possible that a factor could be considered null in 
teims of it's influence over success and failure. If this is believed to be the case, they need to 
be identiGed in order that project managers understand the miportance they have. To finish 
this section concerning the factors it is reconunended that the use ofthe fimnework 
suggested in Figure 2.7 that incorporates both success and failure factors would help in the 
development of our understanding of the scale and criticality of success factors. 
9.2.2 Criteria to Measure Success 
DeLonc and McLean (1992) and other authors considered that the search for success factors 
is no more than a speculative exercise until the criteria to be used to judge success are 
known However, the search for new criteria has not attracted the same level of interest 
compared with the effort expended to identify new success factors. The most frequently 
discussed criteria in the literature were found to be cost, quality and the. An argument was 
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developed suggesting this is limiting the chance of success, ifthese were the only m=ures 
against which success was judged. This research proposed a fiurnework, tenned 'The 
Square Route' (Figure 2.8) that includes additional criteria against which success could be 
measured. The purpose of 'The Square Route' is to indicate that additional categories could 
be considered when measuring project success, including subjective criteria. 
The analysis of the questionnaire for stage I produced 255 suggestions of how the success 
of IS projects could be measured. Respondents mentioned the criteria of cost, quality and 
time in 44% of their suggestions. However, the three new categories of criteria that were 
included in the 'Square Route' were mentioned in the remaining majority (56%) of the 
suggestions. 711is provides support that the additional criteria proposed in the 'Square 
Route' would be used in practice if they were an available option. Other industries have 
managed to overcome the temptation to limit the criteria to judge success to those that are 
quantifiable. It was considered a weakness for IS project management not to include more 
qualitative criteria. For example, the American Nuclear industry uses the concept of 
prudence as a success criteriorL If those project managers had behaved in a prudent manner, 
such as were their decisions reasonable, a project that was over time or cost could still be 
considered a success. 
The correct selection of criteria is critical to the future success of a project. At a time when 
organisations focus staff effort towards core activities, it seems reasonable to suggest that 
the criteria will become the focus for the energy of those stalE It follows therefore, that 
what will get done will be directed primarily towards that which is measured, Le. the criteria. 
A selection of incorrect or unnecessary criteria for an IS project will divert limited project 
staff resources into wasted nugatory work. Meanwhile criteria found by Wateridge (1996) to 
be important, such as,... were the staff happy in their work', could niistAenly be forgotten. 
When criteria are selected, deWitt (1988) urged that the reason for their inclusion should 
also be considered. It was suggested that the review stage of a project should not use criteria 
in term ofludging success or fitilure but rather '... what went right, what went wrong and 
why'. 
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Another significant finding from the stage I questionnaire was the potential that trust in 
project teams could influence success. When this was combined with the discovery that there 
was a gap in the project management literature concerning trust, it made the subject worth 
fimher investigation and informed the second research objective. Trust became the focus for 
stage 2 ofthis research. A new business game called 'Project Paradox' was developed and 
tested as described in Chapters 5 and 6. 
93 Summary and Evaluation for Research Objective 2 
The second research objective was- to understand the likely impacts that trust in project 
teams would have on the success of IS projects. 
The link between trust and IS project success was identified by the analysis of the replies to 
the questiormaire in stage 1, this showed: 
* 98% of the questionnaire respondents believed trust was inWrtant to the success 
of IS projects, 
* 84% had experienced a breakdown of trust, 
* 68% considered that controls were not able to act as a replacement for a lack of 
trust. 
The significance ofthese results became apparent when they were compared with the next 
lighest success factor ie. planning, that was mentioned by 33% of the respondents. 
A further literature review indicted the generic importance of trust. Many definitions were 
found, however, since trust was found to be discipline specific there was some difference in 
context. Anthropology, for example, considered trust in non-commercial terms. Marketing 
on the other band viewed trust through an economic model with factors such as limited 
information and delayed payments providing a unique need for trust. The difference between 
trusting the technical competence of a person was also contrasted with the type of trust that 
would be used to consider whether to trust a person's likely fiduciary social behaviour. 
However, the overall impression from the literature indicted that trust was in operation when 
someone was vulnerable to the actions of others, but was not worried that the other' would 
attempt to take advantage and benefit personally from the disparity fii power and control. 
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The ideal project envirorffnent was considered to be where a reciprocal altruistic or 
symbiotic behaviour would odst. It was filrther argued that an enviromient to support such 
behaviour should have a shared and complementary set of objectives for the stakeholders. 
Project management was found to incorporate the features ofrapid trust due to the 
temporary nature ofprojects and other project specific factors. Trust was found to spiral in 
a positive or a negative direction; the withholding of information being the principle reason 
for a decrease in trust. Trust was found to exist at three levelsý calculus, knowledge-based 
and identification-based. Calculus trust required controls to be in place to operate. A higher 
level of trust, termed knowledge-based included an element of forgiveness in place of 
controls. This required people to have a positive prior experience ofworking with each 
other. 
At the identification-based level of trust, one person could act as the agent for another 
though having conmion beliefs and aims. These three types of trust are also known under the 
tenns economic, cognitive and social. Social and cognitive trust are within the bounds of 
anthropology but econornic (calculus) trust is considered to be the most likely level of trust 
used by project tearm With calcWus/economc trust, individuals decide whether to risk 
trusting and co-operate with others through a 'rational choice' model. 
The research focused on whether teams would trust each other in a project setting and 
measured the level of co-operation between teams. A new project scenario called, Project 
Paradox was developed to test whether bust was likely to exist in an IS project setting. 
Project Paradox was a finitely repeated non-zero swn game that retained the 'essential 
tension' of mist created by the decision rule within the Prisoner's Dilernma, a part of game 
theory. However, Project Paradox was designed as a placebo, N-person game with varying 
amounts of information available to the players during different playing orientations. 
Fhl, the playing of Project Paradox was simulated with the decisions to co-operate or not, 
using a Non-strategy, ie. when the decisions co-operate or not were taken at random The 
results of the Non-strategy produced the value against wMch the tearn results could be 
compared. 
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The analysis ofthe strategies used in the 14 garnes in scenarios I and 2 were rnapped against 
the results of other adaptations of the Prisoner's Dilemma. Further comparisons were made 
against what is usually accepted as the most significant previous study by Axelrod (1984). 
The teams who participated in the Project Paradox runs used a range of strategies such as 
'Tit for Tat', 'Prober' and 'Grudger'. From the anabsis anew strategy was observed that 
was not considered by previous researchers. This was termed a 'Benevolent Finisher'. In this 
strategy a team who 'beat' another team fnished the game by co-operating when it was too 
late to influence the result insofar as the score was concerned. Teams who played the 
'Benevolent Finisher' attempted to repair the breakdown of trust they had earlier caused in 
an attempt to 'win' the game. 
In the Axelrod (1984) experinlent, the Non-strategy (Le. when decisions to co-operate or 
not were made at random) was beaten by all other strategies and produced the lowest value. 
In Project Paradox only 19 from 42 runs (45%) produced a value that was higher than that 
achieved using the Non-strategy. The team players of Project Paradox had taken a majority 
of their decisions not to co-operate with other teams. This clearly indicated that they either 
did not mist the other teams or that they were using the lowest level of trust Le. the rational 
choice model oftrust and co-operation. Rather than operate at the social level of fiduciary 
trust, the players chose to adopt opportunistic behaviour instead of the social and moral 
considerations in their decision making. The players were demonstrating that they were not 
trustworthy in the Project Paradox environment. 
Parallels could be drawn with the low success rate of IS projects ifthese behaviours were 
used in Eve project developments. For example, a project with several stakeholders with 
conflicting objectives is likely to have less co-operation from the teams than if a joint 
objective had been agreed. Accepting a sub-optimum set of objectives and to some extent all 
stakeholders being unsatisfied was suggested in an interview Collins (1994) as a more 
realistic expectation than when all stakeholders attempt to achieve I 00"/o oftheir individual 
requirements. 
The decisions to co-operate (ft= other teams) became worse as Project Paradox 
progressed over tftne; the level of decay are shown in Figures 7.19 and 7.20. It can be seen 
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that although in both scenarios, trust began to decay over time, the level and speed of decay 
for the second scenario was marginally less than that for first scenario. In scenario 1, the 
teams played in an environment representing a co-located project, where the decisions were 
taken using limited information. This was achieved by restneting the communication 
between the teams. For scenario 2 the teams played in an environment representing 
distributed project teams who had the opportunity of making decisions with unrestricted 
communication. 
The results of Project Paradox indicated with 95% confidence that the data used in scenarios 
I and 2 were obtained from different populations. The change in the scenarios had 
contri ibuted to the difference in the rate of decay of Mist between scemrios I and 2 
demonstrating the finportance of conunuriication and building mist to the success of 
projects. The decay of co-operation over tirm demonstrated that the team had entered into 
a spiral of distrust as discussed by Munns (1995). 
The hypothesis for this stage was presented in Chapter 6 and posited that IS project teams 
would co-operate (trust) no less than if the decisions to co-operate were decided at randorn. 
Recall that from the Axelrod (1984) experiment the Non-strategy (Le. using random data) 
produced the lowest score from 15 dfferent strategies. 
Additional tests for significance were also conducted to test the hypothesis. These indicted 
that the data used in scenario I was from a different population to the data used in the 
simulation of using the Non-strategy. This was significant as it indicated 'something else' 
other than chance had produced the difference in the results. The players had demonstrated 
that they bad used rational choice decision making to form their judgements, Le. they chose 
to co-operate less than when random data was used. The data coflected from scenario 2 was 
also compared with the data from the Non-strategy. This result indicated that it was with 
more than 99% certainty that the data for the Non-strategy came from a different population 
than the data for scenario 2. 
In both scenarios the players bad signalled that they were not prepared to co-operate, to a 
level that could have been achieved even through chance. The null hypothesis; that there is 
no difference between the co-operation in scenario I and the figures obtained using a Non- 
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strategy, therefore, fell. Something other than chance bad produced the difference in the 
results between the Non-strategy and results from scenarios I and 2. The conclusion from 
this result was that the conscious decisions made by the teams not to co-operate had caused 
the difference. The reason for their behaviour was that they were not able to be confident 
and trust that the other teams would also co-operate and not seek personal advantage. It is 
believed that this is a significant finding for the project management community. 
In a project environment when the teams have little or no prior knowledge of the other 
teams, they are likely to be wary ofthe intended behaviour of the other teams. In this 
context, this research has demonstrated that sonic teams will operate at the lowest level of 
trust (calculus). They are likely to use a strategy of self-interest, resulting in opportunistic 
behaviour, rather than working at a higher level of trust (knowledge-based, social trust). 
An increase in communication was found to finprove the level of co-operation in projects 
based on 'swift trust'. However, it was observed that even with unlimited coninunications, 
there was a high probability of decay in co-operation over time. Maintaining staff morale and 
motivation throughout the stages of a project is h-nportant. Knowing that co-operation has 
been demonstrated to decay over tim is also a significant point for those managing IS 
projects. 
Obtaining commitment from all stakeholders requires a high degree of trust. This is required 
specifically when the stakeholders work at the social level of trust. At this level of trust 
individuals, expect others do not act in an opportunistic manner but will make their decisions 
for the general good of the organisation or project, sometimes called fiduciary trust. It was 
argued that if stakeholders feel surprised at the end of a project, it could be that their 
expectations set at the start were not realised for the project. However, when stakeholders 
feel a level of disappointnent at the end of an IS project this can still result in the project 
being classed as a success; because achieving a sub-optirnum of stakeholder's requirements 
can be considered as success. 
In order to provide inýproved infornmflon to enable a higher level of bust to be possible, the 
ftamework for a Trust Audit has been proposed. Other researchers had considered the 
benefit of trust inventories and measurement schemes. However, they did not go far enough 
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or take into account the specific attributes ofIS projects and their staff It was recognised 
that it may be difficult to measure trust, however, it was considered possible to identify the 
levels and types of trust linked specifically to the stakeholders involved with IS projects. 
It was, therefore, possible to indicate how a Trust Audit would be developed and this was 
presented in Chapter 8. For example, the Trust Audit takes account ofthe stakeholders as 
identified in the PRINCE 2 project management methodology and covers four areas of trust 
namely- 
" Vuhlerabffity (to the action of others), 
" Credibility ('can' professional and technical and 'will' fiduciary), 
" Cuh-ure (ofthe organisation), 
" Visibility (and openness of information). 
The risks identified specifically linked to issues of trust, as identified from the analysis of the 
results from a Thist Audit, could then be managed to contribute to the success of firture IS 
projects. 
9.4 Conclusions 
From the analysis and evaluation of these research findings, the following II conclusions are 
made. Most of these could be developed into further research actions and suggestions are 
offered (in italics) into how these could be progressed. 
The existing split between the way success and failure factors are researched and reported 
is confusing. A recommendation to combine and rank the success and faffure factors fiito 
one fimnework has been made in Figure 2.7. It isfiniher suggested that thatprocess 
would be supported by the use ofa new single term that could be calibrated as both 
positive and negative. Somejactors werefound to edst in both categories ofsuccess and 
failure while others were only considered as beingpart of one. Failurefactors were 
described as the most critical of critical successfactors and these should be ideWled It 
is suggestedfrom the analysis of this research that a new critical of critical success 
factors would be the level of trust in the project teams and this would be dependent on 
severalfactor, such as the organisational structure. 
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Consider the use of additional success criteria as suggested in 'The Square Route'. It is 
recommended that not all criteria need to be objective and quantifiable. Other, subjective 
criteria such as using the concept ofprudence should also be encouraged and research 
could be conducted to ident6 the requirements ofall the stakeholders. 
The inclusion of the criteria: costý quality and time, in most of the descriptions for project 
management, could produce a misleading perception insofar that these criteria may be the 
focus and the only criteria to be used to measure success. It is suggested that a 
desaiptionfor project management which does not limit thefocus to these criteria may 
help prevent any misunderstanding about how success could be measured Examples of 
this can be seenftom Ward: 'It is an interdisciplinmyprocess ofachieving a 
safiVQzctory endresult', and Turner 'it is the conversion of vision into reality. The 
definition suggested by the author & project management involves the application of 
knowledge, skills and intuition to deliver an acceptable product or change. 
Adopt a more flexible method of defining aims and objectives at the start of an IS projec4 
in keeping with the Rapid Application Development (RAD) method. At the sarne thm 
the objectives must be shared by all participant& This will increase the level of bust at the 
start of the project which, was found to be associated with having clear, but not rigid 
objectives. The developmev of a project initiation docwnent, the ideal contents of that 
need to be identified asJurther research needs to be trailed This wuld include a study 
into the degree to which; stakeholders are prepared toforgo, their specific requirements 
in the searchfor agreedproject objectives. 
Dissolving rather than resolving the ability of tearns to irnprove self-interest would 
increase the focus on project or business objectives, rather than tearn objectives. It is 
proposed that this could prevent teams from behaving at the lowest level of trust 
(calculus), where there is a chance to use oppoftw&ip behaviour against other teams 
who are vulnerable to the actions of others. This requires the design of a non-zero surn 
finitely repeated project environment madq possible by having forgiveness in place of 
penalty clauses. However, total or blind trust is not desirable and some controls will 
always need to be used to prevent the chance of spectacular failures. It is suggested that 
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the controls which would support this include those available at the start of a project. 
These include having a rigorous team selection process thatprovides a triangulation of 
evidence that both technical ability andfiducimy trust are at the required levels Yhese 
4pe of controls are ofthe preventative rather than disciplina7y nature. It isfw1her 
suggested that the level of penalty that an incfividual or team would be given to prevent 
themfrom not co-operating should be considered For example, in Project Par-adox 
scenarios the rank order of the Payoffs maintained the 'essential tension'of the 
Pfisoner's Dilemma Howuver, the Payoff value of -10 may have been afisk worth 
taking not to co-operate. It would be interesting to iden* the threshold Payoff value 
for 'Punishment'that wvuld influenced the level ofco-operation; this being an example 
of a preventative control, 
Benefits have been linked to long-term project teams. Currently they are kno'AM to give 
the teams a chance to ir=ease the level of tnist from calculus to knowledge-based bug 
and possibly to the highest level of identification-based trust. This initiative could include 
a comparison between research variables such as using Istrong'and 'weakmatrix 
project structures. Part of that research could inchide the impact to the success rate of 
ISprojeas when consultants are involveg since they would be a component ofa Wak' 
matrbc. 
Improved levels of information and communications were linked to an increase in co- 
operation and trust. All options to facilitate information flow and conununication 
channels between tearns should be considered. For example, information is unlikely to 
be either complete orperfect. However, it has been shmm that mistrust develops if 
people believe or discover that information has been mithheld To overcome this, it is 
suggested that communication between the project manager and the team members 
either via anonymous questionnaires or interviem should take place to iden* whether 
or not, staff have a concern about a lack of information The aim would be to enwe all 
stakeholders are not surprised by the outcome ofevents, since this has been linked to 
Poor communication At the same time, the stakeholders should be encouraged to accept 
a sub-optimum ofthe overall requirements since such an outcome could still result in 
the project being a considered to be a success. 
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The analysis from this research has shown that if the decision makers in project teams are 
subsequently affected by the decisions, they are likely to use rational econornic decision 
making to inform theirjudgernent, in an attempt to obtain the best for their team or 
personally. A recorntriendation. to address this problem is to use 'trusted intermediaries'. 
They could base their decisions from a neutral independent position and have the overall 
business or project aims uppennost in forming their decision making, rather than personal 
gain. Other researchers have indicated that there is no such thing as an independent 
thirdparty mthin aproject team It is suggested howver, that academics or a small 
team selectedfrom aprofessional body couldprovide advice to ISproject teams The 
question uvuld be, who uvuldpay and are they clearly independent? To overcome this 
it may be possiblefor organisations to contribute to afund of independent advisors that 
could be managed through professional bodies. 
Further develop Project Paradox into a group or flunily of games to test for additional 
types and levels oftrust. Ais could be achieved by the introduction of other trust games 
that simulate the 'one-shot'environment and one that requires sequential rather than 
simultaneous decisions needed by the Prisoner's Dilemma Different types of decisions 
are taken in ISprojecis and extending Project Paradox to include these would ensure a 
more representative view ofa team orproject environment trustKorthiness, the results of 
which could be included in the Trust. 4 Wit 
Consider additional tearn building activities. Fiduciary trust is the type being tested during 
outdoor team building activities. However, team members are unlikely to let others 
become irýured in these type of exercises. The VAx oftrust that project teams have been 
observed to use has been demonstrated to be rational economic (calcWus trust). 
Including a game such as Project Paradox as part of team building wo uld increase the 
benefits ofsuch activities, as the teann would understand the ramiji'cations of both 
social and economic types of twt. 
Include trust as part of a formal risk schedule. Research indicates project managers use 
the left hemisphere of the brain in preference to the right hemisphere in work related 
activities. Tnist is afitctor that wM reside in the right hemisphere, however, includffig 
trust in a risk schedule will transfer it to a technical task Le. those controlled by the left 
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hemisphere of the brain, the side found to be used most by IS project managers. A 
firamework was presented in Chapter 8 that demonstrated how a questionnaire targeted 
at the stakeholders ofan IS project would indicate the level and type of1rust in the team 
and organisation. From this it would be possible to indicate whether the risk of low trust 
existed and that some appropriate risk management should be carried out. 
9.4.1 Concluding Rcmarks 
The dependency on accurate and timely information systems continues to increase while the 
success rate for IS projects remains low. This research has concluded with II initiatives to 
help address the problem. 
Thc key finding from this research relates to the importance of identifying trust as a risk 
within IS project management; a factor that was previously ignored before this research 
started and that now requires fiulher research. It is recommended that the practical 
appfication of both the Project Paradox simulation and the Trust Audit, will contribute 
towards educating the IS community about the issues of trust as a critical success factor. 
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Appendix A 
Subiects covered by the UK APM BoK (1995) 
Project management Organisation 
& People 
SyAems Managcrnent Orgmisational Dcsign 
Programme Management Control & Co-ordination 
Project Management Communications 
Project Life Cycle Leadership 
Project Environment Delegation 
Project Strategy Team Building 
o ect Appraisal 
Project Success 
Failure Criteria 
Integration 
C(xiflict Management 
Negotiation 
Management 
Development 
Systems & 
Procedures 
Close Out 
Post Project Appraisal 
Techniques & General Management 
& Procedures 
Work Definition Operational/Technical 
Management 
Planning Marketing & Sales 
Scheduling Finance 
Estimating Information Technology 
Cost Control Law 
Performance Procurement 
Measurement 
Risk Management Quality 
Value Management Safety 
Change Control Industrial Relations 
Mobilisation 
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A12pendix B 
Subiects covered bv UK BoK (2000) 
I General --7ý 
Project Management Programme Management Project Context 
I Strategic 
Project Success Criteria Risk Management 
Stratcgy/Project Management Plan Quality Management 
Value Management Health, Safety& Environment 
Control Technical Commercial Organisational People, 
71 
Control: Work Content and Scope Management, Time Scheduling/Phasing, Resource 
Management, Budgeting & Cost Management Change Control, Earned Value 
Management, Information Management 
Technical: Design, Implementation & Hand- Over Management, Requirements Management. 
Estimating, Technology Management, Value Engineering, Modelling & Testing. 
Configuration Management 
Commercial: Business Case, Marketing & Sales, Financial Management, Procurement, Legal 
Awareness. 
Organisation: Life Cycle Design & Management Opportunity, Design & Development, 
Implementation, Hand-over, (Post) Project Evaluation Review (O&W(Lsý 
Organisation Structure, Organisational Roles. 
People: Communication, Teamwork, Leadership, Conflict Management, Negotiation, 
Personnel Management 
Opportunity Design & Implementation d-over Post-project 
Identification Development 
\ 
Evaluation 
Concept/ Feasibility Design, Modellin Make, Build esý Opaution & 
Marketing Bid 
/ 
& Procurement & Test Cc Commission Maintcnancel 
, S St, tzar; -up integrated 
1,09istics Support 
Source: Morris, P. W. G. & Dixon, M. (2000) 
249 
Appendix C 
Proffle of management writers Source: Crainer (1998) 
A, uthor What 
Bower Tearnworking 
Carnegie Communication 
Champy Roles, style and systems 
Dernming Quality 
Drucker Management by objectives 
Henderson Cash management 
Juran Quality: 
Ohmae Strategy 
Peters Excellence 
Taylor Scientific management 
Barnard Organisation objectives 
Fayol 6 Principles 
Geneen Unshakeable facts/analysis 
Matsushita Customer service 
Packard Involvement/leadership 
Sloan Management structures 
Watson Jr Company beliefs as core values 
Ansoff Strategic plarming 
Argyris Organisation learning 
Bennis Leadership 
Handy Managing chance 
Herzberg Motivation 
Jaques Objectives 
Kanter 
Kotler Marketing fitriction 
Levitt Marketing 
Lewin Change 
McGregor Motivation 
Maslow Motivation 
Mayo Motivation 
Porter Strategy 
Pascale Management framework 
Minzberg Roles of management 
How 
Trust 
Sincerity 
Critical measures of performance 
Statistics, trust 
Educating 
Boston Square business model 
Self-supervision 
Use ofkey Factors 
Freewheeling project-based structures 
Planning and control of every action 
Communicating 
4 Activities 
Meetings, information 
Focus upon benefits 
Management by Wandering Around, 
Strategic business units, education 
Polices, practices, goals 
Task and Gap analysis 
Staff learning built intojobs 
Vision, trust, communication and learning 
information, Intelligence and Ideas 
Understanding hygiene and motivation factors 
Responsibility for long term decisions 
Empowering individuals 
Using different product perspectives 
Focus upon customer not the product 
T(raining) groups 
Theory X (lazy) theory Y (reliable) 
Levels of personal needs. Clear goalslobjectives 
Teamwork and communication 
Customer, costs, clear goals 
7S model. Based on Systems(3) and people(4) 
Interpersonal, Informational, 
Decisional, Scheduling and Negotiating 
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Appendix D 
Organisations who contnibuted and did not request anonytrdty 
AT&T 
Lloyds-TSB 
Zurich Municipal 
Portman Building Society 
Government Crown Agents 
Sema. Group 
Booker Belmont Wholesale 
Consultants MCP 
Reuters 
Exel Logistics 
AMP 
Glaxo Wellcome 
British Airways 
Ministry of Defence Director General of Information Technology Systerns 
Shell UK Ltd 
AGF Insurance 
names Water 
Lombard 
Group 4 
Bull Information Systems Ltd (Integris) 
Royal Mail 
Eldridge Pope 
Reed Personnel 
P&0 Properties 
Intel 
Barclays 
Ordnance Survey 
National radiological protection board 
Rank Xerox 
Vosperthomycroft Control Ltd 
ICL 
Poole Hospital 
Marks and Spencer 
SC Johnson Wax Ltd 
National Health Service Trust 
Banque Nationale DeParis 
Other replies were received from companies who were prepared to provide data but 
requested anonymity. Those were major conTanies who represented the Mowing sectors: 
publishing, insurance, cosmetics, manufacturers, information providers, breway, 
confectioners and the arts. 
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Appendix E 
Questionnaire 1 (252-256) 
252 
r.. z 
Successful IS Project Management 
The aim of this re§earch study is to understand the decisionvariables and their influence in the successful 
implementation of ISAT development projects. The meaning of the word project in this questionnaire is 
limited to that boundary. The results from this questionnaire will enable the identification of some of those 
variables which will provide a focus for detailed research to be conducted. 
A successful project for the purpose of this research would be one that met the agreed business 
requirements. 
The research report will not attribute any remark or reply to any individual, organisation or company. 
Thank you for taking time for this research. 
Roger Atkinson 
Question I 
How many successful projects have you been involved in within the last five years: 
Question 2 
How many un-successful projects have you been involved in within the last five years: 
L 
Question 
When you begin orjoin a project, what are your expectations of success? 
Low success 12345 lEgh success 
"Pectations 00000 expecmdons 
Forquestions 4 to 13 please base your reply on only one successful project with which you were involved. 
Question 
1: youT opinion, what were the three most important factors that influenced the successful implementation Of the project? 
Question 
253 
a) Was a project management mediodology used? 
0 Yes 
0 No 
b) If yes, which methodology? 
Question 6 
a) Was a systems development methodology. used? 
0 Yes 
0 No 
b) If yes, which methodology? 
Question 7 
a) Were any CASE tools used? 
0 Yes 
0 No 
b) If Yes, which CASE tools? 
i-- :1 
Question 8 
What was your involvement in that project? For example, PM, User, Technical Supplier 
r- - L 
Question 9 
In which of the five broad financial bands did that project belong? 
0 Up to E50,000 
0 Between; E50,000 and E100,000 0 Between E100, ()Oo and; E1,000,000 
Between E1,000,000 and E10,000,000 
OverflO, 000,000 
Question io 
234 
How many full time project staff were employed? 
El 
Question 11 
a) Were extemal consul=ts used at any stage of the project? 
Yes 
No 
b) If yes, please Est the stages. 
Question 12 
How long did the project take from start to successful implementation? 
EDyrs r7Mths 
Question 13 
To what extent was ihe project solution based on bespoke or Off The Shelf (OTS) packages? Please select I or 5 as appropriate. If a combination of bespoke and OTS was used, please select 2 to 4 to indicate the balance as appropriate. 
Bespoke 12345 OTS 00000 
Question 14 
In your opinion do you believe trust between project team members or others involved with the project to be of importance? 
Trust not 12345 Trust is 
Lýnporýnt 00000 important 
Question 15 
Have you, during the life of projects in the last five years, felt that trust had been broken? 
No Project 12345 All Projects 
CLe. Never) 00000 (i. e. Each and Every Project) 
255 
Question 16 
Do you consider management controls are capable of compensating for a lack of trust? 
0 Yes 
0 No 
Question 17 
What criteria would you consider using when judging wbether a project was successful? 
Question 18 
In your opinion, over the last five years was the trend more or less likely that a project would be 
successful? 
Less likely 1234: 5 More likely 00000 
Question 19 
Please provide any further infonnation you believe to be a variable likely to influence the success of a 
project. 
0 
c4jJ 't 14 \ J 
Question 20 
If you have been involved with an un-successful project, in your opinion, was anything overlooked, forgotten or missed? Please give examples as appropriate. 
256 
Optional 
Please supply the details requested below if you would consider answering a further questionnaire. 
Name: 
II 
Address: 
37 
Telephone: 
Submit QueLtjio2ný Clear All Values -S= Again 
Roger AtIdnson 
Department of Information Systems 
The Business School 
Bournemouth University 
Talbot Campus 
Poole 
Dorset 
BH12 5BB 
Tel: 01202 595582 
Fax: 01202 595036 
E-mail: ratldnso(@bournemouth. ac. uk 
This document last updated on Mon Mar 18 1996 12.41: 01 by Dr. Adrian R. Warman 
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Appendix F 
Questionnaire 2 (258-262) 
.1 Is 8 
1ý0 
EAJ() 
(FOR) 
WN, 
W 
E 
Successful IS Project Management 
r1muk you for taking time for this researclL 
ýoger Atkinson Senior Lecturer 'llm Business Scbool 
Questions] -3: Aboutyou 
Question I 
How many successfid projects have you been involved in within the last five years? 
Quesfion 2 
Haw many failed projects have you been involved in within the last five years? 
............... failed projects 
Questions 3 
In total how many years have you project managed? 
............... Years 
259 
Questions4-13: About aspecificprojed 
Question 4 
What were the criteria gainst which success was measured? 
Question 5 
In your opinion, what were the most important factors leading to success ? 
............................................................................................................................................................. I 
FQ--ue; Won 6 
ject management methodologies used? Please circle as appropriate Were any prq 
Yes No 
If Yes, which? .............................................................................................................................. 
Questions 7- 
Were any systems development methodologies used? Please circle as appropriate 
Yes No 
If Yes, which? .............................................................................................................................. 
Questions 8 
Were any CASE tools used? Please circle as appropriate 
Yes No 
If Yes, which? ...................................................................................................................................... 
Project Management PhD Questionnaire Il 2 
L 
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Question 9 
In which of the five broad financial bands did the project belong, Please circle as appropriate 
1. up to 150,000 
2. Between L50,000 and 000,000 
3. Between L100,000 and L1,000,000 
4. Between L1000,000 and L10,000,000 
5. Over 110,000,000 
Question 10 
How many staff were employed? 
............... number of staff 
Question 11 
Please list any stages during which consultants were employed 
I ............................................................................................................................................................. I 
Question 12. 
What was the elapsed tune for the project from start to implementation 
............... Years ............... Months 
Question 13 
To what extent was the project solution based on bespoke or Off-the-shelf (OTS) packages? Plem 
circle I to 5 to indicate the balance as appropriate. 
Bespoke 12345 OTS package(s) 
PrOject Management PhD Questionnaire Il 
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Questions 14 - 19. - Any project 
Question 14 
In your opinion, do you believe trust between team members or others involved with a project to be of 
importance to achieving the success criteria ? Please circle as appropriate. 
Trust is Important 12345 Trust is not important 
kýeWoii 1-5 
Have you during the lifie of a project believed trust to have been broken or lost? Please circle as 
appropriate 
No Projects 12345 All Projects 
If Yes please describe the cause ................................. ........................................................................... 
Question 16 
DO you consider management controls. are capable of compensating for a lack of U= ? Please circle 
as appropriate. 
Yes No 
Quesdon 17 
What mteria would you consider using to meas= whether a project was successful 
I Qw-iio-nis 
I In Your (Tinion. is the ft-end for pmject management to be less or inore likely to be successful? 
Less likely 12345 More likely 
I Please suggest what you believe has caused the trend 
Project Management PhD Questionnaire II 
. 1W 
r-Q-uestion 19 
When starting a new project it is likely that you will make some assumptions which would lulvc to 
come true to improve the likelihood of project success. Please list any assumptions you make M-hcu 
starting a new project. E. g. staff wiH remain until project completion. 
Question 20 Failedprojects 
F6We-stion 20 
The cause or reason for project failure may have been because some task was carried out incorrecti) 
i. e. a sin of commission- It is also possible that the reason for project failure was because some task 
was forgotten i. e. a sin of omission. Please list any sins of omission which in your view may have 
contributed to the failure of any ISAT projects. 
Signature of person completing questionnaire ..................................................................... 
Please send replies to: 
Roger Atkinson 
The Business School 
Bournemouth University 
Christchurch House 
Talbot Campus 
Poole Dorset BH12 5BB 
Tel: 01202 595582 
E-mail ratkinso@boumemouth. ac. uk 
Project Management PhD Questionnaire US 
hý 
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_ vvendix 
G 
Project Paradox Rubric (264) 
264 
The Project Management Business Game 
Welcome to work. You have been selected to join a new project in one of three important Toles. Ile 
project executive have decided to operate the project within a formal project management style and 
structure. The executive are also aware of the dangers of following in a prescriptive way a rigid 
method and have agreed terms with the project manager which provides for some intelligent, loose 
interpretation of formal guidelines. Accordingly Senior Business, Senior Technical and Senior 
User positions within the project have been created. You will fulfil one of these posts. Project 
PARADOX is to introduce a new global information systems network for a newly merged business 
venture in travel and sport holidays. The new company is GLAX-Oil Holidays Ltd. The two original 
established companies have been involved in the manufacturing industry, but both believed however 
the time seemed right to expand into the growing leisure and travel service industry. 
Working for you are a team of highly dedicated, motivated and educated project stafE It is likely that 
you may also have the opportunity to bring with you one or two staff from your previous projects. 
This is now accepted as usual business practice. Take it for granted that your team can and will 
provide the best advice and support possible. Your colleagues, the other two Senior Directors also 
have teams equally capable of providing support within their functional areas. 
The task as always is to implement the project on-time, within budget and to the agreed quality 
criteria as yet to be agreed. Within the organisation is a performance related bonus Scheme which 
relates to the three Senior Directors and their stafE If you are seen to be performing well as a unit, 
team rewards are yours. 'ne other directors have the same contract as you and their staff will also 
personally benefit if they can demonstrate a high performance within the life ofthe projecL 7bc 
performance related pay (PRP) measurement scheme will be awarded on a did-you-do-it-right basis. 
Ibis requires the project to be on-time to budget and with quality requirements. Other possible 
Project success criteria, reflecting did-you-get-it-right, will not be considered for the PRP. That is to 
Say for example, did the end-users like the end product or did the results of the post implementation 
review, held 6 months after project closure, indicate the system was accurate and supported business 
targets. The project will be split into seven stages. The exact name of these stages is not important. 
You could consider for example the project to be managed using the one pass 'Waterfall' 
development method with stage names such as feasibility, design implementation following in 
sequence to completion. Using the Rapid Application Development (RAD) or Rapid Incremental 
Development (RID) method with seven iterations for decision making are other ways to consider the 
project. 
The matrix below in Table I indicates the possible decisions both you and your colleagues can make 
and the resultant bonus or penalty each decision will yield to both you and them. 
Table 1 
BuAwu V 300 'Y -100 -1 Y -100 Y -100 N 1500 N . 250 'N 250 -N -10 Technical Y300 - Y-100 N -5M- N 250 Y-10V-Y-100,, 
N 250 ', N-iO 
User Y'300 N 500 Y -100 N 250 Y -100 N 250 Y -100 N -10 
Good Luck 
RogerAtkbison PrqjcdManagw=tBusiz=Ga= 1997 C 
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Appendix H 
Examples of Feedback from Ile European Aeronautic Defence and Space (EADS) 
Systems and Defence Electronics 
Run in Germany Nov. 2003 after participating in a Project Paradox Workshop. 
A positive contribution would be achieved at 'all' levels of the organisation hierarchy by 
'all' functional occupational classes participating in Project Paradox workshops. 
Taking part in Project Paradox workshops influenced how working in teams in the future 
would provide confidence from the beginning but beware of 'dirty tricks' and abuse of 
confidence. 
As a result of participation in Project Paradox workshops the following emergent 
learning and issues related to trust were reported. 'Once broken there is no way back to 
trust and co-operate'. 'Without trust there is no way forward for a project and fiOure is 
the outcome: no satisfaction and no benefit to anyone'. 'Iftrust and co-operation can be 
built, then the project will move fast and successfully'. 
'It is easy to lose the trust ofother people but very difficult to earn it again. 
'Each member of an organisation can make a positive contribution because each mernber 
has different experiences and therefore a different behaviour in project work: the 
workshop is a good way to analyse this behavior. 
'I think the environment created in this workshop was very realistic'. 
The most appropriate time to participate in a Project Paradox workshop would be either 
'... before joining a project team or ... during 
induction'. 
Taking part in a Project Paradox workshop influenced the approach to working in teams 
in the future because 'I will always co-operate initially instead of simply weighing up the 
best way of achieving own ends'. 
'I learned that it is always better to trust initW. 
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